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Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to provide detection and estimation techniques in order to ensure the
safety and security of modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) even in the presence of arbitrary sensors
faults and attacks. We leverage the fact that modern CPS are equipped with various sensors that provide
redundant information about the system's state. In such a setting, the system can limit its dependence on
any individual sensor, thereby providing guarantees about its safety even in the presence of arbitrary
faults and attacks.
In order to address the problem of safety detection, we develop sensor fusion techniques that make use
of the sensor redundancy available in modern CPS. First of all, we develop a multidimensional sensor
fusion algorithm that outputs a bounded fusion set which is guaranteed to contain the true state even in
the presence of attacks and faults. Furthermore, we provide two approaches for strengthening sensor
fusion's worst-case guarantees: 1) incorporating historical measurements as well as 2) analyzing sensor
transmission schedules (e.g., in a time-triggered system using a shared bus) in order to minimize the
attacker's available information and impact on the system. In addition, we modify the sensor fusion
algorithm in order to provide guarantees even when sensors might experience transient faults in addition
to attacks. Finally, we develop an attack detection technique (also in the presence of transient faults) in
order to discard attacked sensors.
In addition to standard plant sensors, we note that modern CPS also have access to multiple environment
sensors that provide information about the system's context (e.g., a camera recognizing a nearby
building). Since these context measurements are related to the system's state, they can be used for
estimation and detection purposes, similar to standard measurements. In this dissertation, we first
develop a nominal context-aware filter (i.e., with no faults or attacks) for binary context measurements
(e.g., a building detection). Finally, we develop a technique for incorporating context measurements into
sensor fusion, thus providing guarantees about system safety even in cases where more than half of
standard sensors might be under attack.
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ABSTRACT
CONTEXT-AWARE SENSOR FUSION FOR SECURING CYBER-PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS
Radoslav Svetlozarov Ivanov
Insup Lee
James Weimer
The goal of this dissertation is to provide detection and estimation techniques in
order to ensure the safety and security of modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
even in the presence of arbitrary sensors faults and attacks. We leverage the fact that
modern CPS are equipped with various sensors that provide redundant information
about the system’s state. In such a setting, the system can limit its dependence
on any individual sensor, thereby providing guarantees about its safety even in the
presence of arbitrary faults and attacks.
In order to address the problem of safety detection, we develop sensor fusion
techniques that make use of the sensor redundancy available in modern CPS. First of
all, we develop a multidimensional sensor fusion algorithm that outputs a bounded
fusion set which is guaranteed to contain the true state even in the presence of
attacks and faults. Furthermore, we provide two approaches for strengthening sensor
fusion’s worst-case guarantees: 1) incorporating historical measurements as well as
2) analyzing sensor transmission schedules (e.g., in a time-triggered system using a
shared bus) in order to minimize the attacker’s available information and impact on
the system. In addition, we modify the sensor fusion algorithm in order to provide
guarantees even when sensors might experience transient faults in addition to attacks.
Finally, we develop an attack detection technique (also in the presence of transient
faults) in order to discard attacked sensors.
In addition to standard plant sensors, we note that modern CPS also have access
to multiple environment sensors that provide information about the system’s context
vi

(e.g., a camera recognizing a nearby building). Since these context measurements are
related to the system’s state, they can be used for estimation and detection purposes,
similar to standard measurements. In this dissertation, we first develop a nominal
context-aware filter (i.e., with no faults or attacks) for binary context measurements
(e.g., a building detection). Finally, we develop a technique for incorporating context
measurements into sensor fusion, thus providing guarantees about system safety even
in cases where more than half of standard sensors might be under attack.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The steady advancements in sensing, actuating and computing technology over the
past few decades have enabled the development of increasingly sophisticated systems.
In fact, fully or partially autonomous systems can now be found in multiple and
diverse applications such as aircraft [70], automobiles [201], surgical systems [203],
smart grids [40], drones [2] and robotics [202]. What is common between all these
systems is the tight coupling of hardware and software capabilities and constraints
as well as the combination of heterogeneous components with various assumptions
and guarantees about their performance. This great complexity has highlighted the
need for the theory of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) at the intersection of control
and information theory, formal methods and embedded systems.
As the autonomy of modern CPS increases, however, so does the concern about
their safety – all of the examples cited in the previous paragraph are systems that
are in direct contact with or operate in the presence of people. What is more, safety
worries are not just a theoretical artifact; deadly CPS crashes have occurred due to
failures of components at all levels of system design, including sensors, actuators,
software and human operators (or any combination thereof). The following list
contains some recent examples of such failures:
• Sensor faults. An example of such a failure was the recent Tesla autonomous
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driving crash on May 7, 2016 during which the Tesla driver was killed. Investigators concluded that the crash was (partly) due to the inability of the camera
to recognize cross traffic (Tesla avoided blame as their Autopilot system was
not responsible for handling cross traffic) [8].
• Actuator faults. We illustrate this class of failures with an example from
medical CPS due to their high safety-criticality. The widely used Da Vinci
Surgical System [203] was forced to perform a major recall of some parts due
to an increased number of accidents. The main cause of malfunction was
friction within certain instruments that affects the surgeon’s actions [6, 166].
• Imperfect human-CPS interaction. Several aircraft accidents were caused to a
different degree by this type of failure. One of the most notable is the crash
of Air France Flight 447 off the coast of Brazil on June 1, 2009. According to
the official report, the reason for the accident was the deadly combination of
incorrect speed readings by the pitot tubes and an inadequate reaction by the
crew [63].
The problem of ensuring system safety is further exacerbated by security concerns – due to the quickly rising number of their applications (including military
and medical applications), modern CPS are increasingly being subjected to malicious attacks preventing them from correctly performing their tasks. In fact, the
potential attack surface has considerably grown with the introduction of computationally powerful and interconnected components. On the one hand, since CPS
consist of both physical and cyber components that perform critical functions, they
are by definition vulnerable to all conventional physical attacks such as breaking
or tampering with a certain part as well as standard cyber attacks such as buffer
overflow or denial of service. At the same time, multiple cyber-physical attacks exploiting the interaction between the two layers (e.g., communication vulnerabilities
or flawed estimation/control approaches) have now been carried out as well. A few
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notable classes of CPS-specific attacks are listed below:
• Sensor spoofing. In this class of attacks, sensor measurements are altered by
manipulating the system’s environment, including the communication medium.
Examples of this attack include a yacht that was carried off course due to
spoofed GPS readings [172] as well as the RQ-170 Sentinel drone that was
captured in Iran [164, 182] (while the details of the capture are not publicly
available, it is widely believed that hijackers captured the drone through jamming the GPS signal).
• Software vulnerabilities. As demonstrated by the Stuxnet virus [77], critical
industrial infrastructure could be disabled by exploiting software bugs and
thereby gaining control of key components.
• Communication protocol vulnerabilities. In some systems, e.g., automotive
CPS, it is possible for the attacker to compromise the entire system by gaining
access to the internal network and exploiting communication vulnerabilities
such as the lack of authenticity in the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus [47,
119].
As illustrated in the above examples, modern CPS can crash in multiple and
unpredictable ways, caused both by arbitrary failures as well as by malicious attacks.
Furthermore, these crashes are often caused not just by a single component failing
but by a combination of Byzantine faults or crafty attacks that are difficult to detect
or prevent. Therefore, it is clear that there is a need for a unifying theory for
the design and analysis of modern CPS – this theory needs to not only ensure the
safety of these systems under nominal conditions but it also has to provide safety
and security guarantees even in the presence of unknown faults and attacks in the
individual components.

3

1.1

High-Level Goal

As described in the previous section, ensuring the safety and security of modern
CPS requires considering all possible interactions of the system’s components as
well as all possible ways in which these components can fail or be attacked. As a
first step towards addressing this daunting task, we focus on a crucial aspect of any
autonomous system’s operation, namely providing precise information about its state
and context. Precise information (e.g., a vehicle’s location estimate) is a necessary
condition for guaranteeing the system’s safety – for example, it is not possible to
ensure automobiles will not crash in traffic that cannot be detected; similarly, a
boat cannot guarantee it will reach its destination if its location measurements are
spoofed. Thus, the goal of this dissertation is to develop a general approach for
detecting when the system is unsafe or insecure; furthermore, this technique needs
to provide guarantees about the system’s safety regardless of the fact that some
system components might be faulty/attacked.
To state the above goal more concretely, consider a system (e.g., a robot), denoted
by S, operating in an environment E (e.g., surrounding people and obstacles) in the
presence of a possible attacker A; the scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The
system consists of the three typical components of any autonomous system: (1) a
plant (including actuators), (2) sensors, and (3) a control algorithm. The system has
an internal state, denoted by xk , signifying various aspects of its execution at time
k such as location, velocity, etc. The state evolves (in discrete time) as a function of
the previous state and the applied inputs:
xk+1 = f (xk , uk ),

(1.1)

where uk is the control input and f is a function mapping current states and inputs to
future states. The controls uk are computed by the control algorithm as a function,
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the system architecture considered in this dissertation. The
system operates in an environment that may include people, obstacles, etc. Sensors are available to measure both the plant and the environment’s states. At the
same time, a malicious attacker might be able to compromise all vulnerable system
components. In this dissertation, we assume attacks can occur in sensors only.
denoted by g, of all received measurements:
uk = g(y0:k ),

(1.2)

where y0:k denotes all measurements received from time 0 up to k. The system has
sensors available for measuring both the system and the environment’s state such
that at each time k, the received measurements yk are:
yk = h(xk , xE
k ),

(1.3)

where xE
k is the environment’s state, which contains relevant elements to the system,
e.g., location of people and obstacles, nearby buildings, texture of surface. The
environment’s state also evolves in time according to some (unknown) dynamics.
Finally, as shown by the examples in the previous section, the attacker might
compromise multiple system components and modify their behavior in an arbitrary
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way. At the same time, such an all-powerful attacker makes the problem of providing
any kinds of guarantees about the system undecidable. Thus, to keep the problem
tractable and as justified in the following section, we assume attacks can occur in
sensors only.
Given the description of the three of entities in Figure 1.1, the control algorithm’s
task is to reach a desired state (e.g., a destination), while preserving a given safety
property psaf e , which is a predicate on the system and environment’s states (e.g.,
the robot should not collide with people). The control algorithm is split into three
components: (1) a state estimator that estimates the system’s state and (2) a detector that raises alarms when the system is unsafe or under attack; the estimator and
detector’s outputs are in turn used by the (3) controller in order to compute control
inputs for the actuators. This modular design is preferred in most systems to a unified control approach (e.g., optimal control using dynamic programming [26]) due
to its greater flexibility. While classical optimal control techniques such as dynamic
programming might find the optimal control policy in many scenarios, they become
computationally intractable (or even undecidable) in the case of faults and attacks.
The modular formulation, on other hand, can handle such scenarios by ensuring that
each of the three components provides guarantees about its output (e.g., the detector does not raise any safety false alarms) – thus the control algorithm can provide
guarantees on its final output as well (e.g., the state will be within some epsilon from
the desired state).
As described at the beginning of this section, the high-level problem is
to develop detection and estimation techniques for establishing whether
the system is safe and secure, i.e., for the property psaf e . These techniques
must also provide guarantees about their performance even in the presence of
faulty/attacked system components (the exact form of these guarantees is stated
in Section 1.5; an example is that the detector never says psaf e is true when it is false,
i.e., there are no false alarms). Given these guarantees on the estimator and detec-
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tor components, it is assumed that the controller component is developed in
such a way so as to ensure the overall task of the control algorithm.

1.2

Challenges for Detection and Estimation in
Modern CPS

Designing estimators and detectors for general CPS with arbitrary models is a challenging task. First of all, since CPS are a subset of the broad class of control systems, they present the standard challenges involved with modeling complex systems,
namely that if the f and h functions are non-linear or discontinuous, then few optimal and computationally tractable algorithms exist. In addition, actual CPS never
behave according to their models – sensors and actuators experience faults, control
code has bugs, and systems are often subjected to malicious attacks on multiple
components. This subsection lists two of the main CPS-specific challenges for detection and estimation algorithms as well as the corresponding simplifying assumptions
that we make in order to make these challenges manageable.

1.2.1

Detection and Estimation in the Presence of Faults

As mentioned before, all system components experience faults during their lifetime.
For the purpose of this discussion, a fault is defined as any behavior that does not
match the system model, i.e., the component’s expected behavior. Faults are dangerous because they disrupt system performance – since most systems are developed
with a given (parameterized) model/expectation in mind, faults may render these
systems unsafe and lead to crashes. Faults can be transient and recover on their own
(e.g., a GPS losing signal in a tunnel but regaining it after that) but can also be
permanent and irreparable (e.g., a broken actuator).
In some well-studied systems, it might be possible to plan for faults and react
accordingly. However, given the complexity of modern CPS, it is impossible to
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predict and guard against all kinds of faults in such systems. Therefore, it is difficult
to justify any assumption about the class or timing of faults in CPS. At the same
time, making no assumptions at all means the problem is undecidable – if faults are
allowed to happen at any time and in any way, then no control algorithm can meet
its goals in the worst case.
We alleviate this problem by restricting our attention to sensor faults only and
assuming that actuators (and other components) behave as modeled. As will be
explained in Section 1.3, the reason it is possible to provide guarantees even with
arbitrary sensor faults is that we can utilize the inherent sensor redundancy available
in modern CPS. On the other hand, no such redundancy can be exploited in actuators
or other components; thus, handling more general faults in actuators (and other
components) is left for future work.
Assumption. We assume that (arbitrary) faults can occur in sensors only. Actuators and other components are assumed to behave as modeled.

1.2.2

Detection and Estimation in the Presence of Attacks

Similar to faults, malicious attacks are another major challenge for CPS analysis
and development. Once an attacker finds a vulnerability in a component, it is often
possible to gain full control of that component and force it to behave in any desired
way. Thus, attacks are similar to faults in the sense that they force the attacked
component to behave unexpectedly. At the same time, they are different as they
are always targeted and malicious whereas faults are often benign and transient;
therefore, attacks require a special treatment when ensuring systems’ resilience.
Once again similar to the fault case, the problem of securing the system becomes
undecidable if we assume that attacks can occur in all components and in all ways.
To overcome this problem, we leverage the redundant-sensor framework as well –
similar to the previous subsection, we focus on sensor attacks only and leave the
problem of providing resilience to attacks on all components as part of future work.
8

Assumption. We assume that attacks can occur in sensors only. Actuators and
other components are assumed to behave as modeled.

1.3

Multi-Sensor Systems

As argued in the previous section, ensuring the safety of arbitrary CPS becomes
challenging when one considers the full generality of the problem. That is why, in
this dissertation we restrict our attention to faults/attacks in sensors only. Even in
this case, however, if sensors are modified by faults or attacks in a manner that causes
them to behave in unpredictable ways, then developing detection and estimation
techniques is not possible without additional assumptions. That is why, traditional
approaches usually make simplifying assumptions so as to scope the problem (a more
thorough review of related work is provided in Chapter 2); more specifically, at least
one of the following assumptions is made in most standard approaches to
fault/attack detection:
1. Rich training data containing attacks/faults is available. Such systems are able to detect and recover from attacks and faults by examining and
learning from previous occurrences of the same anomaly [46].
2. The system nominally operates in a known state. This a very common
assumption in related works, including intrusion detection systems [22, 131,
137], fault detection approaches [221], etc. Starting from a known nominal
condition allows these approaches to perform a variant of change detection
where an alarm is raised when an unexpected/unlikely behavior is observed.
3. The fault/attack has a known effect or comes from a known class of
faults/attacks. This assumption makes it possible to design detectors aimed
specifically at these classes of faults/attacks (e.g., by detecting a change of
system parameters [23, 24, 177, 178]).
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While the above assumptions might be reasonable in simpler or well-understood
systems, they are difficult to justify in modern CPS. In particular, as shown in the
introductory examples, CPS can fail in intricate and unpredictable ways that have
not been observed before (thus invalidating assumptions 1 and 3). In addition, they
are designed to operate in hostile and rough environments – in fact, these systems can
never assume they are in known nominal states (assumption 2) since undetected data
injection attacks can produce arbitrary errors in nominal state estimation algorithms,
e.g., in the case of a perfectly attackable system [128, 147].
This is why, in this dissertation we do not make any of the above assumptions
and take a different approach, namely we leverage the fact that modern CPS are
equipped with multiple sensors that can be used to provide redundant information
about certain aspects of the system’s state (e.g., a GPS and an IMU can both be
used to estimate speed, even though neither one measures it directly). In this setup,
the dependence on any individual sensor can be reduced – while some sensors might
provide spurious data, whether due to a fault or an attack, the system will still be safe
if it uses the sensors that are operating normally. This means that no assumptions
are necessary about how and when faults/attacks might occur in any specific sensor,
information that might be difficult to obtain a priori.
At the same time, this framework comes at a cost as well – at least half of the
sensors must operate according to specification in order for the approach to work.
However, by developing multiple and diverse sensors, system designers can make it
unlikely for many sensors to fail at the same time. Increased sensor diversity also
makes it harder for an attacker to corrupt a large number of sensors; for example, all
known spoofing techniques, whether physical attacks [185] or cyber spoofing [47, 119],
require significant effort and time investment, which makes it difficult for attackers
to simultaneously control different sensors in a given system.
To better illustrate the benefit of multi-sensor systems, we now provide two examples of systems where multiple sensors are available. First consider the LandShark
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(a) The LandShark robot [7]. It has access
to five sensors that can be used to estimate
velocity: left and right encoders, an IMU, GPS
and a camera.

(b) Typical medical devices used in
an operating room: a pulse oximeter [4], a blood gas analyzer [3], an
infusion pump [1] and an anesthesia
machine [5].

Figure 1.2: Example systems with multiple sensors that can be used to estimate the
same variables.
robot [7], as illustrated in Figure 1.2a. The LandShark is a heavy-duty vehicle,
designed to operate on rough terrain and hostile territory; therefore, it needs to be
resilient to multiple kinds of sensor and actuator failures as well as malicious attacks.
The LandShark is equipped with five sensors: two wheel encoders, a GPS, an IMU
and a camera. While these sensors measure different physical variables, they can all
be used to estimate the vehicle’s velocity as well. Thus, if one of these sensors is
faulty or attacked, it might be possible to detect that its respective measurements
are inconsistent with the other sensors’ and raise an alarm.
Similarly, Figure 1.2b shows that modern operating rooms (ORs) also have multiple measuring devices as well. At minimum, a typical OR has a pulse oximeter [4],
a blood gas analyzer [3], an anesthesia machine [5] and an infusion pump [1]; depending on the case, other devices might be present as well such as a ventilator. These
devices provide clinicians with various data about the patient’s vital signs – although
it is not straightforward to map some vital signs to others, certain relationships between them can be used in order to conclude that a sensor is not behaving according
to specification (e.g., if the pulse oximeter is showing low hemoglobin oxygen saturation but the blood gas analyzer measured a high blood oxygen concentration, then
11

Figure 1.3: General architecture of a system with access to context measurements.
one of the two readings must be incorrect).
Combining data from diverse, but redundant, sensors lies in the broad field of
sensor fusion. The sensor fusion framework used in this dissertation is formalized in
Section 1.5. In the following section, we present another source of information that
can be used to enhance the capabilities of sensor fusion.

1.4

Context-Aware CPS

Although sensor redundancy enables us to avoid making unrealistic assumptions
about the occurrence of faults and attacks, it has its own limitations as well. In
particular, in order to provide guarantees about its output, it requires that at least
half of all sensors operate correctly – this is a theoretical barrier that cannot be
overcome without using additional information [78]. One such source of information
is state-related context that can be extracted from the system’s environment.
With the proliferation of sensing and computing technology, modern CPS have
access to a wealth of information about their environment as provided by their environment sensors. This information is rarely useful for estimation purposes since
it is too low-level and challenging to map to the state. However, given the recent
improvements in machine learning, it is now possible to obtain high-level representations of this information. For example, if a robot detects a known building using
image processing, the robot can conclude that it is near that building; similarly, if a
12

medical device raises an alarm that a vital sign is above a certain threshold, it might
be possible to conclude that the patient is in a critical state. Consequently, these
discrete-valued context data can be viewed as measurements of (functions of) the
system state, similar to conventional continuous sensors such as IMU or GPS (this
notion is illustrated in Figure 1.3). Thus, context measurements can be used for estimation and detection both as a single source of information and in scenarios when
some of the continuous plant sensors are noisy/biased (e.g., GPS in an urban environment [118] or medical sensors disrupted by moving artifacts [107]) or in security
applications when some sensors might be attacked (e.g., GPS spoofing [164]).
In this dissertation, we are specifically interested in binary measurements as an
important subclass of context measurements, i.e., each measurement takes on a value
of 1 or -1. Binary measurements capture a rich class of scenarios and events that
might occur during a system’s operation. Examples of binary context measurements
include a medical device alarm that a vital sign exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., if
the patient’s oxygen saturation is above a certain threshold, then the overall oxygen
content (the state) must be above a certain threshold [108]) as well as occupancy
grid mapping where a binary measurement is received as the robot gets close to an
obstacle [196].
Since using context measurements for estimation and detection purposes is a
novel idea in itself, one of the contributions of this dissertation is the development
of nominal estimation algorithms using context measurements (i.e., without faults
or attacks). In this setting, context measurements are defined as any binary data
that have a known probability of occurring given the system state. Context measurements are especially useful when they represent low-level data that cannot be
easily expressed as a function of the state (e.g., it is challenging to functionally map
raw images to the state of a robot) – thus, by using the probability distribution of
context measurements given the state, one may use them for estimation in a rigorous
manner.
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In addition to nominal state estimation, context measurements can be used to
enhance sensor fusion techniques for safety detection as well. Since we are interested
in providing worst-case guarantees in this framework, when a context measurement
is received, a set is constructed that contains all possible values for the true state
(e.g., a rectangle around a building inside which the building could be detected using
image processing). As formulated in the following section, this treatment of context
measurements fits exactly into the standard sensor fusion setup.

1.5

Problem Formulation

Having motivated the problem, the shortcomings of existing work as well as our
approach in the previous sections, in this section we summarize all components and
provide the specific problem statements addressed in this dissertation.

1.5.1

Problem Space

In order to provide context for the specific problem statements, we first outline the
general problem space of this dissertation. As described in Section 1.1, we focus
on the detection and estimation components of standard CPS that might
experience faults and attacks in their sensors only. At a high level, there are
four levels of increasing attack resilience in modern CPS (illustrated in Figure 1.4):
1. Nominal State Estimation. When no attacks are present (or suspected),
the system performs nominal state estimation.
2. Attack Prevention. This includes techniques such as encryption [65, 168,
180], authentication [14], trusted computing [123, 205] and others that attempt
to prevent attackers from disrupting the system’s performance.
3. Attack Detection and Resilient State Estimation. If the system operates
in a hostile environment where attacks are possible, then it needs to develop
14

Figure 1.4: Increasing levels of attack resilience in modern CPS. When the system is
under no threat of attacks, it performs nominal state estimation. If attacks might be
present, the system has access to attack prevention, attack detection, resilient state
estimation and, as a last line of defense, safety detection. This dissertation focuses
mostly on safety detection but also investigates related aspects of attack detection
and nominal context-aware estimation.
corresponding detection and estimation techniques. First of all, detectors are
developed for attacks in various system components. In addition, the system
performs resilient state estimation such that it provides guarantees on its state
estimates even if some sensors are under attack.
4. Safety Detection. Regardless of whether an attack exists, the system runs
the Safety Detection component in order to verify that it is in a safe state.
In this dissertation, we are primarily interested in item 4 in the above
list; safety detection can be considered as a last line of defense for the system –
even if attacks are present, the system might be able to avoid crashing if it can
detect when it is in an unsafe state. Furthermore, note that safety detection is
aided by attack detection as well – if a sensor is identified as attacked, it can be
discarded, thereby improving the performance of all other system components; thus,
we also develop techniques for sensor attack detection/identification. Finally, as noted in Section 1.4, we make use of context measurements in addition to
classical plant measurements; since no approaches exist to incorporate such discrete
measurements in estimation/detection algorithms, we develop a technique for
context-aware state estimation in the nominal case as well. Note that the
15

Figure 1.5: Overview of the problem space considered in this dissertation.
problems of resilient state estimation and attack prevention are not considered in
this dissertation – they are orthogonal to our approach and can be applied in parallel
with the techniques presented here (a review of the related work on both topics can
be found in Chapter 2).
Given this setup, we investigate multiple problems in this problem space. In
particular, as shown in Figure 1.5, we consider the three problems discussed above,
namely context-aware state estimation, attack detection and safety detection; in
addition, each problem is made more challenging by the existence of sensor faults,
which adds a second dimension to the problem space. The first problem in the
space is nominal state estimation when no attacks or faults exist – in this case
the problem we address is context-aware state estimation. If no attacks exist but
faults are introduced, then the system should perform a modified version of state
estimation by implementing some of the established Fault Detection, Isolation and
Reconfiguration (FDIR) techniques available in the literature [49, 80, 81, 103] (a
thorough review of FDIR approaches is provided in Chapter 2).
If the system operates in an environment where it might be subjected to attacks,
then it needs to perform attack detection. Once again, we distinguish between nominal attack detection where non-attacked sensors behave according to their models, on
the one hand, and attack detection in the presence of sensor faults, on the other. Note
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that both detection problems are very general – we do not make any assumptions
about the timing or class of sensor faults and attacks that the system might experience. As argued in Section 1.3 and as illustrated in Figure 1.6, the reason we can
address problems of this generality is the fact that we focus on multi-sensor systems
and leverage sensor redundancy in order to detect inconsistencies between sensor
measurements (as also noted in Section 1.3, the multi-sensor framework requires a
different assumption, namely that at least half of the sensors operate correctly).
Finally, as a last line of defense, we consider the problem of safety detection.
Similar to the other problems, here we also distinguish between the nominal case
where sensors behave according to their models and the case where sensors might
experience faults as well. In order to analyze the system’s safety, we employ sensor
fusion techniques – sensor fusion exploits sensor redundancy and provides worst-case
guarantees about the system’s safety regardless of the way some sensors might fail
or be attacked (again, assuming at least half of all sensors are correct). We investigate different ways of improving the output of sensor fusion such as incorporating
measurement history, including context measurements as well as analyzing different schedules of transmitting sensor measurements in order to limit the attacker’s
information.

1.5.2

Problem Statements

To formalize the problems considered in this dissertation, we first summarize the
system model components developed in Section 1.1 and make them more concrete
as needed. We consider a system with a known state dynamics model:
xk+1 = f (xk , uk ) + wk ,

(1.4)

where xk ∈ Rd is the state, f models the state dynamics and w is noise that captures
the fact that f cannot perfectly explain all possible system dynamics. Note that
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Figure 1.6: High-level overview of the requirements of existing attack/fault detection
approaches. All techniques that do not utilize sensor redundancy either need training
data or make simplifying assumptions about the timing or class of attacks/faults.
depending on the specific problem that is considered, different assumptions will be
made about f and w in the following chapters.
As described above, the system has access to two kinds of sensors available to it:
plant (continuous) and context (binary). Each plant sensor is assumed to provide a
measurement that is a linear function of the state:
c
yi,k
= Ci,k xk + vk ,

(1.5)

c
where we denote the measurement by yi,k
∈ Rm , vk is measurement noise, and matrix

Ci,k has appropriate dimensions.
Context sensors, on the other hand, do not measure the system’s state but
rather provide information about its context. We define context as a finite set
C = {c1 , . . . , cN }, where each cj is a context element that can be detected by a
context sensor from certain states; example context elements include nearby buildings with known positions on a map or a vital sign exceeding a certain predefined
b
threshold. For each j, a measurement yj,k
is received that is 1 if cj is detected and
b
-1 otherwise. Thus, each context measurement yj,k
can be modeled as a function hj
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of the state and the context element, i.e.,

b
yj,k
= hj (xk , cj ), where hj (xk , cj ) ∈ {−1, 1}.

(1.6)

Given this model, we may now ask questions of increasing difficulty and explore
the problem space defined in Figure 1.5.
Nominal State Estimation
The first problem that we address is nominal context-aware estimation, i.e., we
assume no faults or attacks are present and all sensors operate as modeled. Note
that estimation is usually solved in a probabilistic setting as probabilities are a
natural way of explaining measurement distributions and obtaining expected state
estimates given the available measurements. Therefore, in the nominal setting we
assume that both process and continuous measurement noises are random variables
(Gaussian, in particular). In addition, we model context measurements in terms of
the probability of obtaining a measurement given the current state, i.e.,

b
yj,k


 1
w.p. pd (cj | x)
=
 −1 w.p. 1 − p (c | x),
d j

(1.7)

where pd is a function of the system state.
Problem 1 (Estimation). Given the system models in Equations (1.4)-(1.7), with
both process and continuous measurement noise following Gaussian distributions, the
first problem we address is how to develop a state estimation algorithm that computes
the exact probability distribution of the state given the measurements.
Safety Detection and Attack Detection
Once we have developed algorithms for context-aware estimation in the nominal case,
we can now ask the question of how to use sensor redundancy in order to perform
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safety detection as well as sensor attack detection/identification.
In order to formulate the problems, first note that safety and resilience are inherently worst-case concepts, i.e., they need to be established even in the worst case
(e.g., it is not enough to claim that the system is safe 99% of the time). Thus,
in this setting we adopt an abstract sensor framework (also known as a set membership framework [140]) instead of the probabilistic approach used in the nominal
estimation problem. Abstract sensors provide a set instead of a single (multidimensional) value – this set is constructed around the actual measurement of
the physical sensor and represents all possible values for the true state given the measurement. By keeping track of these sets over time, it is possible to draw conclusions
about the system’s safety and security even in the worst case.
Furthermore, note that in this framework we assume that all sensors measure
the state directly. In other words, we abstract away the functional formulation in
both (1.5) and (1.6) – instead, a set of possible values is derived using those functional formulations; the size and shape of this set depend on the particular sensor.
This technique allows us to consider a truly redundant setting with multiple sensors
“measuring” the same variable, using different processes and with different precision.
These redundant measurements can then be used in a sensor fusion algorithm that
outputs a fusion set that is guaranteed to contain the true state (assuming at least
half of all sensors operate correctly). The system is considered safe if the fusion set
does not contain any sets that are deemed unsafe.
With the above points in mind, we first state the safety detection problems. It
is clear from the previous paragraph that the smaller the output of sensor fusion
is, the stronger the guarantees about the system’s safety are. Thus, we explore
multiple ways of reducing the size of the fusion set by adding additional pieces of
information and modifying the sensor fusion algorithm accordingly. In particular,
first we solve the sensor fusion problem in a single time step, i.e., we only consider
the measurements obtained at that step. As a first extension, we also make use of
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system dynamics in order to incorporate historical measurements and thus reduce
the size of the fusion set. In the second extension, we note that in a shared bus (e.g.,
CAN bus in automotive CPS) setting, such as the one shown in Figure 1.1, each
system component may observe all transmitted sensor measurements. In particular,
this allows the attacker to observe correct sensor measurements before deciding what
spoofed measurements to send on behalf of the corrupted sensors. Thus, we explore
the effect of different measurement transmission schedules on the attacker’s impact
and what the best schedule from the system’s point of view is.
Problem 2 (Safety Detection with no Sensor Faults). Given the system models in
Equations (1.4)-(1.6) and assuming the abstract sensor framework where all (nonattacked) sensors are correct (and transmit their measurements over a shared bus),
what is the smallest set that is guaranteed to contain the true state at a given time
step? What is the smallest set if historical measurements are used as well? Which
measurement transmission schedule minimizes the attacker’s impact on the output
of sensor fusion?
Note that the above problems can be formulated both in the nominal case where
sensors can only be attacked but are not faulty as well as in the case where sensors
can be faulty. When we introduce sensor faults, however, the assumptions of nominal
sensor fusion techniques (i.e., that at least half of all sensor measurements are correct
in a given round) might be invalidated due to the fact that all sensors might provide
faulty measurements at the same time. Thus, we investigate ways of incorporating
system dynamics (and historical measurements) in order to still provide worst-case
guarantees in the presence of both sensor attacks and faults.
Problem 3 (Safety Detection with Sensor Faults). Given the system models in Equations (1.4)-(1.6) and assuming the abstract sensor framework where (non-attacked)
sensors might experience faults, can we find a bounded set that is guaranteed to contain the true state at any time step?
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Finally, we state the sensor attack detection problems in the abstract sensor
framework as well. Once again, two problems can be formulated, one where sensors
operate correctly if not attacked and one where sensors might be transiently faulty
as well.
Problem 4 (Attack Detection with no Sensor Faults). Given the system models in
Equations (1.4)-(1.6) and assuming the abstract sensor framework where all (nonattacked) sensors are correct, can we detect sensor attacks?
Problem 5 (Attack Detection with Sensor Faults). Given the system models in
Equations (1.4)-(1.6) and assuming the abstract sensor framework where (non-attacked)
sensors might experience faults, can we detect sensor attacks? How do we distinguish
attacks from faults and not raise false alarms due to transient faults?

1.6

Contributions

At a high level, the goal of this dissertation is to develop detection and estimation
techniques for analyzing the safety and security of CPS in the presence of sensor
attacks and faults. We approach the problem by using the fact that modern CPS
are equipped with multiple and diverse sensors measuring related system states.
These sensors not only measure the plant’s state but they also provide information
about the system’s environment; thus, the context measurements extracted from the
environment sensors can be used as regular (discrete) measurements in addition to
classical continuous measurements. Combining these sensors’ data (both continuous
and discrete) not only results in better state estimates but also enables us, by finding
inconsistencies between measurements, to draw conclusions about the system’s safety
as well as about each sensor being faulty/attacked. The benefit of this approach is
that we do not need to make any assumptions about how each individual sensor might
fail or be attacked – instead we rely on redundant information to detect unsafe states.
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In summary, this dissertation addresses three aspects of the problem space described above: 1) nominal state estimation, 2) safety detection and 3) attack detection. The specific contributions of each are listed below:
• Nominal state estimation. Since using discrete context measurements is
a novel idea in itself, our first contribution is the development of nominal
context-aware state estimation. We consider systems with access to both plant
(continuous) and context (binary) measurements – we investigate two ways of
modeling context measurements and derive closed-form Kalman-like filters for
both cases. The theoretical properties of the resulting context-aware filters
are analyzed as well. In addition, we illustrate the benefits of both filters
via several case studies; first, we provide simulations of two robot localization
scenarios with imperfect sensors that can be improved upon using context
measurements. Finally, we present a real-data medical CPS case study where
context measurements are used in order to improve the estimation of blood
oxygen content, a critical vital sign that cannot be reliably measured during
surgery.
• Safety detection. Using the abstract sensor framework, we employ sensor
redundancy and sensor fusion techniques in order to detect when the system
is unsafe even in the presence of sensor faults and attacks (without assuming
anything about their timing or functional form). We develop a sensor fusion
algorithm in order to find the smallest set that is guaranteed to contain the
true state. We also explore several approaches to improve the output of sensor fusion, namely using historical measurements as well as selecting a sensor
transmission schedule that minimizes the attacker’s impact and available information. Finally, we extend the sensor fusion algorithm in order to handle
context measurements as well, thereby further improving the algorithm’s accuracy. Evaluations of these techniques are provided both in simulation and
in experiments using an unmanned ground vehicle.
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• Attack detection. Sensor attack detection and identification is used to improve the performance of safety detection by discarding attacked sensors. The
proposed attack detection techniques are also grounded in the abstract multisensor setting. We note that such detectors often treat faults and attacks in
the same way, thus raising unnecessary alarms due to transient faults. Consequently, we develop a framework for modeling transient faults and for distinguishing them from attacks – a corresponding attack detector in the presence
of transient faults is presented as well. Both detectors are evaluated both in
simulation and in experiments using an unmanned ground vehicle.

1.7

Outline of the Dissertation

The outline of this dissertation closely follows the highlighted problems in Figure 1.5.
We first present in Chapter 2 a general overview of the related work on CPS safety
and security, including nominal state estimation, anomaly detection as well as security approaches (both from a purely cyber and a combined cyber-physical point
of view). Chapter 3 addresses the problem of nominal context-aware estimation; we
develop two context-aware filters, analyze their theoretical properties and evaluate
them, both in simulation and on real data. In Chapter 4, we consider the main problem of this dissertation, namely safety detection in the presence of sensor attacks and
faults; we develop sensor fusion techniques and consider multiple ways of improving
the output of sensor fusion by incorporating measurement history and by analyzing different schedules of measurement transmissions; all techniques are evaluated in
simulation and in experiments with the LandShark robot. The guarantees provided
by sensor fusion are further strengthened in Chapter 5 where we add another piece of
information, namely context measurements; we develop a context-aware sensor fusion
algorithm and evaluate it in simulation of a perfectly attackable system that can only
detect it is unsafe with the addition of context measurements. Finally, Chapter 6
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addresses the third major problem of this dissertation, namely sensor attack detection in the presence of transient faults; we develop a sound detection/identification
algorithm and evaluate it on real data from the LandShark sensors. Concluding
remarks and some avenues for future work are provided in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter reviews the related work in the general problem space defined in Chapter 1. We begin by presenting the most popular approaches to filtering and state
estimation in general before discussing works in the area of fault detection, isolation
and reconfiguration (FDIR) and robustness. The chapter concludes with security
and attack detection. More specific topics such as sensor fusion, sensor selection and
context-aware filtering are reviewed in their respective chapters.

2.1

State Estimation

State estimation is a very well studied problem in the control theory literature.
Some of the first approaches were developed in the 1940s with the introduction of
the Wiener filter and Wiener theory in general [219]. Consequently, the Wiener
filter was extended and transformed into the classical Kalman filter [113], which is
still the default choice for estimator in many applications due to its easy recursive
implementation and intuitive appeal. Multiple extensions of the Kalman filter have
been developed since then depending on the system and its assumptions, including
the Gaussian Mixture filter for multimodal distributions [99, 193], the consensus
Kalman filter for distributed systems [155, 156] and many others [14, 73, 76, 112].
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While the Kalman filter is the best linear unbiased estimator for linear systems
with Gaussian noise [26] (i.e., the function f is linear in (1.4) and the noises w in (1.4)
and v in (1.5) have Gaussian distributions), it is challenging to develop algorithms
with such strong properties in other settings, even in the linear-system framework.
For example, in linear systems where the noise is distributed according to a truncated Gaussian distribution (e.g., in a turbofan engine model [188]) it is difficult
to obtain a closed-form filter, and a popular approach is to estimate the posterior
probability density function (pdf) using Monte Carlo techniques [69, 188]. Other,
heavy tailed, noise distributions have been considered as well, such as a Student-t
distribution [97], but they lead to noise disturbances that are not identically distributed, thus preventing researchers from obtaining closed-form estimates. Robust
filters for general distributions have been developed as well by deriving an optimal
time-varying smoothing boundary layer [84]. Alternatively, instead of a probabilistic
approach, one may assume bounds on the noise. For example, one may derive a
Kalman-like set membership filter given energy bounds on the noise [27]; if instead
the noise is bounded by quadratic inequalities, then the estimation problem can be
efficiently approximated by a convex optimization problem [74].
Unlike linear systems where a multitude of problems and setups have been addressed, estimation in general nonlinear systems is in still an open and challenging
problem. One of the standard approaches to nonlinear estimation is the extended
Kalman filter (EKF) [14], which works by linearizing the system dynamics and observation model and applying the standard Kalman filter to the linearized system.
Another popular approach is the unscented Kalman filter (UKF) [112], which reconstructs the posterior mean and covariance matrix by propagating a minimal set of
sample (sigma) points. Similarly, the smooth variable structure filter is an iterative
algorithm that has also been shown to work well in smooth nonlinear systems [95].
All of these approaches work well in practice for mildly nonlinear systems with
Gaussian-like noise but they do not perform as well in highly nonlinear systems. In
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such cases, one might use non-parametric approximation methods such as Gaussian
Process filtering [99]. Yet another popular approach to nonlinear filtering is particle
filtering [87], which employs Monte Carlo techniques in order to approximate nonlinear functions with arbitrary probability distributions; particle filters have been
shown to work well in practice in robotics applications [62, 148, 202]. Particle filters
have also been combined with Kalman filters in special problems where subsets of
the state can be estimated in closed form [67, 90]. Finally, similar to the case of
linear systems, nonlinear systems with bounded (not probabilistic noise) have been
considered as well – e.g., set membership filters have been developed for systems with
bounded noise and bounded derivatives of state dynamics and have been shown to
outperform the EKF in highly nonlinear systems [139, 141].
A further complication to the estimation task is added by the fact that most system models are inaccurate or at least parameterized by multiple variables that differ
across systems. System identification techniques can be utilized in such cases in order
to obtain a model of the system based on observed data [17, 105, 129]. Approaches
in this domain can be broadly classified as white-box (i.e., first principles) [151],
gray-box [34, 121, 207], or black-box (i.e., data-driven) [111, 191, 197] depending on
the assumptions on the underlying model. In addition, it is also possible to identify the model in an iterative fashion by gradually perturbing parameter values and
minimizing a given cost function of the difference between predicted and measured
states – this technique has been successfully applied in expectation maximization approaches [132, 186] as well as in multiple smoothing algorithms [116, 124, 176, 210].
To summarize, all nonlinear estimation techniques involve approximations, in
addition to often being computationally expensive. A main reason for these disadvantages is the generality of the considered problems – most approaches attempt to
develop estimators for all nonlinear systems or broad subsets thereof (e.g., all systems with differentiable dynamics). In contrast, in this dissertation we focus on a
specific class of nonlinear measurements, i.e., binary measurements, and derive the
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exact posterior distributions in an efficient way.

2.2

Fault Detection, Isolation and Reconfiguration

The existing literature on FDIR is very broad and mature, including multiple exhaustive survey papers [49, 80, 81, 103]. FDIR methods work by developing a model
of the system’s operation and analyzing the residual between the expected and actual
(as measured) behaviors [49]. There are two main approaches in this framework: in
the first an initial condition is assumed such that the residuals can be computed at
each time step as the system evolves [105]. In this setting, observers are developed
that generate alarms when residuals are unlikely to have come from their nominal probability distributions or other expected behaviors [25, 52, 94, 130, 138, 221].
In the alternative approach, a certain type or direction of a fault is assumed such
that fault detection can then be performed by detecting a change of system parameters using a generalized likelihood ratio test or a sequential probability ratio
test [23, 24, 177, 178].
While the FDIR techniques work well in the presence of good models, many systems have complex models that may be difficult to derive. In such cases, system
designers might develop simpler models and then apply techniques that guarantee
the system is robust to modeling errors and faults [163]. Such approaches work by
robustifying the employed estimator algorithms, e.g., by using the minimum covariance estimator [171], robust measure of data spread [57, 101] or robust principal
component analysis [200].
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2.3

Security and Attack Detection

The literature on security and attack detection can be broadly split into general
computer security as well as techniques specifically tailored to the needs of CPS.
Computer security is a widely researched area, with multiple established approaches
and practices [15]. Some of the most notable branches of the area include intrusion
detection systems [22, 131, 137], encrypted communication protocols [65, 168, 180],
trusted computing [123, 205], security software verification [48, 68] and other software
defenses [35, 56].
What is common between the standard computer security techniques is that
they focus exclusively on cyber attacks. Modern CPS, on the other hand, are much
more complex – a holistic analysis of the attack surface of CPS reveals that they
are not only vulnerable to standard cyber threats, but are also subject to attacks
exploiting their physical environment, thereby modifying sensor/actuator behavior
and affecting the overall system model [42, 43, 44]. There are various approaches to
securing CPS – the first class are those using fault-detection-like techniques such as
developing state observers and change detectors [145, 147, 198]. In addition, attackresilient state estimators have been introduced for systems with bounded noise [158,
159]. Researchers have also investigated ways to secure communication channels [10,
11, 12, 162] and more specifically the Control Area Network (CAN) bus [92, 96,
126, 127, 208], which is known to have multiple security vulnerabilities [98]. Finally,
techniques specific to the cyber-physical coupling of CPS have been developed such as
applying carefully chosen control inputs so as to expose the attacker [146], injecting
and defending against false data injection attacks [128, 145, 147] or employing game
theory analysis in order to model the attacker’s behavior [9, 39, 91].
The common theme among the discussed approaches in both the fault detection
and security domain is that certain assumptions are made about the occurrence of
faults and attacks, i.e., either that they have a known functional form/direction
or that the system begins in a known nominal state. Instead of making such as30

sumptions, which might be unrealistic in modern CPS, we provide resilience and
robustness through sensor redundancy and sensor fusion techniques [136] (described
in more detail in the following chapters).
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Chapter 3
Context-Aware Estimation
In this chapter we investigate the problem of context-aware state estimation, i.e.,
continuous state estimation using both continuous and discrete context-dependent
measurements. As described in Chapter 1, context measurements are high-level
representations of environment-sensor data that cannot be easily mapped to the state
– by using the probability distribution of context measurements given the state, one
may use them for estimation in a rigorous manner. The probabilistic formulation
makes sense intuitively – for example, if a building is far from the robot and appears
small in images, it might be recognized in just a few images; on the other hand, if
the building is nearby, we expect to recognize it in most images, i.e., the probability
of receiving a context measurement would be high for states close to the building.
In this dissertation we focus on binary measurements, i.e., each measurement
takes on a value of 1 or -1. Binary measurements form an interesting subset of discrete
measurements as they appear in a lot of CPS applications: 1) a medical device alarm
that a vital sign exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., if the patient’s oxygen saturation
is above a certain threshold, then the overall oxygen content must be above a certain
threshold [108]) as well as 2) occupancy grid mapping where a binary measurement
is received as the robot gets close to an obstacle [196].
The concept of estimation with context-based measurements was originally ex-
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plored in radar target tracking where measurements may also arrive irregularly and
could take on discrete values; one notable technique developed in this domain is the
probability hypothesis density (PHD) filter [134]. At the same time, the models
considered in this domain are very general, which makes it challenging to derive
exact theoretical results and instead leads to approximations that might be computationally expensive to obtain. Other general non-linear filtering methods have been
developed as well, such as the hybrid density filter (HDF) [100], the set-membership
filter [139], as well as the assumed density filter (ADF) [106] (the context-aware filter
is actually a type of ADF for which we can compute the moments of the posterior
distribution). Due to their generality, however, these filters do not provide strong
theoretical guarantees about specific classes of non-linear systems.
Context measurements are also similar to quantized measurements in that they
take on discrete values [83, 167]. At the same time, quantized measurements are
different because they are derived from standard continuous measurements whereas
context measurements are only related to the state through the probability of detection. System identification with binary measurements [213] has also been investigated although no approaches exist for the probabilistic setting considered in this
work.
Context-aware filtering is also similar to Kalman filtering with intermittent observations [183, 190] and unreliable links [93, 104, 155, 179] in that measurements
arrive irregularly; the frequency of measurement arrivals affects the filter’s performance in these cases. Related to this is the concept of sensor scheduling where
different sensors are used at different times so as to minimize interference or power
consumption [110, 209, 220]. Yet another similar problem has been considered in the
wireless sensor networks area where multiple sensors are deployed over a large area
such that the receipt of each sensor’s measurement could be considered a context
measurement [75, 135].
Due to their discrete nature, context measurements can also be modeled with
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hybrid systems [102], where different modes contain different models of context measurements. Such models include Markov chain switching [55, 192], deterministic
switching [66, 161] and other more general models [214]. However, due to their
complexity, all of these approaches rely on approximations in order to perform the
estimation task.
Different notions of context are also widely used in robotics for the purpose of
localization and mapping [31] by using scene categorization [85] and object class
information [13, 19]. However, these papers do not provide theoretical guarantees
for their developed approaches. The work that is closest in its setup and assumptions to this dissertation addresses the problem of indoor localization by using both
continuous and discrete measurements [19]; however, the particle filter that is used
to combine the two types of measurements does not provide any theoretical guarantees for a finite set of particles and may suffer from particle deprivation problems
in high-dimensional spaces. Finally, context-aware filtering could also be related to
machine learning (e.g., Gaussian process classification [165]) in the sense that the
objective is to learn a continuous probability distribution from discrete-valued data.
In particular, the Expectation Propagation (EP) algorithm [143] is similar to the
context-aware filter in that posteriors are approximated with Gaussian distributions
as well – at the same time, no convergence results exist for EP.
In contrast with existing works, we develop a context-aware filter for linear systems with access to binary measurements – no knowledge is assumed about the
measurements other than their probability of occurring given the state. In particular, we focus on two classes of functions that lead to (near) closed-form solutions
and that represent a wide variety of detection scenarios observed in practice.
The first class of probability of detection functions are inverse-exponential functions. With this class of functions, the probability of detection is high when the
state is close to a certain value (e.g., the robot is close to a building) and decreases
rapidly as the state moves away. We show that this class of functions leads to a
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closed-form filter with Gaussian Mixtures without any approximations. The second
class of functions are sigmoid functions defined as the probit function [152]. The
probit function resembles a step function, i.e., for small inputs it is close to 0 but
once a threshold is crossed, it increases rapidly and converges to 1. This class of
functions capture the threshold medical alarms described above as well as threshold
detection scenarios (e.g., occupancy grid mapping).
Similar to the inverse-exponential filter, we develop the probit-based contextaware filter by deriving the exact posterior distribution of the state given a context
measurement. At the same time, it is not known how to compute the posterior
for multiple context measurements since the integrals become intractable. As a
result, we approximate the posterior distribution after the receipt of each context
measurement with a Gaussian distribution with the same first two moments as the
true posterior. The approximating Gaussian distribution is then used as a prior for
the next measurement, thus obtaining a recursive context-aware filter.
In order to understand the asymptotic nature of the probit-based filter, we also
analyze its theoretical properties. We first show that the posterior distribution is
unimodal, so that the Gaussian approximation is indeed justified. In addition, we
show that, for a scalar system, the expected variance of the filter’s estimates is
bounded provided that the probability of receiving both a measurement of 1 and
-1 is at least some positive number η. This result is similar to a corresponding
fact about Kalman filtering with intermittent observations [190] in the sense that
the system needs to perform “useful” updates often enough in order to keep the
uncertainty bounded. Generalizing this result to multidimensional systems, however,
is challenging due to the fact that we aim to estimate continuous variables using
discrete measurements only; at the same time, the intuition from the one-dimensional
result could be used to prove a similar claim in the multidimensional case as well.
To provide further intuition about the probit-based filter’s performance in the
multidimensional case, we show convergence results about systems with no dynam-
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ics. In particular, we show that the eigenvalues of the filter’s covariance matrix
converge to 0 if and only if a persistence-of-excitation condition holds for the context measurements. This result is the context equivalent to an observability claim
in a standard linear system – intuitively, it says that if there exist context measurements that observe all states, then the filter’s uncertainty decreases over time.
Furthermore, we show that as the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix converge to
0, the expressions for the moments of the Gaussian approximations converge to the
Newton method [36], which suggests that the estimates themselves likely converge
to the true state, since the posterior distribution is unimodal. This result provides a
parallel with the widely used Expectation Propagation [143] algorithm where similar
Gaussian approximations are employed at each step – thus, the results presented in
this Chapter might be of interest to the machine learning community as well.
Finally, both context-aware filters are thoroughly evaluated in Sections 3.6, 3.7
and 3.8. We first provide simulations of two robot localization scenarios that illustrate real-world applications of context measurements. In addition, we provide
additional simulations to illustrate the saw-shaped nature of the estimation curve
induced by the probit-based filter as well as to illustrate a case in which the probitbased filter does converge for moving systems as well. Finally, we provide an application of the probit-based filter on real-patient data from the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia (CHOP) where the context-aware filter is used to estimate the patient’s
blood oxygen concentration.

3.1

System Model and Problem Formulation

This section formalizes the system model and states the estimation problem addressed by the context-aware filter. We consider a linear discrete-time system of the
form
xk+1 = Ak xk + νkp ,
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(3.1)

where xk ∈ Rd is the system state, x0 ∼ N (µ0 , Σ0 ), νkp ∼ N (0, Q) is Gaussian process
noise, and Ak is a matrix of appropriate dimensions.1
As described in Chapter 1, the system has two kinds of sensors available to it:
plant (continuous) and context (binary). Plant sensors measure (subsets of) the
state directly. The system has a linear observation model for plant sensors of the
form
ykc = Ck xk + νkm ,

(3.2)

where we denote plant sensors’ measurements by ykc ∈ Rm , νkm ∼ N (0, R) is Gaussian
measurement noise, and matrix Ck has appropriate dimensions. Note that ykc is a big
c
vector with all individual sensor measurements yi,k
stacked on top of one another;

vk and Ck are obtained similarly.
Context sensors, on the other hand, do not measure the system’s state but rather
provide binary information about the system’s context; example context measurements include detecting nearby objects with known positions on a map or a vital
sign exceeding a certain predefined threshold. At each time k, a measurement ykb is
received that is equal to 1 if a detection occurs and -1 otherwise.2 We assume that
ykb is equal to 1 with a known probability of detection given the state, denoted by
pdk (ykb | x), i.e.,

 1
w.p. pdk (ykb | xk )
ykb =
 −1 w.p. 1 − pd (y b | x ),
k
k k

(3.3)

where pdk is a function of the system state. As noted in the introduction of this
chapter, pdk is close to 1 when the system is in a state that is highly correlated with
receiving a context measurement (e.g., a robot is close to a building). Note that pdk is
time-varying, i.e., different binary measurements may be received at different times.
1

Note that we do not consider inputs uk in order to simplify notation. All results presented in
this chapter hold in the addition of inputs as well.
2
Note that our framework can handle more than one binary measurement per time by repeated
updates. We make the one-measurement assumption in order to simplify notation.
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It is assumed that, conditioned on the state, context measurements are mutually
independent.
Problem. Given the system defined in (3.1)-(3.3) and a prior pdf
c
b
pk|k (x) = p(x | y0:k
, y0:k
)

the goal is to compute the posterior density
c
b
pk+1|k+1 (x) := p(x | y0:k+1
, y0:k+1
),

describing the system’s state given all available measurements and inputs.

3.2

Challenges with a Bayesian Approach

The problem formulation in Section 3.1 naturally lends itself to a recursive Bayesian
approach with a predict and an update phase of the form
Z
Predict: pk+1|k (x) =

pf (x | z)pk|k (z)dz,

(3.4)

c
b
Update: pk+1|k+1 (x) = ξk+1 po (yk+1
, yk+1
| x)pk+1|k (x),

where pf (xk+1 | xk , uk ) is the conditional pdf of the state at time k +1 given the state
c
b
and input at time k, po (yk+1
, yk+1
| xk+1 ) is the joint pdf of all available measurements

(plant and context) given the state and ξk+1 is a normalization constant [202].
While (3.4) provides a compact representation of the filtering problem, in general
it is impossible to obtain a closed-form expression for the densities and the corresponding integrals. The notable exception is the linear Gaussian case which results
in the Kalman filter, as noted in Chapter 2. However, the discrete measurements
considered in this paper do not lead to clean analytic derivations such as the one
in the Kalman filter. In such a case it might be possible to use some of the non38

linear estimation techniques described in Chapter 2 such as the ADF, PHD filter,
HDF and others. At the same time, as argued in Chapter 2, all these approaches
involve approximations and have variable performance on real problems. Therefore,
in this thesis we focus on two specific probability of context detection functions (i.e.,
pdk (ykb | x) in (3.3)) that lead to closed-form filters. We argue that each of these
functions captures a sufficiently large class of scenarios so as to be useful in a lot of
modern systems. The following two sections present these functions, both formally
and intuitively, before deriving the resulting filters.

3.3

Context-Aware Filter with Inverse-Exponential
Functions

The first class of probability of context detection functions considered in this dissertation are inverse-exponential functions.
Assumption. Suppose the probability of context detection functions are inverseexponential functions that are defined as follows:
T V −1 (G x −θ )
k k
k
k

1

pdk (ykb | xk ) = e− 2 (Gk xk −θk )

,

(3.5)

which are parameterized by θk ∈ Rq and Vk ∈ Rq×q , and Gk ∈ Rq×d , which can be
thought of as a selection matrix when q < d. This probability is 1 when Gk xk = θk
and approaches 0 when Gk xk − θk gets large. Note that Gk , θk and Vk are possibly
time-varying, i.e., a different context measurement could be received at each time
step.
We argue that inverse-exponential functions capture a wide class of context measurements observed in reality. In particular, they are designed so that the probability
of detecting a context element is large when the system is in the vicinity of that element and is small otherwise. For example, in the case of detecting a nearby building
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using image processing, the probability of getting a detection is very high when the
camera is close to the building but starts decreasing rapidly as the system moves
away [19]. As another example, consider a vehicle trying to localize by detecting
frequency modulation (FM) radio signals – since certain FM signals can only be
detected in certain regions, receiving such a known signal may help the vehicle improve its localization estimate. Inverse-exponential functions can be used to model
this scenario as well, since wireless signals are also known to greatly decay as the
receiver gets far away from the transmitter [86].
Having fixed (3.5) as the probability of context detection, with θk , Gk and Vk
known at each time step (or potentially learned from data), we now derive the resulting context-aware filter. Note that, due to the shape of the function in (3.5)
(i.e., it resembles a non-normalized Gaussian pdf), incorporating the context measurements in the filter results in a Gaussian Mixture (GM) distribution. A GM is a
distribution whose pdf is defined as a weighted sum of Gaussian pdfs:

gGM (x) =

M
X

wi φ(x; µi , Σi ),

(3.6)

i=1

where φ(x; µi , Σi ) is the pdf of a Gaussian distribution with mean µi and covariance
P
matrix Σi , and wi are weights such that M
i=1 wi = 1. GMs have two properties
that make them suitable for modeling multimodal distributions. First of all, they
are linear combinations of Gaussian pdfs; thus, a recursive filter using a GM can
be developed with a bank of Kalman filters, one for each element in the GM. In
particular, this means that the context-aware filter developed in this chapter has a
closed-form solution for GMs, i.e., if the prior is a GM (including a single Gaussian
distribution, which is a special case of a GM), then so is the posterior. The second
useful property of GMs is that, given a sufficient number of elements, a GM can
be used to approximate any continuous pdf [99]. For these reasons, GMs have been
extensively studied and appear in a lot of the popular nonlinear filters.
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We now present the main result of this section, namely the context-aware filter
with inverse-exponential functions.
Proposition 1. Consider a system with linear dynamics
xk+1 = Ak xk + νkp ,
linear state observation model
ykc = Ck xk + νkm ,
and context observation model of the form
T V −1 (G x −θ )
k k
k
k

1

pdk (ykb | xk ) = e− 2 (Gk xk −θk )

.

Assuming that the state prior pk|k is a Gaussian Mixture, then the predicted and
updated pdf ’s, pk+1|k and pk+1|k+1 respectively, are also Gaussian Mixtures without
any approximation.
Proof. Note that, unlike the conventional Kalman filter that has a predict and an
update stage, the proposed filter has three steps: prediction, continuous update and
discrete update. There is also an optional mixture reduction step discussed at the
end of the section.

3.3.1

Predict

For the predict stage, we note that

pk+1|k (x) =

M
X

Z
wi

φ(x; Ak z, Q)φ(z; µi , Σi )dz

i=1
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=

=

M
X
i=1
M
X

wi φ(x; Ak µi , Ak Σi ATk + Q)
wi φ(x; µpi , Σpi ),

i=1

which is the usual form of the Kalman filter predict equations (e.g., see [113]). The
resulting distribution is again a GM.

3.3.2

Continuous Update

As described above, we perform the update separately for state (continuous) and conc
text (discrete) sensors. Upon receiving a measurement yk+1
, the continuous update

is:
c
p(yk+1
| x)pk+1|k (x)
c
p(yk+1 | z)pk+1|k (z)dz
P
p
p
c
φ(yk+1
; Ck x, R) M
i=1 wi φ(x; µi , Σi )
=R
P
p
p
c
φ(yk+1
; Ck z, R) M
j=1 wj φ(z; µj , Σj )dz

M 
c
X
φ(yk+1
; Ck x, R)φ(x; µpi , Σpi )
wi γic
R
=
c
αc
φ(yk+1
; Ck z, R)φ(z; µpi , Σpi )dz
i=1

pck+1|k+1 (x) = R

=

M
X

wic φ(x; µci , Σci ),

i=1

where
c

α :=

M
X

wi γic

Zi=1
c
γic :=
φ(yk+1
; Ck z, R)φ(z; µpi , Σpi )dz
c
= φ(yk+1
; Ck µpi , Ck Σpi CkT + R)
c
− Ck µpi )
µci := µpi + Kic (yk+1

Σci := (I − Kic Ck )Σpi

42

Kic := Σpi CkT (Ck Σpi CkT + R)−1 .
Note that the posterior distribution is also a GM with the same number of elements but with possibly rescaled weights.

3.3.3

Discrete Update

For the discrete update, first note that the posterior distribution depends on whether
b
yk+1
is -1 or 1 as the probabilities of getting either one are different. Consider first
b
= 1:
the case when yk+1

pk+1|k+1 (x) = R

b
= 1 | x)pck+1|k+1 (x)
p(yk+1

b
p(yk+1
= 1 | z)pck+1|k+1 (z)dz
P
c
c
c
φ(θk ; Gk x, Vk ) M
i=1 wi φ(x; µi , Σi )
=R
P
c
c
c
φ(θ; Gk z, Vk ) M
j=1 wj φ(z; µj , Σj )dz
M  c d
X
φ(θk ; Gk x, Vk )φ(x; µci , Σci )
wi γi
R
=
αd
φ(θk ; Gk z, Vk )φ(z; µci , Σci )dz
i=1
M  c d
X
wi γi
=
φ(x; µdi , Σdi ),
d
α
i=1

where αd , γid , µdi , Σdi and Kid are defined similar to their continuous analogues.
b
Finally, when yk+1
= −1, the update becomes


b
1 − p(yk+1
= 1 | x) pck+1|k+1 (x)

pk+1|k+1 (x) = R
b
1 − p(yk+1
= 1 | z) pck+1|k+1 (z)dz

M
b
X
wic 1 − p(yk+1
= 1 | x) φ(x; µci , Σci )
=
PM c R
b
1
−
p(yk+1
= 1 | z)φ(z; µci , Σci )dz
j=1 wj
i=1
=

M
X
i=1

where βi := γid

1−

wic
PM

j=1

wjc βj

φ(x; µci , Σci ) +

p
(2π)q det(Vk ).
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−wic βi
PM c φ(x; µdi , Σdi )
1 − j=1 wj βj

Thus, we have inductively shown that for the probability of detection function
considered in this paper, the localization filter can be computed in closed form and
results in a GM distribution of the posterior. Note that the number of elements in
the GM doubles every time ykb = −1, thus an additional step may be necessary in
order to bound the number of elements.

3.3.4

Mixture Reduction

The proof of Proposition 1 provides an exact form for the posterior. However, the
number of elements in the GM doubles every time a measurement of -1 is received;
hence, this number may increase exponentially over time. Many approaches for
reducing the number of elements have been proposed in the literature, ranging from
keeping the elements with highest weights to merging or discarding elements based on
certain notions of distance between them [193]. Note that most available techniques
assume weights are positive, yet the GM developed in this paper may have negative
weights as well. In such cases, one may use a Gibbs Sampler [195] in order to reduce
the size of the GM. A Gibbs Sampler draws random samples from the distribution
and can approximate it with a GM with a desired number of elements. Note that in
order to sample from a distribution with negative weights such as the one developed
in this paper, accept-reject sampling may be utilized [150].

3.4

Context-Aware Filter with Sigmoid Functions

Although inverse-exponential functions capture a wide variety of context measurements that occur in practice, there are other interesting scenarios that cannot be
explained with this class of functions. In particular, a major limitation of inverseexponential functions is that they are symmetric around their θ parameter; thus,
they would not be well suited for modeling inherently non-symmetric context measurements such as a vital sign crossing a predefined threshold (e.g., the blood-oxygen
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saturation is less than 90%). Similarly, inverse-exponential functions cannot be used
to model a scenario in which a building can only be detected from certain angles
(e.g., because of occlusions).
In order to overcome these limitations, in this section we investigate a second
broad class of context detection functions, namely sigmoid functions.
Assumption. Suppose the probability of context detection functions are sigmoid
functions that are defined as the probit logistic function [153]:
pdk (ykb | xk ) = Φ(ykb (bTk xk + ak )),

(3.7)

where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard Normal distribution,
bk ∈ Rd is a vector of known weight parameters, and ak ∈ R is a known parameter
offset. Note that pdk (ykb = 1 | xk ) = 1 − pdk (ykb = −1 | xk ) due to the rotational symmetry of Φ, i.e., Φ(−x) = 1 − Φ(x). We assume there is a finite set of size C of
context weights and offsets V = {(b1 , a1 ), . . . , (bC , aC )}.
Note that the inner function in (3.7) defines a hyperplane, determined by the
values of ak and bk , that can be intuitively considered as the detection threshold,
i.e., the probability of getting a detection is very low when the state xk is below the
“threshold” and increases rapidly as xk crosses the “threshold”. To explain the name
of this class of context detection functions, note that in the one-dimensional case,
this function greatly resembles the classical sigmoid function: f (x) = 1/(1 + e−x ),
which also exhibits this pattern of values close to 0 as x approaches −∞ and close
to 1 for large x, with a very quick transition period in between. Due to this step-like
shape, sigmoid functions are well suited for modeling the scenarios presented above –
it is expected that once a signal exceeds a certain threshold, even inaccurate sensors
will be able to detect the event and raise an alarm.
Assumption. In this section, to simplify notation we assume the system has access
to context measurements only (but not continuous plant measurements). All results
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presented in this section hold in the presence of continuous (linear) measurements
as well.
Developing an exact filter incorporating probit-based measurements is not straightforward, however, due to the fact that the posterior distribution, once context measurements have been received, is not the same as the prior (even if the prior is
Gaussian). At the same, as argue below, a Gaussian distribution with the same
mean and covariance matrix is a good approximation for the posterior distribution.
We now present the phases of the sigmoid-based filter, in a similar fashion to the
GM-based one (excluding the continuous update). In this case we assume the prior
pk−1|k−1 , at time k ≥ 1, is a single Gaussian distribution with mean µk−1|k−1
and covariance matrix Σk−1|k−1 .

3.4.1

Predict

The predict phase is the classical Kalman filter prediction:
Z
pk|k−1 (x) =

φ(x; Ak−1 z, Q)φ(z; µk−1|k−1 , Σk−1|k−1 )dz

= φ(x; Ak−1 µk−1|k−1 , Ak−1 Σk−1|k−1 ATk−1 + Q)
= φ(x; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 ),
where φ(x; µ, Σ) denotes the pdf of a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ.

3.4.2

Update

The posterior distribution after the receipt of a binary measurement ykb is shown in
Proposition 2 below (all proofs are given in the Appendix).
Proposition 2. Upon receipt of a discrete measurement ykb ∈ {−1, 1}, the discrete
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update is as follows:

pk|k (x) =

Φ(ykb (bTk x + ak ))φ(x; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )
,
Zk

(3.8)

where

Zk = Φ

y b (bT µ
 k k k|k−1



+ ak )
.
q
T
bk Σk|k−1 bk + 1

Approximation. We approximate the posterior distribution in (3.8) with a Gaussian distribution with the same mean and covariance matrix.
Note that the posterior distribution after incorporating context measurements is
no longer Gaussian. However, a Gaussian still seems to be a good approximation
for (3.8). In particular, as shown in Proposition 3 below, the distribution in (3.8)
is log-concave; log-concavity, in turn, implies unimodality, as discussed in Corollaries 1 and 2. Thus, we approximate the posterior in (3.8) with a Gaussian with the
same mean and covariance matrix as the distribution in (3.8) – these quantities are
computed in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 3. The distribution in (3.8) is log-concave, i.e., the function
g(x) = ln(pk|k (x))

(3.9)

is concave.
Corollary 1 ([64]). In one dimension, the distribution in (3.8) is unimodal, i.e.,
there exists a point x∗ such that pk|k (x) is increasing for x ≤ x∗ and pk|k (x) is
decreasing for x ≥ x∗ .
Corollary 2 ([64]). In many dimensions, the distribution in (3.8) is star-unimodal
(a random variable X ∈ Rn is said to have a star-unimodal distribution if for ev47

ery bounded non-negative Borel measurable function f on Rn , tn E[f (tX)] is nondecreasing for t ∈ [0, ∞)).3
Proposition 4. The mean of the distribution in (3.8) is:
µk|k = µk|k−1 + Σk|k−1 bk (bTk Σk|k−1 bk + χk )−1 ykb ,

(3.10)

where

χk =

q
bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1 − bTk Σk|k−1 bk α(Mk )
α(Mk )

α(x) = φ(x; 0, 1)/Φ(x)
ykb (bTk µk|k−1 + ak )
Mk = q
.
bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1

(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)

The covariance matrix of the distribution in (3.8) is:
Σk|k = Σk|k−1 − Σk|k−1 bk (bTk Σk|k−1 bk + γk )−1 bTk Σk|k−1

(3.14)

where
γk =

(1 − h(Mk )) bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1
h(Mk )

h(x) = α(x)(x + α(x)).

(3.15)
(3.16)

Remark. Note that the context-aware filter is similar to Kalman filtering with intermittent observations [190] in that measurements arrive in a stochastic manner.
Thus (3.14) resembles a standard Riccati equation (update), where the non-linear
term γk could be considered as the equivalent of measurement noise.
Note also that the functions α and h defined in (3.12) and (3.16), respectively,
3

Note that while there is a standard definition of unimodality in one dimension, many definitions
exist in multiple dimensions (consult [64] for an exhaustive discussion).
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have been studied extensively in the statistics community. The ratio α is known
as the inverse Mills ratio; some properties of the inverse Mills ratio that are used
throughout this dissertation are summarized below.
Definition. The inverse Mills ratio is defined as the ratio of the pdf and cdf of a
standard Normal distribution, respectively, i.e.,
α(x) = φ(x; 0, 1)/Φ(x).
Proposition 5 ([173]). The following facts are true about the inverse Mills ratio:
1. h(x) := −α0 (x) = α(x)(x + α(x))
2. 0 < h(x) < 1, ∀x ∈ R
3. h0 (x) < 0, ∀x ∈ R.
Remark. Since 0 < h(x) < 1, we can conclude that γk > 1.

3.5

Convergence Properties of the Sigmoid-Based
Context-Aware Filter

In this section we analyze the convergence properties of the sigmoid-based contextaware filter. Due to the fact that the task is to estimate a continuous variable using
only discrete measurements, proving convergence is hard in general, especially given
the random and time-varying nature of the filter. Ideally, one could hope to prove
that the expected covariance matrix is bounded under some conditions on the initial
covariance matrix and the probability of measurement arrivals (i.e., similar to the
result for Kalman filtering with intermittent observations [190]). However, note that
there is an extra non-linear γk term in the Riccati equation for the covariance matrix
update in (3.14). The presence of γk makes it challenging to analyze the system when
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dynamics are also considered since γk cannot be upper-bounded in general (as shown
in Proposition 5, the function h can be arbitrarily close to 0). Such an upper bound
can be derived in the special case of a scalar system as shown in the next subsection.
To provide further intuition about the filter’s convergence, we also show results
for a non-moving system. In particular, in Subsections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 we provide an
observability-like claim for the filter, i.e., the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
converge to 0 if and only if a persistence-of-excitation condition is true for the weight
vectors vk over time. Furthermore, we show that, as the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix converge to 0, the discrete update of the filter converges to a Newton Method
step, which is an intuitive result given that the filter approximation matches the first
two moments of the true posterior distribution.

3.5.1

Bounded Variance for a Scalar System

In this section we analyze conditions that result in a bounded variance of the contextaware filter given a scalar system:
xk+1 = axk + νkp ,

(3.17)

where xk , a ∈ R, and νkp ∼ N (0, q).
First note that the update in (3.14) looks like a standard Riccati equation, except
for the non-linear term γk . Thus, one way to show that the context-aware filter’s
variance is bounded is by providing an upper bound on γk such that (3.14) is bounded
(with some positive probability) by a standard Riccati equation. In such a case, our
problem can be reduced to Kalman filtering with intermittent observations [190],
and we can use some of the known facts for that scenario.
One case in which γk can be bounded (with positive probability) is when the
probability of receiving both a measurement of 1 or -1 is at least some positive
number η. In such a case, γk can be upper-bounded (with probability at least η) by
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((1 − h(0))bk σk bk + 1)/h(0) by using the properties of h, i.e., h0 (x) < 0 for all x. This
condition leads to the following result, similar to a result from Kalman filtering with
intermittent observations.
Theorem 1. Consider the system in (3.17) and suppose that, for all xk , pdk (ykb |
xk ) ≥ η for ykb = ±1. Then there exists some ηc ∈ [0, 1) such that
∀σ0 , E[σk ] ≤ Mσ0 , for ηc < η ≤ 1,
where Mσ0 is a constant that depends on the initial condition.
Theorem 1 says that the filter’s expected uncertainty is bounded at all times if
the probability of receiving “useful” context measurements is sufficiently high (by
“useful” we mean that a measurement can be both 1 or -1 with probability at least
η such that receiving the measurement does provide significant information). This
result makes sense intuitively – if the system is moving away from all available context
measurements (i.e., if bT x + a is very large in absolute value for all (b, a) ∈ V), we
cannot expect to be able to estimate the state; conversely, if context measurements
are available throughout the system’s execution, then the filter’s uncertainty should
be low.
Note that the proof of Theorem 1 does not generalize immediately to the multidimensional case, as the bound on γk in the multidimensional case does not lead to
a standard-Riccati-equation bound on the expected covariance matrix. At the same
time, we believe the same intuition could be used to obtain a similar result for the
multidimensional case as well.

3.5.2

Covariance Matrix Convergence for Non-Moving System

While we cannot bound the filter’s expected uncertainty in the multidimensional
case, we provide such a result in the special case of a non-moving system. In partic51

ular, we show that for a system with no dynamics, the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix converge to 0 if and only if a persistence-of-excitation condition (formalized
below) is true for the weight vectors bk over time. To simplify notation and since no
dynamics predictions are performed in this section, we drop the prediction notation
in the rest of this section (i.e., we write Σk instead of Σk|k = Σk+1|k ).
Before presenting the main result of this subsection, we first describe the behavior
of the covariance matrix after multiple binary updates, as presented in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. After applying N updates at time k, the covariance matrix update from (3.14)
can be written as:
Σk+N = Σk − Σk BkT (Bk Σk BkT + Γk )−1 Bk Σk ,

(3.18)

where Bk = [bk+1 , . . . , bk+N ]T , [Γk ](i,j) = γk+i if i = j and [Γk ](i,j) = 0 otherwise.
The update in Lemma 1 looks similar to a standard Riccati equation (without
the dynamics elements). Thus, it is not surprising that convergence of the covariance matrix depends on similar conditions on the matrix Bk as for a Ck matrix
in a standard linear system. One such property is the widely used persistence of
excitation [89].
Definition (Persistence of Excitation). The sequence of context weights and offsets,
(bk , ak ), is said to be persistently exciting if there exist d linearly independent
weight vectors with corresponding offsets P = {(b1 , a1 ), . . . , (bd , ad )} that appear infinitely often, i.e., for every k, there exists lk ∈ N such that
∀(bi , ai ) ∈ P, ∃t ∈ {k, . . . , k + lk } s.t. (bt , at ) = (bi , ai ).
Persistence of excitation is a standard assumption in estimation and system iden-
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tification [89].4 Intuitively, it means that there exists a set of context measurements
that are received infinitely often such that their corresponding weights span Rd .5
The offsets are also important because even if the same weights repeat over time,
the change of offsets might still affect the probability of receiving new context measurements.
Theorem 2. Suppose the system has no dynamics (i.e., Ak = I, the identity matrix,
p

and Q = 0). Let λjk > 0 be the eigenvalues of Σk . Then λjk −−→ 0 as k → ∞ if and
only if (bk , ak ) is persistently exciting.
Theorem 2 is essentially an observability result. It suggests that if some states
are not observed through binary measurements, then the uncertainty about those
states does not decrease over time. On the other hand, if all states are observed, then
the uncertainty is reduced over time in a manner similar to the standard Kalman
filter with a persistently exciting Ck matrix.
At the same time, even if the covariance matrix converges to zero, it is not clear
whether the mean of the estimator converges to the true state. However, as shown
in Section 3.7, simulations suggest that the estimates do converge to the true state.
Furthermore, similar convergence results exist for the Expectation Propagation (EP)
algorithm (which also approximates the posterior distribution with a Gaussian with
the same moments), namely 1) EP converges to the true state for strongly log-concave
observation models [60] (the probit model is log-concave but is not strongly logconcave) and 2) in the limit, EP has a fixed point at the true state if the observation
model has bounded derivatives [61] (true for the probit model). Thus, it is likely
that the context-aware filter’s mean also converges to the true state but we leave
proving this result for future work.
4

The definition used in our work is a special case of standard definitions since we have a finite
set of context weights.
5
Note that persistence of excitation does not require the received context measurements to take
on a specific value, i.e., they can be either -1 or 1. Intuitively, the definition only requires the same
classifiers to run infinitely often.
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3.5.3

Convergence of “Site” Approximations

In an effort to better understand the asymptotic behavior of the sigmoid-based
context-aware filter for systems with no dynamics, in this subsection we analyze
the effect of a single update in the limit. In particular, we show that as more data
is available, each discrete update resembles a Newton Method step (this result is
similar to a recent result about the limit behavior of EP [61]).
Definition. The Newton Method for finding the minimum of a twice-differentiable
function f is computed as follows: given the previous iteration point xn , the next
step is [36]:
h 00
i−1 0
xn+1 = xn − f (xn )
f (xn ).
The significance of this property is that the Newton Method converges to the
optimal value (i.e., the peak of the distribution) of concave or quasi-concave functions. Since the posterior distribution considered in this work is log-concave (i.e.,
quasi-concave), there is strong evidence to believe that the context-aware filter with
the probit observation model does indeed converge to the true state.
Before presenting the result, we first note that each update of the context-aware
filter could be viewed as a Gaussian approximation of the observation model itself
(i.e., of the probit model). More specifically, the posterior Gaussian approximation
could be considered as a Gaussian distribution that resulted from an update in
which the observation model was also a Gaussian distribution with the appropriate
parameters (also known as a “site” approximation in machine learning).
Definition (Site Approximation). Given a Gaussian prior φ(x; µk−1 , Σk−1 ) and a
binary update with observation model Φ(ykb (bTk x + ak )), a site approximation is a
Gaussian distribution ps (x) := φ(x; µs , Σs ) such that the distribution (normalized by
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the constant β)
pG (x) = βφ(x; µk−1 , Σk−1 )φ(x; µs , Σs )
has the same mean and covariance matrix as the true posterior
pk|k (x) =

1
Φ(ykb (bTk x + ak ))φ(x; µk−1 , Σk−1 ).
Zk

Site approximations are easily computed when we consider the natural param−1
eters of the distribution. Suppose the prior distribution is φ(x; Ω−1
k−1 ωk−1 , Ωk−1 ),

where Ωk−1 = Σ−1
k−1 and ωk−1 = Ωk−1 µk−1 are the prior’s information matrix and
mean, respectively.

Similarly, suppose the posterior Gaussian approximation is

−1
s −1 s
s −1
φ(x; Ω−1
k ωk , Ωk ). Then the parameters of the site approximation φ(x; (Ωk ) ωk , (Ωk ) )

are computed as follows [18]:
Ωsk = Ωk − Ωk−1

(3.19)

ωks = ωk − ωk−1 .

(3.20)

The site approximation abstraction is useful as it allows us to reason about the
“contribution” of each update. In particular, we can derive the following result.
−1
−1
Theorem 3. Suppose the prior is φ(x; Ω−1
and ωk =
k ωk , Ωk ) (where Ωk = Σk

Ωk µk ). After performing an update in the context-aware filter, the natural parameters
of the site approximation are:
−1 T
bk
Ωsk+1 = bk+1 γk+1

(3.21)

−1 b
s
yk+1 ,
ωk+1
= Ωsk+1 µk + (I + Lk+1 )bk+1 Nk+1

(3.22)

55

where
Nk+1 = bTk+1 Σk bk+1 + χk+1
−1 T
Lk+1 = bk+1 γk+1
bk+1 Σk .

Corollary 3. Suppose the system has no dynamics (i.e., Ak = I, the identity matrix,
and Q = 0). If (bk , ak ) is persistently exciting, then the natural parameters of the
site approximations converge to the Newton Method [36], i.e.,
p

00

Ωsk+1 −−→ ψk+1 (µk )
p

(3.23)
0

s
ωk+1
−−→ Ωsk+1 µk − ψk+1 (µk ),

(3.24)

b
where ψk+1 is the negative log-likelihood of the measurement yk+1
, i.e.,

b
ψk+1 (x) = − ln(Φ(yk+1
(bTk+1 x + bk+1 ))).

p

s
Remark. Note that since Ωsk+1 µsk+1 = ωk+1
, we can conclude that µsk+1 −−→ µk −
00

0

[ψk+1 (µk )]−1 ψk+1 (µk ), which has the exact form of the Newton Method.
The significance of Corollary 3 is that since the Newton Method converges to the
minimal (maximal) point of a log-convex (-concave) function, then the site approximations converge to the so called Canonical Gaussian Approximation (CGA) [60],
i.e., the Gaussian distribution whose mean is the maximizer of the true observation
model’s probability distribution and whose covariance matrix is the Hessian at that
maximum. Finally, it is known that CGA’s converge almost surely to a large class
of posterior distributions, e.g., as shown by the Bernstein-von Mises Theorem [28].
Thus, Corollary 3 presents strong evidence to believe that the context-aware filter
does indeed converge to the mean of the true posterior distribution. Sections 3.7
and 3.8 present multiple evaluations in support of this claim as well.
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Trajectory for vehicle moving in an urban environment
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Shark trajectory.
jectories.
by each filter.

3.6

Evaluation of the Inverse-Exponential ContextAware Filter: Localization Simulation

Having developed the theory of context-aware filtering in the previous sections of this
chapter, in the remaining sections we provide several case-study evaluations in order
to illustrate the usefulness of this approach. To evaluate the inverse-exponential
context-aware filter, in this section we present a simulation of a robot localization
scenario where context measurements can be used to improve state estimation. The
sigmoid-based context-aware filter is evaluated, both in simulation and on real data,
in the following sections.
In order to evaluate the inverse-exponential filter, we develop a case study using
the LandShark robot. In this scenario, the LandShark is moving in an urban environment while trying to visit different waypoints as part of its mission. The vehicle
has access to one continuous sensor, namely GPS, in order to perform localization;
however, GPS measurements are often inaccurate in urban environments – in this
case, they have a large variance and a bias to the North, thereby making localization
challenging. In order to improve its state estimates, the LandShark also uses context
measurements – it can recognize nearby buildings using image processing and model
the corresponding binary measurements using the inverse-exponential functions as
described above.
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The entire trajectory driven by the LandShark, including the city’s map, is presented in Figure 3.1. Note that the LandShark has a differential-drive model, i.e.,
each turn results in nonlinear state dynamics. Therefore, a linearization is necessary
in these cases in order to apply the context-aware filter, similar to the one in a typical
extended Kalman filter (EKF).
In order to evaluate the performance of GM-based filter, we compare the accuracy
of its estimates with a regular EKF that only uses the continuous GPS measurements.
The (first part of the) estimated trajectories by each filter are shown in Figure 3.2.
For the EKF, the estimate is chosen to be the mean of the posterior Gaussian distribution at each time step; for the inverse-exponential filter, the estimate is the mode
of the distribution (in this application the mode is selected as the element with
highest weight in the mixture). As shown in Figure 3.2, the context-aware filter
consistently outperforms the EKF – its estimates are closest to the actual trajectory
and are more robust to the large variance in GPS measurements, whereas the EKF’s
estimates tend to change significantly when inaccurate measurements are received.
As further evaluation, Figure 3.3 shows the absolute errors incurred by each
filter for the entire trajectory of the LandShark. The context-aware filter’s errors
are invariably lower than those incurred by the EKF and also do not exhibit much
lower variability from one round to the next. All these results suggest that the
context-aware filter with inverse-exponential functions can significantly improve state
estimation and greatly outperforms continuous-sensor-based approaches, especially
in scenarios with inaccurate and unreliable continuous sensors.

3.7

Evaluation of the Probit-Based Context-Aware
Filter: Simulations

In this section, we provide three simulation evaluations in order to illustrate different
properties of the probit-based context-aware filter. Real-data evaluation is provided
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the performance of the context-aware filter on a nonmoving scalar system.
in Section 3.8.

3.7.1

System with No Dynamics

In the first simulation scenario, we evaluate the performance of the filter on a system
with no dynamics, in order to illustrate the significance of Theorem 2. Figure 3.4
shows the filter’s evaluation on a scalar system with a constant state xk = 3 and with
access to one context measurement with corresponding parameters bk = 1 and ak =
−5. The initial condition is set to µ0 = 1, Σ0 = 2. Figure 3.4c shows the evolution
of the covariance for 10 runs of the system; as expected, the covariance converges to
0 for each one, thus ensuring the convergence of the filter overall. Figure 3.4b shows
the estimation errors for the same 10 runs – the figure indicates that the estimates
are close to the true state, although some estimates converge more slowly due to
different random realizations of the measurements. Finally, Figure 3.4a shows the
interesting toothed shape of the estimates for an example run, with discrete jumps
as new context measurements are incorporated.
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Context-Aware Filter Accuracy for an Unstable System
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of the performance of the context-aware filter on an unstable
system.

3.7.2

System with Unstable Dynamics

In the second simulation, we evaluate the performance of the context-aware filter on
a system with unstable dynamics. The system dynamics are as follows:

xk+1 = 

1.01

0

0

1.01


 xk + νkp ,

where νkp ∼ N (0, 0.001I) and x0 = [1 1]T .6 30 context measurements are received
at each time, 15 with weights bk,1 = [0 1]T and 15 with weights bk,2 = [1 0]T ; the 15
offsets ak are decreased linearly from 0 to -150 (i.e., they provide rough information
as to whether each state is between 0 and 10, 10 and 20, etc.).
Figure 3.5 shows the results of the simulation. We observe similar trends as in
Figure 3.4, i.e., the trace of the covariance matrix (Figure 3.5c) converges over time,
and the filter’s estimates seem to track the real system well after the initial period of
uncertainty (Figure 3.5b). These results suggest that the context-aware filter does
seem to converge over time (given certain observability-like conditions) and is likely
asymptotically unbiased.
6

Note that systems with larger-eigenvalue dynamics were tested as well with similar results; the
system used in this section was chosen for visualization purposes.
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Figure 3.6: Velocity estimates by each
filter.

3.7.3

100

Figure 3.7: Absolute errors by each filter.

Velocity Estimation with Biased Measurements

Finally, we evaluate the sigmoid-based context-aware filter in a scenario with both
plant (continuous) and context measurements; note that plant measurements are
biased in order to illustrate the fact that context measurements can be used to
improve estimation in scenarios where standard sensors are not sufficient. Once
again, we use the LandShark robot as the experimental platform. In this case study,
the LandShark is moving in a straight line in an urban environment, accelerating
to a target velocity and then slowing down for intersections. The LandShark’s goal
is to estimate its velocity in order to avoid collisions at intersections while moving
as quickly as possible. Once again, it has access to GPS measurements to estimate
velocity; however, the GPS velocity measurements have a negative bias at high
speeds, thus potentially causing the LandShark to apply higher inputs and reach a
dangerously high speed. In order to improve estimation, the LandShark can also
measure air resistance at the front of the vehicle; while resistance cannot be mapped
to speed in a straightforward fashion, it possible to establish whether the vehicle
is moving beyond a certain velocity threshold. This information can be converted
into a binary context measurement indicating that the LandShark is approaching its
target velocity and can be consequently modeled using a sigmoid function.
To evaluate the performance of the sigmoid-based filter, we compare it with a
Kalman filter that is only using the continuous measurements (note that a classical
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Kalman filter is sufficient in this case since the vehicle is moving in a straight line).
Figure 3.6 shows the estimates produced by each filter, including the actual velocity.
Once again, the context measurements provide essential information that allows
the system to significantly improve its state estimates and overcome the GPS bias,
especially when running at high speeds. In addition, Figure 3.7 provides the absolute
errors of each filter; the Kalman filter’s errors have a much larger variance and are
invariably higher as well, similar to the localization scenario discussed above. Thus,
this case study also supports the conclusion that the context-aware can be used to
greatly improve estimation by incorporating binary context measurements.

3.8

Estimation of Blood Oxygen Concentration
Using Context-Aware Filtering

While the previous case studies were simulated and focused on automotive CPS, in
this section we investigate a medical CPS application of the sigmoid-based contextaware filter using real-patient data collected at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP). In particular, we address the problem of non-invasively estimating
the concentration of oxygen (O2 ) in the blood, one of the most closely monitored
variables in operating rooms (ORs).
The motivation for this problem comes from the fact that modern ORs are
equipped multiple devices that measure various vital signs and provide clinicians
with ample information about the patient’s state. Analyzing this information in real
time can be challenging in a busy OR, especially when trends over time and correlations between variables need to be considered. The OR setting fits exactly in the
framework of this thesis, namely the design and development of CPS that process
multi-sensor information and provide safety analysis of the resulting system.
As mentioned above, the specific problem addressed in this section is the estimation of the O2 concentration (also referred to as content) in the blood; the O2
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content has to be maintained within certain limits at all times because too low values
can lead to organ failure and brain damage whereas too high concentration could be
toxic. Therefore, one of clinicians’ highest priorities is controlling the O2 by keeping
a stable and sufficient end-organ perfusion.
Similar to the previous case studies, the estimation of O2 content is made challenging by imprecise measurements. The total concentration can currently be measured only in an invasive fashion, i.e., by drawing blood from the patient. As a result,
clinicians use a non-invasive alternative, namely the hemoglobin-oxygen saturation
(Sp O2 ), which is measured by a pulse oximeter. While Sp O2 is a good measure of the
concentration in the location where it is measured (e.g., a finger tip), it is not a good
indication of the O2 content in other parts of the body as there may be differences
in perfusion (e.g., as caused by a tourniquet on a limb). Furthermore, monitoring
Sp O2 forces clinicians to perform reactive control only – they take action when low
Sp O2 is observed, at which point the patient may already be in a critical state.
As a proactive way of controlling the O2 concentration, clinicians also monitor
the remaining O2 content (i.e., non-hemoglobin-bound), namely the content of O2
dissolved in arterial blood. Unlike Sp O2 , the partial pressure of dissolved oxygen in
arterial blood (denoted by Pa O2 ) can used as a predictive control indicator – Pa O2
drops significantly before major decreases in the overall concentration are observed.
At the same time, Pa O2 is currently only measured by drawing blood from the
patient, which is invasive and requires more time (on the order of several minutes),
thus losing its predictive value.
To overcome this problem, in this thesis we address the problem of estimating
Pa O2 non-invasively and in real time. To do so, we employ other measurements
available in real time in modern ORs, namely the fractions of O2 and carbon dioxide
(CO2 ) in inhaled and exhaled air, respectively, the pressure and volume of inhaled
air, and the respiratory rate. By using the correlation between Pa O2 and these
pulmonary variables, one can estimate Pa O2 without having to draw blood from the
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patient. However, this approach introduces another challenge – models describing
the circulation of O2 in the blood and airways are imprecise and contain multiple
parameters that vary widely across patients, e.g., metabolic rate, lung membrane
thickness, arterial wall thickness. While it may be possible to learn some of these
parameters given enough data, most of them are not identifiable using non-invasive
measurements only. At the same time, certain binary correlations between variables
can be established, e.g., when Sp O2 is above a certain threshold, then the overall
O2 concentration must be above a certain threshold as well. Having obtained such
binary measurements, we can now apply the context-aware filter to the O2 content
estimation problem.

3.8.1

Related Work

Related work in the MCPS domain can be broadly divided in three areas: verification, detection and estimation [125, 142, 149]. When precise models are available, it
is possible to use formal methods in order to analyze the system and ensure it satisfies
certain safety properties; several applications have been investigated in this domain,
including the cardiac pacemaker [33, 154], the artificial pancreas [37, 122, 217] and
the verification of the infusion pump [16, 157].
The most common approach to detection of adverse events in hospitals is the use
of threshold alarms [117]. These systems work by tracking a single vital sign and
raising an audible alarm when an upper or lower threshold is crossed [72]. Threshold
alarms are popular because they are simple to implement and understand. However,
multiple works have shown that single-variable-tracking alarms are severely limited
because they tend to produce a large amount of false alarms, ranging from 57%
to 99% depending on the application [32, 88, 206]. This in turn has led to the
problem of alarm fatigue in caregivers who would sometimes ignore important alarms
believing that they are false [59, 71, 187]. The main reason threshold alarms fail is
that physiological models contain a lot of parameters that vary drastically across
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humans – in order to deal with this issue and to provide consistent and guaranteed
performance regardless of the patient physiology, the parameter-invariant detector
has been developed [177, 216] and successfully applied to three different detection
scenarios, namely critical pulmonary shunt detection [107, 108], meal detection in
Type I diabetics [50, 215] and hypovolemia detection [169, 170].
Estimation tends to be harder than detection because it requires knowledge of
physiological models in order for the resulting estimates to be accurate. Physiological models are typically developed using compartments [53] – in this setting a
compartment may represent an actual physical location, e.g., a lung, or may be an
abstraction for a larger component, e.g., the transport of blood from the heart to
the tissues. Example compartmental models include the cardiac [204] and insulinglucose [133] systems. A fundamental challenge of compartmental modeling is the
balance between physiological accuracy and model identifiability. While accurate
models may better capture human physiology, it is harder to identify their parameters using standard system identification techniques [17, 105, 129]. On the other
hand, parsimonious models can be identifiable through the training data, but their
accuracy may be poor.
In cases where models may be difficult to develop or identify, it may be possible
to use data-driven approaches such as machine learning [41, 54, 144, 160, 174, 175].
In order to perform well, however, machine learning requires rich training data
with accurate annotations [29] which may not be available in most medical applications [71, 189]. Moreover, temporal reasoning over clinical data using data-driven
techniques is still an open area of research [194, 197]. Thus, it is unlikely that a pure
data-driven approach will perform well as an oxygen content estimator. Instead, as
explained below, in this dissertation we approach the problem by building a crude
physiological model and improving it by providing extra information through context
measurements.
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(a) A blood gas analyzer [3].

(b) A pulse oximeter [4].

(c) A standard anesthesia machine [5].

Figure 3.8: Measurement devices currently available to clinicians.

3.8.2

Problem Formulation

This subsection outlines the current approach to monitoring the O2 concentration,
notes its drawbacks, and formulates the problem addressed by the context-aware
filter.
Currently, clinicians have only one available real-time measurement on the blood
side, namely the hemoglobin-oxygen saturation in the peripheral capillaries (Sp O2 ),
measured by a pulse oximeter (Figure 3.8b) at an extremity (usually a finger tip).
The saturation is a good measure of the O2 concentration in the location it is measured because of the oxygen content equation [218]:
Cp O2 = 1.34Sp O2 Hb + 0.003Pp O2 ,

(3.25)

where Cp O2 is O2 concentration in the peripheral capillaries, Hb is the amount of
hemoglobin in g/dL, and Pp O2 is the partial pressure of dissolved oxygen in the
peripheral capillaries measured in mmHg. As can be observed in (3.25), O2 appears
in only two forms in the blood – it is either bound to hemoglobin or dissolved in the
blood. Equation (3.25) shows that, for normal values of Pp O2 around 80-200 mmHg
and of Hb around 12-17 g/dL [218], the majority of O2 is bound to hemoglobin.
Thus, Sp O2 is a good measure of the O2 concentration in the peripheral capillaries.
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Figure 3.9: A typical hemoglobin dissociation curve for O2 . It shows the shape of the
relationship between the partial pressure of dissolved O2 and hemoglobin saturation.
The curve is true for any physiological location, e.g., in the peripheral capillaries the
horizontal axis label would be Pp O2 and the vertical would be Sp O2 .

By assuming that Cp O2 is just a delay of Ca O2 (the O2 concentration in the arteries),
Sp O2 can also be used as a good proxy for Ca O2 . The disadvantage of using only
Sp O2 , however, is that it is usually at 100% in healthy humans – by the time it
starts dropping, the O2 content has already decreased; hence, monitoring the O2
concentration through Sp O2 is reactive in nature.
In contrast, monitoring the partial pressure of dissolved O2 is proactive. In
addition to (3.25), dissolved O2 and hemoglobin-bound O2 are related according to
a well-studied hemoglobin dissociation curve [181]. Figure 3.9 shows an example
dissociation curve. While the magnitude of the curve may vary across patients, the
overall S-shape remains the same. Figure 3.9 shows that for large values of the
partial pressure (top right corner), the saturation is close to 100%; at the same time,
any noticeable decrease in saturation (and consequently the O2 concentration) can
be observed only after a large decrease in the partial pressure. Thus, monitoring
the partial pressure of dissolved O2 in arterial blood (Pa O2 ) provides clinicians with
a proactive way of addressing changes in O2 content before they are reflected in
changes in Sp O2 .
Estimating Pa O2 , however, is challenging because it cannot be measured non-
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invasively and in real time (it can only be measured by drawing blood and analyzing
it in a blood-gas analyzer, shown in Figure 3.8a). Instead, we focus on other realtime measurements, available in modern ORs, as means to infer Pa O2 . At CHOP, the
anesthesia machine (Figure 3.8c) provides several pulmonary measurements, namely
the fractions of O2 and CO2 in inspired and expired air, the volume and pressure of
inspired air, respiratory rate and others. At the same time, estimating Pa O2 from
these variables is not straightforward – while it is possible to model the relationship
between Pa O2 and the anesthesia machine measurements (e.g., using Fick’s laws of
diffusion), such models contain multiple parameters that vary widely across patients.
Instead of learning these parameters for each patient (which is made challenging
by the limited amount of available data), we aim to incorporate the pulmonary
measurements by extracting context information from them, thereby improving the
overall O2 content estimates.
Problem 6. The problem considered in this section is to develop an estimator for
Pa O2 and Ca O2 by using the noninvasive real-time inputs (fraction of O2 in inspired
air, volume and pressure of inspired air, respiratory rate) and pulmonary measurements (partial pressure of CO2 in exhaled air) available to clinicians.
Remark: Our solution uses one blood-gas analysis in order to initialize the estimator.

3.8.3

Physiological Model

In order to develop an estimator for Pa O2 , one needs to first identify a model mapping the available measurements to Pa O2 , as well as formalize the dynamics of the
variables in the human body. This subsection develops both of these models; a
general-trends dynamics model is described first capturing the first-order effects of
the circulation of O2 around the body. Next, a measurement model is presented,
containing both the available regular continuous measurements as well as context
measurements derived from the real-time pulmonary measurements.
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Table 3.1: Summary of cardiopulmonary partial pressures and blood concentrations.
Partial pressures begin with the letter “P” whereas concentrations begin with “C”.
Variable Names
Pi O2
PA O2
Ca O2 , Pa O2
Cp O2 , Pp O2
Cv O2 , Pv O2
Cd O2 , Pd O2
Pe O2

Figure 3.10: A simplified schematic
model of O2 variables in the respiratory and cardiovascular systems.7

3.8.4

Physiological Location
Airways (inspiration)
Alveoli
Arteries
Peripheral capillaries
Veins
Pulmonary capillaries
Airways (expiration)

Figure 3.11: An illustration of shunted (bottom) vs. non-shunted (top) blood dynamics
in the lung. O2 -rich non-shunted blood participates in diffusion and then mixes with
CO2 -rich shunted blood.

Overview of Physiological Variables

Before presenting the actual models, we first provide an overview of the physiological
variables used in this section. For reference, all variables are summarized in Table 3.1
and shown in Figure 3.10. In inspired air, the partial pressure of O2 is denoted by
Pi O2 . In the lungs, the air enters the alveoli where the partial pressure is denoted
7

Note that, for better illustration, the figure shows the pulmonary veins merging before entering
the heart, whereas in healthy humans they connect to the left atrium directly.
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by PA O2 . In the alveoli, diffusion occurs, and the gas enters the blood stream at the
pulmonary capillaries where the partial pressure of O2 is denoted by Pd O2 and the
total concentration is Cd O2 . Note that, as shown in Figure 3.11, some of the blood
is shunted (e.g., due to blood draining directly into the cavity of the left ventricle
through the thebesian veins [218]) and does not participate in diffusion. When the
blood from the pulmonary veins enters the heart, it is pumped in the arteries where
the partial pressure and concentration are denoted by Pa O2 and Ca O2 , respectively.
The arteries transport the blood to the peripheral capillaries (Pp O2 and Cp O2 ),
where metabolism occurs and converts O2 into CO2 . Finally, the veins (Pv O2 and
Cv O2 ) transport the blood back to the lungs and the cardiovascular cycle repeats.
The breathing cycle concludes with expiration, where the partial pressure of O2 in
expired air is denoted by Pe O2 .
Dynamics Model
Having introduced the variables and processes at a high level, we now formalize the
model dynamics. While models of varying complexity exist in the literature, typically, as the model complexity increases, so does the number of unknown model
parameters (e.g., lung capacity, metabolism) that vary across patients. Since these
parameters are unidentifiable with current non-invasive measurements, the most
popular approach is to use minimal models, i.e., models with a minimal number
of parameters that still capture the first- or second-order dynamics of the system.
Therefore, we develop a minimal dynamics model, building on results from the work
of Kretschmer et al. [120] on estimating Pa O2 and from our previous work [107] on
detecting drops in the O2 concentration. Our model is approximate in the sense that
it captures general trends and relationships among the variables in order to reduce
the number of unidentifiable parameters. We use population average values for the
few remaining parameters and improve the fidelity of the model by incorporating
binary context measurements.
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We develop a discrete-time model for the O2 concentration and later discuss how
to convert from concentrations to partial pressures.8 The relationship between the
variables in the airways is governed by the alveolar air equation [79]:
PA O2 (k) = Fi O2 (k)(PAT M − PH2 O ) −

PA CO2 (k)(1 − Fi O2 (k)[1 − RQ])
,
RQ

(3.26)

where Fi O2 is the fraction of O2 in inhaled air (it can be converted to Pi O2 using
the first term on the right-hand side), PA CO2 is the partial pressure of CO2 in the
alveoli, PAT M and PH2 O are the atmospheric and water vapor pressures (in mmHg),
respectively, and RQ is the respiratory quotient. RQ is a measure of the ratio of
O2 and CO2 used in metabolism and varies with the type of consumed food. Note
that Fi O2 is set by clinicians, so it can be considered as input, whereas PA CO2 is
measured by end-tidal CO2 (EtCO2 ), i.e., the partial pressure of CO2 at the end of
the breath.9
When diffusion occurs, O2 usually diffuses completely so that the partial pressures
are the same:
Pd O2 (k) = PA O2 (k).

(3.27)

After diffusion, O2 is in the blood, so its concentration needs to be computed as
well. To convert from partial pressure to concentration, one uses (3.25)10 in combination with the O2 dissociation curve (Figure 3.9) in order to compute the saturation
corresponding to that partial pressure. Let us denote the dissociation curve by g,
i.e., g is a function mapping partial pressures of dissolved O2 to hemoglobin oxygen
saturation. Thus, the O2 concentration in the pulmonary capillaries after diffusion
8

Our model is discrete-time because the available sensors (at CHOP) have a discrete sampling
rate. It does not model the partial pressures of dissolved O2 directly because the required relationships are nonlinear and would unnecessarily complicate the estimation task.
9
Note that EtCO2 might be smaller than PA CO2 due to dead space, i.e., the volume of air in
the airways that is not in contact with blood. However, dead space is about 5% of tidal volume [58],
hence it is not considered in this dissertation.
10
Note that the O2 content equation is true for any location in the body, i.e., one can replace
Cp O2 and Pp O2 with Cd O2 and Pd O2 .
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can be expressed as:
Cd O2 (k) = 1.34Hb · g(Pd O2 (k)) + 0.003Pd O2 (k).

(3.28)

Note that g varies greatly between patients. We show how to select g based on
population averages below.
Continuing with the cardiovascular dynamics, the concentration in arterial blood,
as shown in Figure 3.11, is the weighted average of the concentrations in shunted
and non-shunted blood, according to the fraction f of shunted blood. Then
Ca O2 (k) = (1 − f )Cd O2 (k) + f Cv O2 (k),

(3.29)

where the shunted blood has the same O2 concentration as venous blood.
The O2 concentration in the peripheral capillaries is assumed to be the same as
in the arteries [218], i.e., no reactions occur that change the gas concentrations:
Cp O2 (k) = Ca O2 (k).

(3.30)

Finally, the concentration in the veins is equal to that in the peripheral capillaries
minus the effect of metabolism:
Cv O2 (k + 1) = Cp O2 (k) − µ,

(3.31)

where µ captures the patient-specific metabolic rate. Note that a delay is introduced
in order to model the fact that it takes time for the blood to travel from the arteries
to the veins.
The whole parameterized model can now be summarized in a typical state-space
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equation:
ak+1 = (1 − f )(dk+1 ) + f (ak − µ) + v1,k

(3.32)

ek+1 = ek + v2,k
where ak := Ca O2 (k), dk := Cd O2 (k), ek := PA CO2 (k), vk := [v1,k , v2,k ]T is white
Gaussian process noise. Modeling the dynamics of PA CO2 (k) more precisely is possible but introduces more parameters. A random walk model achieves two goals: 1)
a linear model with few parameters is maintained and 2) PA CO2 is a system state
and, hence, may vary less than the noisy EtCO2 measurements.
Note that the model in (3.32) is close to linear in the ranges we are interested in. To see this, note that Fi O2 (k), i.e., the fraction of O2 in inhaled air,
is 21% in breathing air and usually much higher during mechanical ventilation.
This means that PA O2 (k), as computed in (3.26), is also very high (in the extreme case when Fi O2 (k) = 100%, PA O2 (k) = 713mmHg, with normal values for
PAT M = 760mmHg, PH2 O = 43mmHg). This in turn means that Pd O2 (k) is also
high, i.e., in the top right corner of the dissociation curve in Figure 3.9. Therefore,
g(Pd O2 (k)) ≈ 1, i.e., (3.28) simplifies to:
Cd O2 (k) = 1.34Hb + 0.003Pd O2 (k).

(3.33)

Using (3.33) in (3.32), the new model becomes
ak+1 = (1 − f )(1.34Hb + 0.003(c1 uk + c2,k ek )) + f (ak − µ) + v1,k

(3.34)

ek+1 = ek + v2,k ,
where c1 = (PAT M − PH2 O ), uk = Fi O2 (k) and c2,k = (1 − uk [1 − RQ])/RQ.
Thus, the above model is a linear time-varying system (note that the input uk ,
which also appears in c2,k , is multiplied by one of the states, ek , but this does not
introduce non-linearities because we are only considering the estimation problem
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and not the control problem). There are several parameters in the model; as argued
above, these cannot be learned due to unobservability. Thus, we select population
average values for the parameters (except for f ) and argue that context measurements will correct model inaccuracies. More specifically, based on medical literature [218], these values were selected as: Hb = 12 g/dL, PAT M = 760 mmHg, PH2 O =
47 mmHg, µ = 5 mL/dL, RQ = 0.8.
The parameter f , which represents the fraction of shunted blood, does not have
typical ranges and can vary widely depending on the patient’s condition (e.g., a
pulmonary shunt leads to 50% shunted blood). Thus, we adopt an approach used in
prior work [120] for the estimation of f . This requires an initializing measurement of
Pa O2 through blood-gas analysis. By obtaining this measurement, one can estimate
Ca O2 through (3.28), where a functional form for g is also assumed, as developed
in [115]. Then, using (3.32) and assuming that ak+1 = ak = a, one obtains the
equation:
a = (1 − f )d + f (a − µ),

(3.35)

where d is computed from (3.28). This equation can now be solved for f in order to
obtain the fraction of shunted blood.
Measurement Model
As usual in the context-aware setting, the available measurements are split into
continuous and context. The only available continuous measurement is
yk = ek + wk ,

(3.36)

where yk := EtCO2 (k) and wk is white Gaussian measurement noise, independent
of the process noise vk .
In addition to the continuous measurement, the system has access to several
context measurements. The first context measurement can be derived from the
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hemoglobin-oxygen saturation – when Sp O2 is below 100%, this information can be
used to upper-bound the O2 concentration since the majority of O2 is hemoglobinbound (as shown in (3.25)). Note that we do not use Sp O2 measurements directly in
the model since mapping the saturation to the concentration of dissolved O2 requires
knowledge of the magnitude of the dissociation curve g. The alarm related to Sp O2
measurements is raised when Sp O2 (k) drops below 99%. According to (3.25), one
can reasonably conclude that if Sp O2 < 99%, then Ca O2 < (1.34 ∗ 0.99)Hb. This
naturally leads to a threshold alarm based on Sp O2 and to the sigmoid-based context
aware filter. The sigmoid parameters of the context detection function in (3.7) can
be set to vi = [1 0]T , ai = −(1.34 ∗ 0.99)Hb.
The second class of alarms consists of several alarms due to the more complicated
nature of the signal. This class of alarms aims to use the three other inputs available
to clinicians: tidal volume (Vt ), respiratory rate (RR) and peak inspiratory pressure
(P IP ). Each of these inputs affects diffusion through Fick’s law of diffusion, which
can be stated as follows, adapted to this application [218]:
d˙k ∝ cA(PA O2 (k) − Pd O2 (k)),

(3.37)

where dk = Cd O2 (k) as before, c is a constant that captures the O2 diffusive capacity
and lung thickness, and A is the lung surface area. Equation (3.37) states that
the number of diffused moles is directly proportional to the surface area and to the
difference between the pressures in the lung and in the blood. Note that (3.37)
cannot be solved because of the unknown initial condition and unknown parameters.
However, one can compute the signal on the right hand side at each point in time;
since it is proportional to O2 diffusion, when the signal is higher, one would expect
the O2 concentration to increase as well.
To construct this signal, note that if we make the usual assumption that a lung
2/3

is a sphere, then A ∝ Vt

. In addition, since a patient can take several breaths

in between two measurements, the respiratory rate can be used as well in order to
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compute a “cumulative tidal volume” since the last measurement, i.e.,
V̄ (k) =

tS
RR(k)Vt (k),
60

(3.38)

where tS is the sampling time in seconds. Thus A ∝ V̄ 2/3 .
Furthermore, note that P IP is directly proportional to PA O2 . Thus, one can
adapt (3.26) to include P IP as effectively increasing atmospheric pressure:
PA O2 (k) = Fi O2 (k)(PAT M − PH2 O + P IP (k)) −

PA CO2 (k)(1 − Fi O2 (k)[1 − RQ])
.
RQ
(3.39)

The final piece of the “diffusion” signal is the initial value of Pd O2 (k). Since
the initial value is equal to the venous Pv O2 (k), Pd O2 (k) is directly proportional
to Pa O2 (k − 1); therefore, we use the expected value of ak−1 to obtain an “expected” Pa O2 (k). To obtain a rough estimate of the partial pressure, one needs
to invert (3.25) and solve the following nonlinear equation (e.g., by using simplex
methods):
E[ak−1 ] = 1.34Hb · g(E[Pa O2 (k − 1)]) + 0.003E[Pa O2 (k − 1)],

(3.40)

where E denotes the expectation operator; note that a functional form of g must be
assumed, e.g., as in [115]. Thus, the final constructed signal is:
sk = V̄ (k)2/3 ∗ (PA O2 (k) − E[Pa O2 (k − 1)]).

(3.41)

In order to use s as a context measurement, one needs to identify changes in its
baseline and raise alarms. To do this, an initial baseline of the signal is selected, and
alarms are raised if the signal is too high or too low with respect to that baseline. In
particular, suppose the first blood-gas measurement of Pa O2 is received at time step
q; then the value of sq is selected as a baseline and alarms are raised at a later step k
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if sk is lower than 0.5sq or 0.8sq or if it is higher than sq , 1.2sq , or 1.5sq . Therefore,
similar to the first class of context measurements, one can use a sigmoid function to
model these binary measurements.
To select the respective Ca O2 thresholds, we note that since sk is directly proportional to Ca O2 , a relative change in sk should result in a similar relative change in
Ca O2 (k). Thus, we identify the baseline Ca O2 (q) and set the thresholds accordingly.
For example, if sk < 0.8sq , then an alarm is raised and the corresponding sigmoid
parameters are vi = [1 0]T , ai = −0.8Ca O2 (q). The other thresholds are derived
similarly.
This fully specifies the context observation model and completes the full system
model. The following subsection presents the case-study evaluation of this model
and of the resulting context-aware filter.

3.8.5

Case Study

This section presents a case-study evaluation of the context-aware estimator for
Pa O2 . We use real-patient data collected during lung lobectomy surgeries on children
performed at CHOP. A lung lobectomy is the surgical removal of a lung lobe, often
due to disease such as cancer or a cystic lung lesion; lobectomies often require onelung ventilation (i.e., the endotracheal tube is inserted down a mainstem bronchus,
so the patient breathes with one lung only) in order to keep the perioperative lung
still. In children, one lung is often not enough to provide sufficient O2 to the body,
hence the O2 concentration tends to decrease.
For evaluation purposes, we use the blood-gas samples taken during these cases
and compare them with our estimates. As mentioned earlier, clinicians do not usually
draw blood unless they suspect a problem, hence there are at most several measurements per case, while most cases do not have any. After removing all cases with less
than two measurements (recall that one is necessary for the algorithm initialization),
we retain 51 cases overall. In each case, we initialize the context-aware filter with
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Figure 3.12: Absolute errors for each of the two compared Pa O2 estimators, the
context-aware filter and the Fi O2 -based estimator. Red dashed line shows the average
error of the context-aware filter, whereas blue dashed line indicates the average error
of the Fi O2 -based estimator.

the first blood-gas measurement and evaluate it on the remaining ones. In addition,
as described in the previous section, the diffusion signal baseline (used to define
context measurement thresholds) is also computed at the time of the first blood-gas
measurement. Finally, note that the available blood-gas measurements only contain
Pa O2 measurements, hence only Pa O2 estimates are evaluated.
Figure 3.12 presents the absolute errors of the context-aware filter, with all measurements from all patients stacked together. For better evaluation, we compare
the filter with a Pa O2 estimation algorithm developed in previous work that uses a
similar model and also requires one blood-gas measurement for initialization [120];
this algorithm is named here “Fi O2 -based estimator”. As can be seen in the Figure,
the context-aware filter eliminates all of the Fi O2 -based estimator outliers except for
one (discussed below). In addition, the context-aware filter achieves a lower average error overall, 51.7 mmHg, than the Fi O2 -based estimator’s average error, 63.3
mmHg. To put the error in perspective, note that Pa O2 measurements are usually
in the 200-400 mmHg range (due to Fi O2 being usually close to 100%), with the
exception of a few cases with infants where it is in the 100-200 mmHg range. With
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Figure 3.13: Example cases for different scenarios. Red Sp O2 data points indicate
low-Sp O2 alarms; blue Sp O2 data points indicate no Sp O2 alarms. Diffusion signal:
red data points indicate 0.5sq alarms; yellow data points indicate 0.8sq alarms; green
data points indicate no alarms; blue data points indicate 1.2sq alarms; magenta data
points indicate 1.5sq alarms (recall sq is the diffusion signal at the initialization point,
i.e., first blood-gas analysis).
this in mind, errors of 100 mmHg are still significant; yet, the reasonably uniform
distribution of the errors suggests that the context-aware filter is not greatly affected
by inter-patient variability and is thus a reasonable choice of estimator, once a more
accurate model and more precise context measurements are obtained.
To further analyze the performance of the context-aware filter, we analyze two
cases, one with very good performance and one with bad performance. Figure 3.13a
presents an example case where context measurements bring a significant improvement.11 It shows the estimates of each of the two estimators, together with the
blood-gas samples, as well as all other measurements and inputs used in the filters. Note that after the initializing blood-gas measurement, clinicians reduce Fi O2
11
Note that the estimates prior to the first blood-gas sample are not used for evaluation but are
included for completeness.
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(around time step 800), probably content with the patient’s current condition. Yet,
other inputs (Vt , RR, P IP ) do not change greatly, indicating that the patient’s O2
concentration should not decrease significantly. This is confirmed by the diffusion
signal, which only decreases by about 20%; thus the 0.8sq alarm is raised but the
0.5sq alarm remains silent, which causes the filter to set the estimate somewhere in
between. In contrast, the Fi O2 -based estimator is greatly affected by the reduced
Fi O2 .
As an example bad-performance case, we consider the outlier in Figure 3.12 for
the context-aware filter. Note that, once again, the context-aware filter is not greatly
affected by the decreased Fi O2 . In this case, the problem is that the diffusion signal is
actually too low at the initialization stage (around step 580), so high-signal alarms
are raised later. A possible explanation for the bad performance of the filter in
this case is a wrong timestamp of the first blood-gas sample; these timestamps are
entered manually and are prone to significant errors, as explored in prior work [189].
In particular, note that tidal volume and respiratory rate are steadily decreasing
from around step 420 onwards; thus it is not unlikely that the blood-gas sample was
obtained at that time as well. As is apparent from the diffusion signal, if the baseline
is set around step 420, no high-signal alarms would be raised later. Finally, note
that estimation is made harder by the lack of low-Sp O2 alarms.
Based on these results, we conclude that the context-aware filter is a promising
direction for future research in the MCPS area. By incorporating auxiliary information, it is able to correct some of the deficiencies of imprecise models and results in
better estimation overall, even when the variables in question are unobservable.

80

Chapter 4
Safety Detection Using Sensor
Fusion
In this chapter, we consider the main problem of this dissertation, namely safety
detection. As noted in Chapter 1, modern systems can fail and be attacked in
arbitrary ways; thus, it is difficult to justify any assumptions about the timing
or types of faults/attacks. At the same time, since we are primarily interested
in providing accurate information to the controller (in the form of estimation and
detection), we focus on attacks and faults in sensors only and assume that other
components (e.g., actuators) behave as modeled.
We address the problem of safety detection in the presence of arbitrary sensor
attacks and faults by using the inherent redundancy in modern CPS. As shown
in Chapter 1, modern CPS have access to multiple sensors that can be used to
provide redundant information (e.g., several sensors can be used to estimate velocity
in the LandShark robot). Using redundancy allows us to develop safety detection
techniques without making assumptions about how and when sensors might fail/be
attacked; as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, such assumptions are made in most related
work on detection/estimation, which makes those approaches not suitable for the
problem considered in this dissertation.
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Sensor redundancy has been explored in depth in the area of sensor fusion where
sensors are generally considered to measure the same variable but through different
means and with different accuracies [109, 136]. One of the first works in this field [136]
assumes that sensors provide one-dimensional intervals and shows worst-case results
regarding the size of the fused interval based on the number of faulty sensors in the
system. A variation of [136] relaxes the worst-case guarantees in favor of obtaining
more precise fused measurements through weighted majority voting [38]. Another
extension combines the abstract and probabilistic models by assuming a probability
distribution of the true value inside the interval and casting the problem in the
probabilistic framework [222]. Finally, sensors can be assumed to not only provide
intervals but also multidimensional rectangles and balls [51] and more general sets
as well [139, 140].
Sensor redundancy has also been applied to multiple fault detection and isolation
problems where relations between sensor measurements can be derived [211]. Similarly, it might also be possible to combine the measurements and draw conclusions
using a voting [45, 114] or a fuzzy voting scheme [30].
The concept of sensor redundancy has also been used in attack resilience research
as well. In particular, Fawzi et al. [78] provide worst-case state estimation analysis
depending on the number of attacked sensors; more specifically, they derive sufficient
conditions on the maximum number of attacked sensors the system can tolerate, i.e.,
conditions under which the system can recover its initial state. This result was
extended for the purposes of resilient state estimation where the authors considered
bounded process and measurement noise as well [158, 159].
In this dissertation, we provide several contributions over related works. First
of all, we modify the sensor fusion framework in order to handle multidimensional
measurements. In particular, we model each sensor as providing a multidimensional
polyhedron (constructed around the physical sensor’s measurement). Based on the
assumption that at most half of all sensors are attacked/faulty, a bounded fusion
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polyhedron is derived that is guaranteed to contain the true value. The fusion
polyhedron is then used for safety detection – if it does not contain any unsafe
states, the system is considered safe.
In addition, we develop a few algorithms for reducing the size of the fusion polyhedron (thereby improving the guarantees of sensor fusion). In the first, we incorporate historical measurements in order to improve the output of sensor fusion. More
specifically, we develop several approaches for mapping historical measurements to
the current time and compare them in terms of the volume of the resulting fusion
polyhedron. Different optimal approaches are presented depending on the assumptions on attacked sensors (e.g., the same sensors are attacked at all times).
In the second approach, we revisit the overall system architecture and note that
in many modern CPS, nodes communicate over a shared bus (e.g., a CAN bus in automotive CPS); thus, all sensor measurements can be observed by all other system
components, including attacked ones. In addition, these systems are often implemented in a time-triggered fashion where at every round of execution, each sensor
transmits its measurement during its allocated time slot, according to a predefined
schedule [184, 199]. This in turn means that, depending on the schedule, the attacker can consider other (correct) sensor measurements before sending his own in
an attempt to increase the uncertainty of the sensor fusion output while remaining
undetected. Therefore, we consider different communication schedules (based on sensors’ precisions) and investigate how they affect the attacker’s impact on the output
of sensor fusion. We provide both theoretical and experimental evidence to show
that systems with similar architectures to the one considered in this work should
implement the Ascending schedule, which orders sensors according to their precision
starting from the most precise.
Finally, we note that the above algorithms assume that less than half of all
sensors are faulty or attacked at any given time. However, sensors often experience
transient faults that recover on their own (e.g., GPS losing connection in a tunnel)
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– since transient faults are a normal part of system operation, controllers should be
designed to be robust and achieve a guaranteed level of performance regardless of the
manifestation of these faults. On the other hand, sensor fusion loses its worst-case
guarantees if all sensors are allowed to be faulty at a given time. Thus, we develop
a transient fault model for each sensor and a corresponding sensor fusion algorithm
that is still guaranteed to contain the true state (and can be used for safety analysis)
even in the presence of transient sensor faults.
All of the above approaches are evaluated both in simulation and in experiments
using the LandShark robot. Thus, we believe that this is a powerful framework
that can be used to improve the resilience of any modern CPS that have access to
redundant information.

4.1

System Model and Problem Formulation

This section formalizes the sensor fusion framewrok as well as the attack models
used in rest of this chapter. The problem formulations considered in this chapter are
stated as well.

4.1.1

System Model

We begin by noting that many of the techniques used in sensor fusion are independent
of system dynamics (i.e., they are applied at every time step and provide guarantees
even if the dynamics are unknown). That is why we do not specify a dynamics model
at this point and leave the dynamics model in its most general form, i.e.,
xk+1 = f (xk , uk ) + νkp .

(4.1)

At the same time, some of the following sections are developed with specific dynamics
models in mind – the corresponding assumptions are always explicitly noted in their
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respective sections.
The sensor model, on the other hand, is markedly different from the one in Chapter 3 – while in Chapter 3 we used a probabilistic model, here we adopt an abstract
sensor model (also known as a set membership model). The reason for this is that
although probabilistic models are well suited for describing a system’s expected operation and expected state estimation given the measurements, their safety detection
performance may suffer when the wrong noise distributions are selected. Under the
abstract model, on the other hand, a set is constructed around each sensor’s measurement containing all possible values for the true state, where the size of the set
depends on the sensor’s accuracy. By tracking these sets over time, one may be
able to draw conclusions about the system’s safety even in the worst case, e.g., if
none of the received “measurements” contain unsafe states, then the system must
be safe. Thus, the abstract model does not require any assumptions on the process
or measurement noise distributions and is naturally suited for safety and security
analysis.
Another modification to the sensor model is that in this chapter we abstract away
the functional relation between the state and the measurements. More specifically,
we assume that all sensors measure the state directly despite the fact that the actual
measurements may be some non-linear functions of the state. This assumption allows us to consider sensors as truly providing redundant information and to directly
compare their “measurements”. Note that while this assumption may not hold in
certain systems (e.g., in medical scenarios it is difficult to convert most available
measurements to other available measurements), it is a reasonable assumption in
many other cases where the same variable may be estimated through several sensors
(e.g., speed can be estimated using multiple sensors on the LandShark as shown in
Figure 1.2a). Naturally, these different sensors will have varying accuracy depending
on the estimation technique that is used; yet, by leveraging the redundant information that they provide, the system should be able to detect when it is unsafe even in
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the presence of attacks/faults in some of the sensors.
We now formalize the above notions by using the abstract sensor framework, as
noted above. Thus, each sensor i provides a direct measurement of the state at time
k of the form
m
yi,k = xk + νi,k
,

(4.2)

m
is bounded measurement noise. Using the bounds on ν m , one may then
where νi,k

construct the set of all possible values for xk given yi,k . These bounds can be obtained by using sensor specifications and manufacturer guarantees or they can also
be learned from data by observing the system’s operation and the largest deviations
of the measurements from the true states.
An intuitive approach to specifying the bounds on ν m is to select bounds in each
dimension independently, i.e., form an d-rectangle around the measurement. However, since most modern sensors employ internal filtering techniques (e.g., Kalman
filters in GPS) these bounds are not always as simple as d-rectangles; furthermore,
some camera-based velocity and position estimators used in urban robotics applications, for example, guarantee different position precisions at different velocities.
Therefore, we use a more expressive notion than d-rectangles, namely d-dimensional
polyhedra.1 Thus, each abstract sensor i can now be considered as providing an
d-dimensional polyhedron Pi,k (constructed around the actual measurement yi,k ) of
the form
Pi,k = {yi,k + z ∈ Rd | Bi z ≤ bi },

(4.3)

where Bi ∈ Rq×d and bi ∈ Rq (for some q) are parameters that are determined by
the accuracy of sensor i.
By construction, each polyhedron Pi,k in (4.3) is guaranteed to contain the true
state under nominal conditions. At the same time, sensors often experience transient
1
Note that in some areas the term “polyhedron” is used to refer to three-dimensional objects
only. In this work, polyhedra can have arbitrary dimensions; in some areas, a “convex polytope”
is another synonym for “polyhedron” as used in this thesis.
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faults, e.g., a camera might be affected by the sun or by temporary obstructions.
Thus, we distinguish between a correct and a faulty measurement depending on
whether a polyhedron contains the true value.
Definition. A measurement is said to be correct if the corresponding polyhedron
contains the true state times and faulty, otherwise.

4.1.2

Attack Model

In addition to sometimes being faulty, a sensor can also be attacked. Note that
no assumptions are made on attacked sensors – once a sensor is under attack, the
attacker can send any measurements on behalf of that sensor. The only assumptions we make are on the number of attacked sensors – we distinguish between two
quantities, namely the real number of attacked sensors, denoted by fa , as well as the
assumed upper bound by the system on the number of attacked sensors, denoted by
f.
Assumption. We assume that the (assumed) upper bound on the number of attacked
sensors, f , is always larger than the actual number of attacked sensors, and that the
number of attacked sensors, fa , is less than half of all sensors, i.e.,
fa ≤ f ≤ dn/2e − 1,

(4.4)

where n is the total number of sensors.
This assumption ensures that the problem is decidable – if it does not hold, then
the system cannot provide any bounds on the true state.

4.1.3

Problem Statement

Given the system and attack models defined above, we can now state the safety
detection problem considered in this dissertation. Note that in the sensor fusion
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framework we perform safety detection by checking whether the fusion polyhedron
(which is guaranteed to contain the true state) contains any unsafe states. Thus, the
problem of sensor fusion is to obtain a minimal-in-volume fusion polyhedron that is
guaranteed to contain the true state.
Note that we first address the nominal sensor fusion problem where sensors are
assumed to be always correct unless they are attacked. In this setting, we address
three problems: 1) the problem of obtaining a minimal fusion polyhedron in a single
time step; 2) the problem of obtaining a minimal fusion polyhedron when historical measurements are used as well; 3) the problem of analyzing different schedules
of measurement transmissions in order to minimize the attacker’s information and
impact on the size of the fusion polyhedron.2 These three problems are stated below.
Problem. The first problem in the sensor fusion framework is how to obtain a fusion
polyhedron in a single time step, i.e., a minimal-volume polyhedron that is guaranteed
to contain the true state.
Problem. The second problem is to incorporate historical measurements in the sensor fusion algorithm in order to further reduce the volume of the fusion polyhedron
while preserving the guarantee that it contains the true state.
Problem. The third problem is to consider different schedules of measurement transmissions in order to limit the attacker’s impact on the size of the fusion polyhedron.
Note that the above problems are all addressed in the nominal case, i.e., when
non-attacked sensors always provide correct measurements. However, if sensors are
allowed to temporarily provide faulty measurements as well, then the fusion polyhedron would not be guaranteed to contain the true state at all times since it is possible
that all sensors might provide faulty measurements at the same time. Thus, we also
consider the problem of sensor fusion in the presence of transient sensor faults.
2

Note that the third problem is only addressed in the one-dimensional case as shown in Section 4.6.
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Problem. The problem of sensor fusion in the presence of transient sensor faults is
to produce a bounded fusion polyhedron that is guaranteed to contain the true state
at each time step despite the fact that unattacked sensors might experience transient
faults (choosing an appropriate model for transient faults is also a contribution of
this dissertation).

4.2

Sensor Fusion in One Dimension

We begin our discussion of sensor fusion with the special one-dimensional case. In
this case each sensor’s polyhedron reduces to an interval. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, sensor fusion with intervals has been studied extensively in
the related literature. In this section, we briefly describe the classical sensor fusion
algorithm in one dimension [136].
The inputs to the one-dimensional sensor fusion algorithm are n real intervals,
and a number f that denotes an upper bound on the number of attacked3 intervals
the system might have. The fusion interval is then computed as follows: its lower
bound is the smallest point contained in at least n − f intervals and the upper bound
is the largest such point. Intuitively, the algorithm works conservatively: since at
least n − f intervals are correct, any point that is contained in n − f intervals may
be the true value, and hence it is included in the fusion interval.
The algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4.1. When f = 0 and the system is confident
that every interval is correct, the fusion interval is just the intersection of all intervals.
When at most one sensor can be attacked (f = 1), the fusion interval is the convex
hull of all points contained in at least four intervals. Similarly, when f = 2 the fusion
interval contains the convex hull of all points that lie in at least three intervals. As
shown in Figure 4.1, as f increases so does the uncertainty represented as the size
of the fusion interval. In particular, for f = n − 1 the fusion interval is the convex
3

Note that the original sensor fusion work was developed with faulty, not attacked, sensors in
mind [136]. We modify the paper’s language to refer to attacked sensors.
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Figure 4.1: Fusion interval for three values of f . Dashed horizontal line separates
sensor intervals from fusion intervals in all figures.

hull of the union of all intervals.
Three important results of this work are worth noting. If f ≤ dn/3e − 1, then the
width of the fusion interval is bounded above by the width of some correct interval.
Additionally, if f ≤ dn/2e − 1, the width of the fusion interval is bounded above
by the width of some interval (not necessarily correct). Finally, if f ≥ dn/2e, then
the fusion interval can be arbitrarily large. Thus, as noted in Section 4.1.2, we
assume that f is always at least as large as the true number of attacked sensors, fa ,
and always less than half of all sensors, i.e., fa ≤ f ≤ dn/2e − 1, causing the fusion
interval to be bounded.

4.3

Notation

Before we address the problem of multidimensional sensor fusion, we introduce some
notation that is used throughout this chapter. Let Nk denote all n polyhedra at time
k. We use SNk ,f to denote the fusion polyhedron given the set Nk and a fixed f . Let
|P | denote the volume of polyhedron P ; in particular, |SNk ,f | is the volume of the
fusion polyhedron. We use Ck to denote the (unknown) set of all correct polyhedra.
Finally, we use s1 , . . . , sn to denote the sensors themselves (not their measurements).
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Algorithm 1 Sensor Fusion Algorithm
Input: An array of polyhedra P of size n and an upper bound on the number of
corrupted polyhedra f
1: C ← combinations n choose n minus f (P )
2: RNk ,f ← ∅
3: for each K in C do
4:
add(RNk ,f , intersection(K))
5: end for
6: return conv(RNk ,f )

4.4

Multidimensional Sensor Fusion

The sensor fusion alorithm in the multidimensional case uses the same intuition as the
one-dimensional case, with the main difference being that different tools are required
to argue over general polyhedra as opposed to one-dimensional intervals. The sensor
fusion algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. It is based on the algorithm for drectangles described by Chew and Marzullo [51]. It computes the fusion polyhedron
by finding all regions contained in n − f polyhedra, denoted by RNk ,f , and then
taking their convex hull in order to return a polyhedron, i.e.,
SNk ,f = conv(RNk ,f ),

(4.5)

where conv(·) denotes the convex hull. Intuitively, the algorithm works in the same
conservative fashion as the one-dimensional case – since there are at least n − f
correct polyhedra, any point that is contained in n − f polyhedra may be the true
state, and thus it is included in the fusion polyhedron; the convex hull is computed
since the output should be in the same format as the inputs (i.e., a polyhedron).
The algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The system consists of three sensors,
hence three polyhedra are obtained, and is assumed to have at most one attacked
sensor. Therefore, all regions contained in at least two polyhedra are found, and
their convex hull is the fusion polyhedron (shaded).
Proposition 6. The fusion polyhedron computed by Algorithm 1 will always contain
91

Figure 4.2: An illustration of the proposed sensor fusion algorithm.

the true state.
Proposition 7. The fusion polyhedron computed by Algorithm 1 is the smallest
convex set that is guaranteed to contain the true state.
Having shown the desired properties of the proposed algorithm, we comment on
its complexity. There are two subprocedures with exponential complexity. First,
finding all combinations of n − f polyhedra is exponential in the number of polyhedra. Second, computing the convex hull of a set of polyhedra requires finding their
vertices; this problem, known in the literature as vertex enumeration, is not known
to have a polynomial algorithm in the number of hyperplanes defining the polyhedra
(hence in their dimension) [20].
We now provide some bounds on the volume the fusion polyhedron. To prove
the first bound, for completeness we first provide the following lemma that will be
useful in showing the final result.
Lemma 2. The vertices of the convex hull of a set of polyhedra are a subset of the
union of the vertices of the polyhedra.
Before formulating the theorem, we introduce the following notation. Let minp B
denote the pth smallest number in the set of real numbers B with size r = |B|.
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Figure 4.3: An example showing that the bound specified in Theorem 4 is tight.

Similarly, we use maxp B to denote the pth largest number in B. We note that
minp B = maxr−p+1 B (e.g., if B = {14, 15, 16}, min1 B = 14 = max3 B). Finally, let
vP be the number of vertices in the fusion polyhedron.
Theorem 4. If f < n/vP then
|SNk ,f | ≤ minf vP +1 {|P | : P ∈ Nk }.
Theorem 4 suggests that if f < n/vP then the volume of the fusion polyhedron
is bounded by the volume of some polyhedron. We note that this condition may
not always hold as the number of vertices of the fusion polyhedron may be the sum
of the number of vertices of the original polyhedra. However, the condition is tight
in the sense that if it does not hold, then the volume of the fusion polyhedron may
be larger than the volume of any of the individual polyhedra. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.3. In this case, each polyhedron (P1 , P2 , P3 or P4 ) is a triangle that is a half
of the big square, so n = 4, and f = 1 = n/vP . Hence the fusion polyhedron, i.e.,
square, is larger in area than any of the triangles. In cases like this one, we resort
to the following bound.
Theorem 5. If f < dn/2e, then |SNk ,f | is bounded by the volume of conv(Ck )
(i.e., the convex hull of all correct polyhedra).
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In conclusion, three different upper bounds on the volume of the fusion polyhedron exist based on different values of f . If f ≥ dn/2e, then the fusion polyhedron
can be arbitrarily large. This is due to the fact that there are now enough corrupted
sensors to include points not contained in any correct polyhedra in the fusion polyhedron (as opposed to Theorem 5). On the other hand, if f ≤ dn/2e − 1, then
|SNk ,f | ≤ |conv(Ck )|. In addition, if f < n/vP , then the volume of SNk ,f is bounded
from above by the volume of some polyhedron. Note that either of the last two
bounds may be tighter than the other depending on the scenario.

4.5

Sensor Fusion Using Historical Measurements

Having developed a sensor fusion algorithm that produces a minimal fusion polyhedron from n polyhedra in a given time step, we now consider the problem of incorporating knowledge of system dynamics to reduce the volume of the fusion polyhedron
by using measurement history. In this section, we assume that state dynamics have
the following linear form:
xk+1 = Ak xk + νkp ,

(4.6)

where xk ∈ Rd is the state as before, Ak ∈ Rd×d is the transition matrix and νkp ∈ Rd
is bounded noise such that kνkp k ≤ M , where k · k denotes the L∞ norm, and M is
a constant.
Note that in this setting we are still assuming that non-attacked sensors provide
correct measurements at all times. We relax this assumption in Section 4.7.
In order to use historical measurements, one needs to first of all develop a technique for mapping previous measurements to the current time using the dynamics
model (similar to the prediction stage of the Kalman filter). For each polyhedron
Pi,k , this can be done using the following map m:
m(Pi,k ) = {z ∈ Rd | z = Ak p + q, ∀p ∈ Pi,k , kqk ≤ M }.
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Thus, m(Pi,k ) is once again a polyhedron (due to the linear mapping and the bounds
on νkp ) that describes the prediction of Pi,k one step in the future.
For simplicity, we also introduce the notation ∩p , referred to as pairwise intersection. In particular, if m(Nk ) is the mapping of all n polyhedra to the next time
step, i.e.,
m(Nk ) = {m(Pi,k ), i = 1, . . . , n},
then let m(Nk ) ∩p Nk+1 denote the intersection of each sensor si ’s measurement in
time k + 1 with the mapping of si ’s measurement from time k, i.e.,
m(Nk ) ∩p Nk+1 = {Pi0 | Pi0 = m(Pi,k ) ∩ Pi,k+1 , i = 1, . . . , n}.
Note that this set again contains n polyhedra, some of which may be empty.
It is worth noting here that our assumptions impose a restriction on the number
of ways in which history can be used. In particular, we only assume an upper bound
on the number of attacked sensors; thus, it is not possible to map subsets of the
polyhedra while guaranteeing that the fusion polyhedron contains the true value. In
other words, such mappings would require additional assumptions on the number of
corrupted sensors in certain subsets of Nk ; hence, all permitted actions in this work
are:
1. computing fusion polyhedra for all n polyhedra in a given time step;
2. mapping this fusion polyhedron to the next time step;
3. mapping all polyhedra to the next time step, thus doubling both n and f .
Based on these permitted actions, we can now enumerate different ways of historical
measurements. While it is challenging to exhaustively list all possibilities, following
are the ways of using past measurements considered in this work:
1. map n: In this approach we map all polyhedra in Nk to time k + 1, and obtain
a total of 2n polyhedra in time k +1. We then compute their fusion polyhedron
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with 2f as the bound on the number of corrupted polyhedra. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.4a. Formally the fusion polyhedron can be described as
Sm(Nk )∪Nk+1 ,2f .

2. map S and intersect: This algorithm computes the fusion polyhedron at time
k, maps it to time k + 1, and then intersects it with the fusion polyhedron at
time k + 1, as illustrated in Figure 4.4b. Formally we specify this as
m(SNk ,f ) ∩ SNk+1 ,f .

3. map S and fuse: Here the fusion polyhedron from time k is mapped to time
k + 1, thus obtaining a total of n + 1 polyhedra at time k + 1, as presented
in Figure 4.4c. Note that f is still the same because SNk ,f is guaranteed to
contain the true value by Proposition 6. Formally this is captured by
Sm(SNk ,f )∪Nk+1 ,f .
4. map R and intersect: This is similar to map S and intersect, but instead we
map RNk ,f to time k + 1, intersect with RNk+1 ,f , and compute the convex hull
as illustrated in Figure 4.4d. Formally we describe this as
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ).

5. pairwise intersect: This algorithm performs pairwise intersection as shown in
Figure 4.4e. Formally we capture this as
Sm(Nk )∩p Nk ,f .
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(a) map n

(b) map S and intersect

(c) map S and fuse

(d) map R and intersect

(e) pairwise intersect

Figure 4.4: Illustrations of the different methods of using history. For simplicity
Ak = I, the identity matrix, and νkp = 0.

97

The obvious way to compare these algorithms is through the volume of the fusion
polyhedra. We provide below a series of results that relate the sizes of the fusion
polyhedra for the aforementioned methods of incorporating measurement history.
Note that all methods are compared over two time steps only – one can use induction
to show the same results hold over the entire timeframe of system operation.
Theorem 6. The region obtained using map R and intersect is a subset of the region
derived by map n.
Theorem 7. The polyhedron derived by map R and intersect is a subset of the polyhedron obtained by map S and intersect.
Theorem 8. The polyhedron obtained by map R and intersect is a subset of the
polyhedron derived using map S and fuse.
Theorems 6, 7 and 8 suggest that map R and intersect is the best of the first
four methods enumerated above as can also be seen in Figure 4.4. This intuitively
makes sense since it is only keeping enough information from previous measurements
to guarantee that the true value is preserved. In particular, it is not computing the
convex hull at time k as map S and intersect and map S and fuse do (and potentially introduce additional points to the fused region), nor is it mapping potentially
corrupted polyhedra as does map n.
We note, however, that without additional assumptions about the rank of Ak ,
map R and intersect and pairwise intersect are not subsets of each other. Counterexamples are presented in Figure 4.5. In Figure 4.5a, RNk ,f is a single point that is
projected onto the x axis. Hence map R and intersect is a subset of pairwise intersect,
which produces an interval of points. Conversely, Figure 4.5b shows an example
where pairwise intersect is a point, and map R and intersect is an interval containing that point. It is worth noting, however, that regardless of which of the two
approaches is used, pairwise intersect can be used as a preliminary step to detect
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attacked sensors – if the two polyhedra of a certain sensor have an empty intersection, then the sensor must be attacked in one of the rounds; thus, it can be discarded
from both, effectively reducing n and f by one.

(a) map R and intersect is not a subset of pairwise intersect.

(b) pairwise intersect is not a subset of
map R and intersect.

Figure 4.5: Examples showing that, in general, polyhedra obtained using
map R and intersect and pairwise intersect are not subsets of each other if Ak is
not full rank.
Finally, we note that if Ak is a full rank matrix and νkp = 0, then pairwise intersect
is the best of all five methods, as shown in the following theorem.4
Theorem 9. If Ak is full rank and νkp = 0, the polyhedron obtained by pairwise intersect
is a subset of the polyhedron derived using map R and intersect.
Therefore, we argue that systems that incorporate past measurements in their
sensor fusion algorithms should use the pairwise intersect method. We now show
that it satisfies the worst-case requirements, same as the no-history case. In addition,
we show that adding historical measurements is always beneficial for the system.
Proposition 8. The fusion polyhedron computed using pairwise intersect will always
contain the true state.
Proposition 9. The fusion polyhedron computed using pairwise intersect is never
larger than the fusion polyhedron computed without using history.
4

A similar counter-example to Figure 4.5 can be found in the case when νkp 6= 0.
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Note that pairwise intersect and map R and intersect do not add significant computational complexity to the no-history sensor fusion algorithm described in Section 4.4. While they still suffer from the exponential procedure of computing the
fusion polyhedron at each time, each of the two methods requires storing at most
n polyhedra to represent historical measurements – intuitively they are the “intersection” of all past measurements. Thus, implementing any of these methods will
not add substantial computational or memory cost for the system. The algorithm’s
implementation is discussed in greater detail in the evaluation section.

4.5.1

Evaluation

Given our results in Section 4.5, we argue that systems with linear dynamics should
use the pairwise intersect method. This section provides an algorithm that implements this method and a case study to illustrate its usefulness.
Implementation
The implementation is shown in Algorithm 2. In essence, at each point in time n
polyhedra (the pairwise intersections) are stored. Thus, past meas represents the
“pairwise intersection” of all previous measurements of each sensor. In addition to
being more efficient in terms of the size of the fusion polyhedron, the algorithm also
needs very little memory – the required memory is linear in the number of sensors
irrespective of how long the system runs.
An important detail that is hidden inside the pair inter function is how attacked
sensors are dealt with. If a sensor si ’s two polyhedra have an empty intersection
then that sensor must be attacked. In this case, both polyhedra are discarded and n
and f are reduced by one. Furthermore, the system has the option of discarding all
future measurements provided by the sensor si ; alternatively, the system may update
past meas with si ’s measurement in the next round. Which choice is made depends
on the system’s trust in the sensor – if it is believed to be continuously under attack,
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Algorithm 2 Implementation of the pairwise intersect algorithm
Input: f , the number of attacked sensors
1: past meas ← ∅
2: for each step k do
3:
cur meas ← get meas(k)
4:
if past meas == ∅ then
5:
past meas ← cur meas
6:
else
7:
past meas = pair inter(cur meas, past meas)
8:
end if
9:
S ← fuse polyhedra(past meas, f )
10:
send polyhedron to controller(S)
11: end for
then discarding all or some of its future measurements is the better option. However,
if it is attacked only in certain conditions (e.g., on certain territory), then its future
measurements should be kept and incorporated in the algorithm. Quantification of
sensor trust, however, is not within the scope of this paper, hence we take this choice
as a design-time decision (input) and leave its analysis for future work.
Case Study
To show the effectiveness of the pairwise intersect approach, we use the sensors
available to the LandShark. In this section, we use four of the LandShark’s sensors
that can be used to estimate velocity – GPS, camera and two encoders. In addition,
GPS and the camera can be used to estimate the vehicle’s position. Therefore, the
encoders provide the controller with interval estimations of the vehicle’s velocity only,
whereas GPS and the camera send two-dimensional polyhedra as estimates of the
velocity and position.5 The sizes of the encoders’ intervals were obtained based on
the manufacturer’s specification, whereas the shapes and sizes of GPS and camera’s
polyhedra were determined empirically – the LandShark was driven in the open,
and largest deviations from the true values (as measured by a high-precision laser
5

For this case study we only require one-dimensional position as will become clear in the next
paragraph. However, our approach could easily be applied to multidimensional measurements.
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(a) GPS under attack.

(b) Camera under attack.

(c) Encoder under attack.

Figure 4.6: Sizes of velocity (ONLY) fusion intervals for each of the three simulated scenarios; Dashed line – volume of the fusion polyhedra when measurement
history is not considered, Solid line – volume of the fusion polyhedra obtained using
pairwise intersect.
tachometer) were collected.
Given this information, the following three scenarios were simulated. The LandShark is moving in a straight line at a constant speed of 10 mph. In each scenario, a
different sensor was attacked such that a constant offset of 1 mph was introduced to
the sensor’s speed estimate. The sensors’ speed tolerances were as follows: 0.2 mph
for the encoders, 1 mph for GPS and 2 mph for the camera. GPS’s tolerance for
position was 30 feet, whereas the camera’s tolerance varies with speed (hence its
polyhedron is a trapezoid) and was 100 feet at 10 mph. At each point in time,
we compute the fusion polyhedron in two ways – using only current measurements
and using the pairwise intersect method. Finally, we record the differences and the
improvement achieved by using history.
To illustrate consistence with earlier one-dimensional works (e.g., [136]), for each
of the three scenarios we first computed the size of the fusion interval in one dimension. Figure 4.6 presents the results. For each scenario, the size of the fusion
interval was never larger when using pairwise intersect, while the gain was significant
at certain times. This is particularly apparent when the encoder was under attack.
The reason for this, as we explain in Section 4.6, is that it is in general beneficial for
the attacker to corrupt the most precise sensors.
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(a) GPS under attack.

(b) Camera under attack.

(c) Encoder under attack.

Figure 4.7: Sizes of fusion polyhedra of velocity and position for each of the three
scenarios simulated; Dashed line – volume of the fusion polyhedra when measurement
history is not considered, Solid line – volume of the fusion polyhedra obtained using
pairwise intersect.
Figure 4.7 presents the results when two-dimensional polyhedra are considered.
Note that in this case there are only two sensors estimating the robot’s position
– when one is attacked, the size of the fusion polyhedron can grow dramatically.
Consequently, pairwise intersect is greatly beneficial for the system as it identifies
the attacked sensors and discards their measurements when their polyhedra do not
intersect. It is worth noting here that in all simulated scenarios if a sensor is found
corrupted in any step we do not disregard its measurement in the next step. Note
also that the volumes in Figure 4.7 are much larger than those in Figure 4.6 – this
is a result of the fact that position tolerances are measured in feet and are larger
than 10. (i.e., 30 feet for GPS). Finally, as consistent with Proposition 8, all fusion
polyhedra contained the actual value of velocity (i.e., 10 mph).

4.6

Attack-Resilient Sensor Transmission Scheduling

In this section we present another approach for improving the performance of sensor
fusion, namely the introduction of a sensor transmission schedule in order to limit
the attacker’s information. As described in the introduction of this chapter and as
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illustrated in Figure 1.1, many modern CPS use a shared bus for communication
between different components (e.g., a CAN bus in automotive CPS). This allows the
attacker to inspect other sensors’ measurements before sending the spoofed measurements in order to maximize the impact on sensor fusion. At the same time, modern
CPS usually operate in a time-triggered fashion such that each sensor transmits each
measurement during a pre-allocated time slot; this effectively creates a schedule of
sending measurements at each round. Thus, in this section we analyze how different schedules (based on sensor precisions) affect the attacker’s impact (for different
attack strategies) and compare these schedules in terms of the size of the resulting
fusion interval.
Note that only the one-dimensional case is considered in this section since the
concept of sensor precision (which is crucial when analyzing transmission schedules)
does not extend to multiple dimensions in an obvious fashion (e.g., a sensor might be
very precise in one dimension and very imprecise in another). In fact, the analysis
presented in this section does not hold in multiple dimensions if sensor precision
is measured by the volume of the fusion polyhedron. Thus, the multidimensional
scheduling analysis for systems with different precision metrics (and possibly different
measurement sets such as balls instead of polyhedra) is left for future work as well.

4.6.1

System Model

As noted above, in this section we assume a single-state system. We assume a linear
bounded-noise system (similar to the one in Section 4.5):
xk+1 = ak xk + νkp ,

(4.7)

where xk ∈ R is the state, ak ∈ R is the transition “matrix” and νkp ∈ R is bounded
noise such that |νkp | ≤ M , and M is a constant.
The observation model is once again grounded in the abstract sensor framework
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– each sensor si provides a direct measurement of the state at time k of the form
m
,
yi,k = xk + νi,k

(4.8)

which is then converted to an interval, denoted by Ii,k (note that we use the notation
Ii,k instead of Pi,k in order to highlight the fact that each measurement is now an
interval instead of a polyhedron). Note that, once again, in this setting non-attacked
sensors are assumed to provide intervals that contain the true state.6
Finally, note that the time-triggered design of the system ensures that each sensor
(attacked or not) sends its measurement during its allotted time slot at each time
step.

4.6.2

Attack Model

This section focuses solely on stealthy attacks that are designed to disrupt system
performance while remaining undetected. We define “disrupt system performance”
as maximizing the size of the fusion interval – since larger fusion intervals mean
higher uncertainty (potentially followed by more frequent emergency responses, such
as system shutdowns, due to safety concerns), such an attack might have a severe
effect on system performance. Thus, the attacker’s goal is to maximize the size of
the fusion interval while remaining undetected; the detection algorithm used by the
system is a conservative attack detection algorithm, in which a sensor is declared
attacked if its interval does not intersect the fusion interval, in which case it is
guaranteed not to contain the true state (Chapter 6 presents a more sophisticated
detection approach that also considers transient sensor faults).
Note that, similar to the rest of this chapter, we assume that the number of
attacked sensors, fa , is less than half of the total number of sensors.
6

Extending the analysis presented in this section to the case with transient faults is left for
future work. One of the main challenges with such an extension would be formulating a reasonable
attack strategy (that also considers transient faults), which is one of the main contributions of this
section.

105

Assumption. We assume that the (assumed) upper bound on the number of attacked
sensors is always larger than the actual number of attacked sensors, and that the
number of attacked sensors fa is less than half of all sensors, i.e.,
fa ≤ f ≤ dn/2e − 1,

(4.9)

where n is the total number of sensors.

4.6.3

Problem Statement

Given the above model, we note that the attacker’s impact depends on the position
of his sensors in the transmission schedule. In particular, if his sensors are last in
the schedule, the attacker can examine all other measurements before sending his
intervals. This would allow him to place his interval(s) in the way that maximizes
damage while not being detected. Therefore, the problem considered in this section
is the following:
Problem. How does the sensor communication schedule affect the attacker’s impact
on the performance of sensor fusion (as measured by the size of the fusion interval)
in a given round and over time? Find the schedule that minimizes this impact.

4.6.4

Notation

The notation used in this section is the same as before, with some additions. In
particular, let Nk denote all n intervals at time k, and let SNk ,f denote the fusion
interval given the set Nk and a fixed f , as before. The main difference is that
instead of Pi,k we now use Ii,k to denote sensor i’s interval at time k. Finally, let li,k
and ui,k be the lower and upper bound of sensor i’s interval, respectively, such that
|Ii,k | = ui,k − li,k . Note that all time indices are dropped in Section 4.6.5, where only
one round is considered in isolation.
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4.6.5

Attack Strategy and Worst-Case Analysis

Note that the attack strategy, as stated in Section 4.6.2, is not fully specified. In
particular, while it may be easy to see what is the best strategy from the attacker’s
point of view when the attacked sensors are last in the transmission schedule, selecting the best placement for the attacked intervals from other slots in the schedule
is not trivial. Therefore, this section formalizes the attack strategy considered in
this work and illustrates how the attacker’s capabilities vary with the utilized transmission schedule. Given this strategy, the second part of the subsection provides
worst-case results to suggest which sensors would be most beneficial for the attacker
to corrupt and for the system to defend, respectively. We denote the strategy with
AS1 ; to illustrate its effectiveness from the attacker’s point of view, we compare it
with another viable strategy in Section 4.6.6. Note that this section does not consider
the use of previous sensor readings, hence a single round is analyzed in isolation. We
introduce the use of measurement history in Section 4.6.7.
As described in Section 4.6.2, the attacker has a goal, maximize the size of the fusion interval, and constraints, stay undetected. We now formalize the two, beginning
with the latter.
Constraints: Staying Undetected
Formally, the attacker has two modes: passive and active, as defined below. When in
passive mode, the attacker’s constraints are tighter, and thus his impact is limited. In
active mode, on the other hand, the constraints on the placement of the compromised
intervals are looser, hence the attacker can send intervals that would greatly increase
the uncertainty in the system.
The attacker begins in passive mode, in which the main goal is to stay undetected.
The detection mechanism used in this section is to check whether each interval has a
nonempty intersection with the fusion interval;7 since the fusion interval is guaran7

In Section 4.6.7, we use historical measurements to improve the system’s detection capabilities.
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teed to contain the true state, any interval that does not intersect the fusion interval
must be compromised. Thus, in passive mode, the attacker computes the intersection
of all seen measurements, including his own sensors’, which is the smallest interval
from the attacker’s perspective that is guaranteed to contain the true state. We
denote this intersection by ∆. Therefore, in passive mode the attacker must include
∆ in his interval (any point that is not contained may be the true state) and has no
restrictions on how to place the interval around ∆ (if the interval is larger than ∆8 ).
The attacker may switch to active mode when at least n − f − far measurements
have been transmitted, where far is the number of unsent compromised intervals.
At this point, the attacker may send an interval that does not contain ∆ because
he is aware of enough sent measurements, i.e., he can prevent his sensor from being
detected because he has exactly far remaining intervals to send and can guarantee
each interval overlaps with n−f −1 sensors and with the fusion interval, consequently.
When in active mode, the attacker is not constrained when sending his intervals as
long as overlap with the fusion interval is guaranteed.
Goal: Maximizing the size of the fusion interval
When maximizing the size of the fusion interval, the attacker’s strategy consists
of two different cases depending on the position of the attacker’s intervals in the
transmission schedule: one to target the largest interval and another to target the
largest expected interval.
Specifically, if all the attacker’s sensors are scheduled to transmit last, meaning
that the attacker will be aware of all measurements prior to sending his, his strategy
can be stated through the following optimization problem, where variables a1 , . . . , afa
8

Note that it cannot be smaller than ∆ since ∆ includes the intersection of all measurements of
the corrupted sensors.
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represent the attacked intervals:
max |SN ,f |

a1 ,...,af a

(4.10)

s.t. SN ,f ∩ ai 6= ∅, i = 1, . . . , fa .
Since the solution to this problem can be obtained with full information about the
correct sensors’ measurements, we call this solution and the strategy that led to it,
respectively, optimal.
Definition. The attack strategy obtained as a solution to the optimization problem
(4.10) (i.e., the placements of the attacked intervals that achieve the solution) is called
optimal (from the attacker’s point of view) given the correct sensors’ measurements.
Any attack strategy that achieves this solution is also referred to as optimal.
Note that the attack strategy described by optimization problem (4.10) is optimal
by definition. However, there are scenarios in which there exists no optimal strategy
for the attacker if his sensors are not last in the schedule. For example, consider
the scenario depicted in Figure 4.8, where out of three sensors, a1 is under attack.
Suppose that the attacker transmits second in the schedule so that he is aware of I1
and his own sensor’s measurement but not of I2 . Given the measurements shown in
the figure, the attacker cannot guarantee that the fusion interval will be maximized
regardless of the interval that he sends. In particular, if a1 is sent to the left of I1
(a1 (1) in the figure) then I2 could appear as shown, in which case a1 (2) would have
resulted in a larger fusion interval. Other attacks could be similarly shown to not
be optimal for any possible placement of I2 .
While the attacker may be able to choose which sensors to attack, as argued in
Chapter 1, certain sensors may not be compromised without detection or at all, with
the resources available to the attacker. Thus, the attacker may not always ensure
that his sensors would be last in the transmission schedule. Consequently, in cases
such as the one in Figure 4.8, a reasonable strategy for the attacker is to maximize
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Figure 4.8: An example showing that if attacker (sinusoid) has not seen all intervals
then he has no strategy that guarantees the fusion interval is maximized.

the expected size of the fusion interval. The expectation is computed over all possible
placements of the unseen correct and compromised intervals.9 Formally, for each
compromised interval am (where m is an index in {1, . . . , fa }) the attack strategy
can be described with the following optimization problem
max

am ,...,af a

E |SN ,f |

R
Cm

(4.11)

s.t. SN ,f ∩ ai 6= ∅ i = m, . . . , fa ,
R
where Cm
is the set of all possible placements of the correct intervals that will be

transmitted after am , and E is the expectation operator.
As shown in Figure 4.8, there are scenarios in which no optimal strategy exists;
yet, there do exist cases in which there is an optimal solution even if the attacker is
not last in the schedule (and the strategy obtained as a solution to the optimization
problem (4.11) leads to that solution). In particular, there exist scenarios in which
if the unseen intervals are small enough it is possible for the attacker to obtain an
optimal strategy.
To formalize this statement, we introduce the following notation. Let C S be the
set of seen correct intervals and let C R be the set of correct sensors that have not
9

To compute the expectation, the attacker is implicitly assuming intervals are uniformly distributed around ∆. If additional information is available about the distribution of sensor measurements, it can be incorporated in the optimization problem (4.11).
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(a) Attacker has seen I1 and I2 ,
while the unseen I3 is small enough.

(b) Attacker has seen I1 and
I2 , while the unseen I3 is small
enough.

Figure 4.9: Examples of the two cases of Theorem 10. Attacked intervals are indicated by sinusoids.
transmitted yet. Let ln−f −fa be the (n − f − fa )th smallest seen lower bound and
let un−f −fa be the (n − f − fa )th largest seen upper bound. Finally, let amin be the
attacked sensor with smallest width.
Theorem 10. Suppose n − f − fa ≤ |C S | < n − fa . There exists an optimal attack
strategy if one of the following is true:
(a) ∀Ii , Ij ∈ C S , li = lj , ui = uj and ∀Il ∈ C R , |Il | ≤ (|amin | − |SC S ∪∆,0 |)/2
(b) |amin | ≥ un−f −fa − ln−f −fa and
∀Il ∈ C R , |Il | ≤ min {lSCS ∪∆,0 − ln−f −fa , un−f −fa − uSCS ∪∆,0 }
Remark. Note that the conditions in the theorem state that either all seen correct
intervals coincide with one another, and the attacker can attack around them (a);
or that the unseen correct intervals are small enough so that they cannot change the
extreme points contained in at least n−f −fa seen correct intervals (b), in which case
the attacker can attack around these points. Both cases are illustrated in Figure 4.9.

Worst-Case Analysis
Given the attack strategy described above, we now analyze worst-case results based
on the sizes of the attacked and correct sensors. The first result puts the problem in
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perspective – it provides an absolute upper bound on the size of the fusion interval.
Theorem 11. Let Ic1 and Ic2 be the two largest-width correct sensors. Then |SN ,f | ≤
|Ic1 | + |Ic2 |.
Theorem 11 provides a conservative upper bound on the size of the fusion interval
because it does not directly take into account the sizes of the attacked intervals. The
following results analyze how the worst case varies with different attacked intervals.
To formulate the theorems, we use the following notation. Let L be the set of
predefined lengths of all intervals. We use Sna to denote the worst-case (largest
width) fusion interval when no sensor is attacked. Similarly, let SF be the worstis
case fusion interval for a fixed set of attacked sensors F, |F| = fa , whereas Sfwc
a
the worst-case fusion interval for a given number of attacked sensors, fa . Finally, we
refer to the set of n fixed (i.e., specific) measurement intervals as a “configuration”.
Note that |Sna | ≤ |SF | ≤ |Sfwc
| by definition. The first inequality is true since when
a
there are no attacks, all intervals must contain the true value, which is not the case
in the presence of attacks, hence the worst-case is at least the same. The second
inequality is true since the worst-case with fa attacks may not be achieved for any
F with |F| = fa .
Theorem 12. If the fa largest intervals are under attack, then |Sna | = |SF |.
The theorem is illustrated in Figure 4.10a. The attacked intervals a1 and a2 both
do not contain the true value, which is at the intersection of the other sensors. Since
a1 and a2 are the largest intervals, they can be moved and can be made correct while
preserving the size of the fusion interval. Hence, the same worst case can be achieved
with correct intervals.
Theorem 13. |Sfwc
| is achievable if the fa smallest intervals are under attack.
a
Figure 4.10b illustrates the theorem. The worst-case for the setup can be achieved
when either Ia or Ismall is attacked.
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(a) Attacking the biggest intervals does not change the worst
case in the system.

(b) Attacking the smallest intervals can achieve the absolute
worst case.

Figure 4.10: Illustrations of Theorems 12 and 13.
A few conclusions can be drawn from the worst-case results shown in this subsection. First of all, from Theorem 11, the smaller the correct intervals are, the smaller
the fusion interval will be in the worst case, regardless of the attacker’s actions. In
addition, as shown in Theorems 12 and 13, the attacker benefits more from compromising precise sensors as opposed to less precise ones. Intuitively, this is true because
imprecise sensors produce large intervals even when correct; attacking precise sensors, however, and moving their intervals on one side of large correct intervals, with
the true value on the other, may significantly increase the uncertainty in the system.
Therefore, one may conclude that it is better for system designers to prioritize the
protection of the most precise sensors.

4.6.6

One-Round Schedule Comparison and Analysis

In this subsection, we analyze the schedule design for communication over the shared
bus in Figure 1.1. It builds on the analysis in Section 4.6.5 by considering how
different schedules affect the capabilities of the attacker. In particular, we examine
the effect of each schedule on the size of the fusion interval.
We first note that the only information available a priori to system designers is
the sensors’ accuracy and their intervals’ sizes, consequently. Thus, any investigated
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(a) An example where the Ascending schedule
is better for the system.

(b) An example where the Descending schedule is better for the system.

Figure 4.11: Two examples that show that neither the Ascending nor the Descending
schedule is better for the system in all situations. The first column shows the measurements by the sensors, including the attacked one. The other columns contain
the intervals sent to the controller, and the corresponding fusion interval.
schedule must be based on interval lengths alone. We focus on the two schedules,
named Ascending and Descending, which schedule sensor transmissions in order
starting from the most and least precise, respectively.
We first note that neither schedule is better than the other in all scenarios.
Figure 4.11 shows two examples in which different schedules are better, i.e., they
produce smaller fusion intervals. In Figure 4.11a the fusion interval obtained with
the Descending schedule is larger because the attacker is aware of the position of
the largest interval. Figure 4.11b, however, shows that knowing the largest interval
does not necessarily bring the attacker any useful information because he can only
increase the fusion interval by overlapping with I1 and I2 . Hence, if he is aware of I3
when sending his interval he would send aD but that would be worse for the attacker
than sending aA which would be the case if the attacker had seen I1 and I2 instead.
Since the two schedules cannot be compared in the absolute sense, we consider
the average case over all possible sensor measurements. In particular, we investigate
the expected size of the fusion interval for a fixed set of sensors with fixed precisions.
One may consider all possible measurements of these sensors and all possible attack
combinations (with fa < dn/2e), and compute the average length of the fusion
interval over all combinations. Note that there are two main considerations when
computing this expectation: (1) what is the distribution of sensor measurements
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around the true state (e.g., uniform over the interval? normal?) and (2) what is the
likelihood of different sensors being attacked.
In the following analysis we investigate two possible distributions, uniform and
normal,10 and assume that all sensors are equally likely to be compromised. Since
obtaining closed-form formulas for the expected sizes of the fusion intervals under
the two schedules was not possible, we computed the values for specific systems. In
particular, we varied the number of sensors from 3 to 5, the sensor lengths from
5 to 20 with increments of 3, and the number of attack sensors from 1 to dn/2e.
For each setup, we generated all possible measurement configurations11 and for each
computed the size of the fusion interval under the two schedules; finally, we computed
their weighted sum (depending on the distribution and likelihood of obtaining each
configuration), i.e., our best estimate of the real expected size of the fusion interval
for a given schedule and system. For all setups, we used f = dn/2e − 1 as input to
the sensor fusion algorithm.
Table 4.1 presents the obtained results. Due to the very large number of setups
tried, only a small subset is listed in this work. During simulations, it was noticed
that the schedules produce similar-size expected intervals when the interval lengths
are close to one another. The schedules differed greatly, however, in systems with a
mixture of very precise sensors and very imprecise sensors. Hence, setups in Table 4.1
were chosen such that they represent classes of combinations according to these
observations. As the table shows, for all analyzed systems, the expected fusion
interval under the Ascending schedule was never larger than that under Descending.
In addition, the gains were significant in some cases. This is also true of all other
setups that are not shown in this paper. We note that while these results are not
sufficient to conclude that the Ascending schedule produces a smaller fusion interval
for any sensor configuration, the same framework can be used for any particular
10

To approximate a normal distribution, we assumed the length of the interval is equal to six
standard deviations, i.e., about 99% of the values of a normal distribution.
11
We discretized the real line with sufficient precision in order to enumerate the possible measurements.

115

Table 4.1: Comparison of the two sensor communication schedules. Subscript U
denotes the uniform distribution, and N denotes the normal distribution.
EU |SN ,f | EU |SN ,f | EN |SN ,f | EN |SN ,f |
Asc.
Desc.
Asc.
Desc.
n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 17}
n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 11}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 17, 20}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 8, 11}
n = 5, fa = 1,
L = {5, 5, 5, 5, 20}
n = 5, fa = 1,
L = {5, 5, 5, 14, 20}
n = 5, fa = 2,
L = {5, 5, 5, 5, 20}
n = 5, fa = 2,
L = {5, 5, 5, 14, 17}

10.77

13.58

10.87

13.18

9.43

10.16

9.89

10.39

7.66

9.44

8.07

10.17

6.32

6.53

6.99

7.23

6.13

6.15

5.66

5.7

7.22

9.18

6.86

9.09

6.71

10.32

6.43

9.77

8.17

11.85

8.11

11.04

system to compare impacts of communication schedules (based on sensors’ precisions
when no other information is available a priori) on the performance of attack-resilient
sensor fusion.
To conclude this subsection, we analyze another possible attack strategy, denoted
by AS2 , and show that the optimization strategy AS1 is worse for the system, i.e., it
is a more powerful attack. In AS2 , a constant positive offset is added to the attacked
sensors’ measurements. Once again, the attacker has to guarantee overlap with the
fusion interval to avoid detection. Therefore, the schedule and the seen intervals
determine if introducing the whole offset would lead to detection, in which case the
offset is reduced to the maximal one that would not result in detection.
To compare the two strategies, we note that they can only be compared when the
attacker is not last in the schedule, in which case he always has an optimal strategy
(specified by AS1 ). Thus, we only investigate cases in which the attacker has control
of the sensors in the middle of the schedule. Similar to the above results, we compute
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Table 4.2: Comparison of the two attack strategies when Ascending schedule is used
– AS1 is the expectation optimization strategy; AS2 is the constant offset strategy.

n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 17}
n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 11}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 17, 20}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 8, 11}
n = 5, fa = 1,
L = {5, 5, 5, 5, 20}
n = 5, fa = 1,
L = {5, 5, 5, 14, 20}
n = 5, fa = 2,
L = {5, 5, 5, 5, 20}
n = 5, fa = 2,
L = {5, 5, 5, 14, 17}

E |SN ,f |
Asc., AS1

E |SN ,f |
Asc., AS2

10.17

9.79

8.65

8.44

7.54

7.16

6.17

5.66

6.61

5.92

7.35

6.92

7.35

5.99

8.78

6.96

the expected size of the fusion interval for each strategy for different setups. The
results are shown in Table 4.2, where a maximal offset of 3 was introduced and
the strategies are compared using the Ascending schedule (the results using the
Descending schedule are similar but not shown in the interest of clarity). Note that
strategy AS1 always produces a larger expected fusion interval than the AS2 , which
means it is expected to lead to more powerful attacks.

4.6.7

Schedule Comparison Over Time

In this section, we analyze how the use of an optimal transmission schedule and
measurement history in sensor fusion can be combined to complement each other
and further improve the performance of the sensor fusion algorithm.
In order to use historical measurements, we reintroduce some of the notation and
terminology from Section 4.5. In particular, recall that we use the function m to
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Table 4.3: Comparison of the two sensor communication schedules when historical measurements are used. Subscript U denotes the uniform distribution, and N
denotes the normal distribution.
EU |Sp i | EU |Sp i | EN |Sp i | EN |Sp i |
Asc.
Desc.
Asc.
Desc.
n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 17}
n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 11}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 8, 11}

8.59

9.65

10.03

11.37

7.77

8.05

9.19

9.61

4.9

5

6.61

6.79

map previous intervals to the current time:
m(Ii,k ) = {z ∈ R | z = ak p + q, ∀p ∈ Ii,k , |q| ≤ M }.

(4.12)

Furthermore, we use the pairwise intersect method to map previous measurements to the current time; the fusion interval obtained from pairwise intersect is
then used in the following comparisons. We assume that the attacker does not have
any limitations, i.e., he is aware of all previous sensor measurements and is able to
implement pairwise intersect as well (or any other algorithm).
Similar to the one-round comparison of schedules, we note that no schedule is
better than the other in the absolute sense. Therefore, we compare them using
the expected size of the fusion interval. As no closed-form solution for this size is
available, we compute the value for the same setups as the ones described in Table 4.1.
The system dynamics were assumed to be xk+1 = xk + νkp , with |νkp | ≤ 1. Table 4.3
presents the results. Two things are worth noting. Firstly, once again the Ascending
schedule produces smaller-size fusion intervals for all setups. Secondly, as compared
with the same setups in Table 4.1, by adding history the system can further reduce
the expected sizes for all setups, even when the attacker also has access to historical
measurements.
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4.6.8

Evaluation

To evaluate the sensor transmission scheduling technique proposed in this section, we
illustrate how it can be implemented on an unmanned ground vehicle. We provide
both simulation and experimental results using the LandShark.
Simulations
For our simulations, we used four of the LandShark’s velocity sensors, namely the
two wheel encoders, the GPS and the camera. The encoders’ intervals were determined based on the measurement error and sampling jitter provided by the manufacturer, whereas the GPS and camera intervals were determined empirically, i.e.,
the LandShark was driven in the open and largest deviations from the actual speed
(as measured by a high-precision tachometer) were recorded for each sensor. The
interval sizes (at a speed of 10 mph) were computed to be 0.2 mph for the encoder,
1 mph for the GPS, and 2 mph for the camera.
To illustrate the advantages of the Ascending schedule, the following scenario was
simulated – three LandSharks are moving away from enemy territory in a straight
line. The leader sets a target speed of v mph, and the two vehicles behind it try
to maintain it for safety reasons. Each vehicle’s velocity must not exceed v + δ1 as
that may cause the leader to crash in an unseen obstacle or one of the other two
LandSharks to collide with the one in front. Speed must also not drop below v − δ2
as that may cause the front two vehicles to collide with the one behind. If either
of these conditions occurs, a high-level algorithm takes control, switching to manual
control of the vehicles. These constraints were encoded via the size of the fusion
interval – if the fusion interval contains a point less than or equal to v − δ2 or greater
than or equal to v + δ1 , then a critical violation flag is raised.
We simulated multiple runs of this scenario, each consisting of two rounds. The
same sensor (randomly chosen at each run) was assumed attacked during the two
rounds. In each round random (but correct) measurements were generated for each
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Table 4.4: Simulation results for each of the three schedules used in combination
with pairwise intersect. Each entry denotes the proportion of time that the corresponding schedule generated a critical violation when there was none.
History Used
More than 10.5 mph
Less than 9.5 mph
No History Used
More than 10.5 mph
Less than 9.5 mph

Ascending

Descending

Random

0%
0%

2.98%
2.63%

4.9%
4.8%

0%
0%

15.29%
16.8%

5.22%
5.61%

sensor and then fusion intervals were computed at the end of the second round under
the Ascending and Descending schedules (using strategy AS1 ). For completeness, a
different Random schedule was used during each round in order to investigate other
schedules that were not analyzed in depth. For each schedule, the fraction of runs
was computed that led to a critical violation, as defined in the previous paragraph.
The target speed was set to be 10 mph, with δ1 = 0.5 and δ2 = 0.5, and system
dynamics were assumed to be xk+1 = xk + νkp , with |νkp | ≤ 10. The results are
shown in Table 4.4. As can be seen, no critical violations were recorded under the
Ascending Schedule, whereas the Descending and Random schedules both produced
some.12 In addition, adding history has greatly reduced the number of violations,
both for the Descending and the Random schedules.
Experimental Validation
In addition to the simulations shown above, experiments were performed using the
LandShark robot. They were used to compare the two attack strategies described in
the paper as well as to illustrate the advantages of the Ascending schedule regardless
of the attack strategy used.
As argued in Section 4.6.6, attack strategies can only be compared when the
12

Note that all critical violations recorded under the Descending and Random schedules are false
alarms, i.e., the system is not in an unsafe state but is led to believe it is in one due to the attack.
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Table 4.5: Average size of the fusion interval for each of the four scenarios.
Optimization strategy
Offset strategy

Ascending schedule
0.399m/s
0.395m/s

Descending schedule
0.652m/s
0.483m/s

compromised sensors are not at the beginning or end of the communication schedule
but in the middle instead. Thus, in the experiments only the mid-schedule sensors
were compromised. In the experiments, the LandShark was driven straight and the
size of the fusion interval for each scenario was computed as soon as measurements
were obtained from all sensors. Note that three sensors were used in the experiments
(GPS and two encoders), with the right encoder being in the middle of the schedule,
i.e., under attack.
Figure 4.12 presents the results of the experiments.13 During the run of the
LandShark, the attack (as computed by AS1 and AS2 ) on the right encoder was
turned on and off several times, and we only recorded the fusion interval sizes at the
rounds with an attack. Since the rounds were independent, they were concatenated
in Figure 4.12 as if the system was always under attack. The four curves represent
the size of the fusion interval for each scenario. As is apparent from the figure, the
Ascending curves are almost invariably below, but never above, the Descending. This
confirms our results that the use of the Ascending communication schedule reduces
the attacker’s impact on the performance of sensor fusion. In addition, it is clear that
the optimization attack strategy (i.e., AS1 ) outperforms the offset one (i.e., AS2 ) at
virtually every round and with both schedules. Finally, Table 4.5 summarizes the
results by providing the average size of the fusion interval for each scenario.
13

A video with the experiments is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8jvo3xe5XU.
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of the sizes of the fusion intervals as obtained with the two
attack strategies, optimization (AS1 ) and offset (AS2 ), and two schedules.

4.7

Sensor Fusion in the Presence of Transient
Faults

Having developed in the previos sections the sensor fusion framework for nominal
systems, in this chapter we note that sensors sometimes experience faults during
their operation and do not conform to the nominal observation model. Thus, the
classical sensor fusion approach developed in the previous sections loses its worstcase guarantees since it might be possible for all sensors to experience transient
faults at the same time. Therefore, in this section we develop a modified sensor
fusion algorithm whose output is still guaranteed to contain the true value even in
the case of transient faults.
It is important to note that transient faults may occur during the systems normal
operation and disappear shortly after. In fact, most sensors exhibit a transient fault
model that bounds the amount of time in which they provide wrong measurements.
For example, it is not uncommon for GPS to temporarily lose connection to its satel-
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lites (or receive noisy signals), especially in cities with high-rise buildings. Similarly,
a sensor transmitting data using an over-utilized network (e.g., with the TCP/IP
protocol with retransmissions) may fail to deliver its measurements on time, thus
providing irrelevant information when the messages do arrive. Due to their short
duration, however, transient faults should not be considered as a security threat to
the system.
In contrast, permanent faults are sensor defects that persist for a longer period
of time and may seriously affect the systems operation. For instance, a sensor may
suffer physical damage that introduces a permanent bias in its measurements. In
such a scenario, unless the fault can be corrected for in the software, the system
would benefit from discarding this sensor altogether.
Sensor attacks can manifest as either transient or non-transient (possibly Byzantine) faults, depending on the attacker’s goals and capabilities. Masking a sensor’s
measurements as a transient fault may prevent the attacker from being discovered
but limits his capabilities. On the other hand, if the attacked measurements are
consistently wrong and resemble a permanent fault, they may inflict more damage
but may be detected quickly. We analyze both kinds of attacks and guard against
their possible effects: in Chapter 6, we propose 1) a detector for the more dangerous,
but easier to detect, kind of attacks, whereas in this section we develop 2) a modified sensor fusion algorithm whose output is guaranteed to contain the true state
regardless of the manifestation of transient faults (or attacks that appear as transient
faults).
In order to formalize the notion of a transient fault, we make use of sensor transient fault models (TFMs) that are now being provided by some manufacturers [82].
Such a model consists of three dimensions: (1) polyhedron size, (2) window size, and
(3) number of allowed faulty measurements per window. At the same time, such
specifications are not always available, so one of the contributions of this section is
a method for selecting the three parameters based on observed training data. We
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illustrate this with a real-data case study using the LandShark.
Once a TFM is developed for each sensor, we propose a modified sensor fusion
algorithm whose ouput, the filtered fusion polyhedron, is guaranteed to contain
the true state even in the presence of transient fautls (or attacks that manifest
as transient faults). The performance of the modified sensor fusion algorithm is
evaluated using real data collected from the LandShark robot.

4.7.1

Problem Statement

In this section, we formalize the problem of sensor fusion in the presence of transient
faults and emphasize the differences from the no-fault case.
System Model
Similar to the classical sensor fusion alorithm in Section 4.4, we note that the techniques developed here are independent of system dynamics, hence no assumptions
on dynamics are made:
xk+1 = f (xk , uk ) + νkp .

(4.13)

The nominal sensor model is also the same as in Section 4.4, i.e., each sensor i
provides a direct measurement of the state at time k of the form
yi,k = xk + vi,k ,

(4.14)

which is then converted to a polyhedron Pi,k such that
Pi,k = {yi,k + z ∈ Rd | Bi z ≤ bi }.

(4.15)

The main difference between the two models is that non-attacked sensors can
now provide faulty measurements as well, i.e., they can experience transient faults.
Definition (Faulty measurement). A sensor si provides a faulty measurement Pi,k
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at time k, if the true state is not included in the polyhedron, i.e.,
xk ∈
/ Pi,k .
The measurement is considered correct otherwise.
Transient Fault Model
By their nature, faulty measurements occur infrequently and usually do not indicate
a permanent problem with the sensor. To reflect this feature and motivated by recent
manufacturer trends to provide faulty-measurements-per-window specifications [82],
we introduce the notion of a sensor’s transient fault model (TFM). A TFM for a
sensor si is a triple (Ei , ei , wi ), where Ei represents the linear inequalities specifying
the size of the polyhedron (i.e., the values Bi and bi in (6.3)) and (ei , wi ) is a transient
threshold specifying that si can output at most ei faulty measurements in any window
of wi measurements. To relate the TFM to the original sensor fusion framework, in
the conservative case the error bounds Ei would be specified large enough so that
no faults are ever observed, i.e., ei = 0 for any wi . The TFM formulation, on the
other hand, allows more flexibility by allowing tighter error bounds at the expense
of declaring some sensor measurements “faults”.
With this in mind, if si complies with its TFM, then any faulty measurements
are deemed transient faults. Otherwise, it is non-transiently faulty.
Definition (Non-transiently faulty sensor). A sensor si is non-transiently faulty at
time k if it has produced more than ei faulty measurements in the last window of wi
measurements, i.e.,
k
X

!
F (i, k 0 )

> ei ,

(4.16)

k0 =k−wi +1

where F (i, k) = 1 if si outputs a faulty measurement at time k, and F (i, t) = 0,
otherwise.
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Attack Model
Note that formalizing attacks in a way that would distinguish them from faults is
challenging. The reason for this is that for any definition of a fault, it is possible for
an attacker to mask his measurements as a fault in order to avoid detection; it is
even possible for the attacker to just relay the actual sensor measurements. Thus, in
order to scope the problem, we split our approach in two: 1) we develop in Chapter 6
a detector for attacks that manifest as the most disruptive kind of faults, namely
non-transient faults; 2) for attacks that manifest as transient faults, we develop the
modified sensor fusion algorithm presented in this section.
Thus, in this section we assume that all attacks that manifest as non-transient
faults have been detected and discarded. The remaining attacked sensors are therefore assumed to comply to their transient fault models, i.e., all sensors are assumed
to produce only a bounded number of faulty measurements. At the same, no assumptions about each individual faulty measurement is made (e.g., when it might
occur or what the measurement might be).
Problem Statements
There are two problems addressed in this chapter. The first one arises from the fact
that TFM’s are not widely available for current sensors and are not straightforward
to obtain.
Problem. Given a system with n sensors and a set of training measurement data,
develop a transient fault model for each sensor si .
Once TFMs are available, we consider the problem of finding a bounded fusion
polyhedron that is guaranteed to contain the true value at each time.
Problem. Given a system with n sensors and a transient fault model (Ei , ei , wi ) for
each sensor, develop a sensor fusion algorithm that produces a fusion polyhedron that
is guaranteed to contain the true value at each time.
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4.7.2

Transient Fault Model Parameter Selection

Before presenting the sensor fusion algorithm in the presence of transient faults,
in this section we first outline a framework to choose the TFM parameters. As
mentioned earlier, manufacturers are transitioning towards providing transient fault
specifications for their sensors to allow for more realistic analysis [82]. However, when
the TFM of a sensor is not provided, it is necessary to identify the TFM parameters
from empirical data. Note that we focus on the one-dimensional case only (i.e., each
sensor provides an interval); the approach could be straightforwardly extended to
d-rectangles by repeating the same procedure for all dimensions. At the same time,
developing such parameters for multidimensional polyhedra is more challenging and
is left for future work.
Due to the fact that it is used for worst-case analysis, the abstract model we
obtain for each sensor must ensure that the sensor’s interval contain the ground truth
except in the case of a faulty measurement. In contrast, probabilistic sensor models
construct a probability distribution of the sensor’s possible measurements and are not
naturally suited for worst-case analysis.14 Thus, statistical approaches to parameter
selection (e.g., the best-fit Poisson process) are unsuitable because they estimate
parameters to maximally explain the data, without providing worst-case bounds.
Therefore, we provide a new method for selecting the TFM parameters from empirical
data. It is important to note that while the training data is assumed to contain no
attacks, no assumptions are made about the presence of faulty measurements.
To empirically identify the TFM parameters, we apply the following procedure.
First, we gather sensor measurements with known true state as training data (e.g.,
by applying a constant input to an automotive CPS and adjusting for the bias in
the input-output speed relation). Next, we examine the data and identify the set of
feasible parameters (, e, w) (to simplify notation, the set of error bounds E is now
14

Note that it might be possible to use probabilistic models for worst-case analysis by constructing
bounds around all measurements with non-zero probability of occurring. This approach, however,
reduces to the abstract model, hence we do not consider it in this dissertation.
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Figure 4.13: Sample plots of the proportion of faults in a window (e/w) against the
error bound ().
merged into a single parameter , which denotes the size of the sensor’s interval) by
sliding a window of size w and finding the worst-case number of faulty measurements
e in a window for different values of .
For a fixed window size w, intuitively, there exists a relation between  and e.
Suppose that we plot the proportion of the number of faulty measurements in a
window (e/w) against  (Figure 4.13 shows possible examples of such curves for
different window sizes). Then, there can be observed a few interesting patterns.
To begin with, there is a large enough  such that no faulty measurements can
ever be observed (i.e., e = 0). As  is decreased from that point, the number of
faulty measurements should slowly increase. The increase rate should be relatively
moderate while  is in the range of underlying true TFM. In other words, e increases
in a relatively constant rate as  decreases, because  gradually excludes more faulty
measurements that occur transiently. Once  passes a certain threshold, it enters
the range of the underlying noise model where most of the sensor measurements
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lie. Thus, as  decreases from this threshold, the number of measurements that are
deemed faulty increases rapidly. We refer to the threshold as a “knee point”.
We argue that the knee points should be selected as the values for the TFM.
On the one hand, they are outside of the sensor’s underlying noise model, thus not
making noisy measurements be flagged as faulty. On the other, they are smaller
than the sensor’s underlying TFM, thus forcing most faulty measurements to be
declared as such. Consequently, the knee points govern the choice of  and e for any
window size w. Note that the right window size depends on the purpose for which
it is used; a larger window size will better capture the true TFM; at the same time,
larger window sizes might result in greater uncertainty (i.e., larger fusion intervals)
as historical measurements need to be mapped to the present time using system
dynamics (with corresponding process noise). Section 4.7.4 provides a real-data
evaluation of the process of obtaining a sensor’s TFM.

4.7.3

The Filtered Fusion Polyhedron: A Modified Sensor
Fusion Algorithm

In this subsection we describe an algorithm that outputs a filtered fusion polyhedron
that is guaranteed to contain the true state and is bounded in size. The filtered
fusion polyhedron can be thought of as the system’s conservative, but correct, guess
of its current state – since it does not trust its last fusion polyhedron, it examines
the historical fusion polyhedra to improve this estimate.
We begin the analysis by noting that the assumption of at most f faulty measurements per round that is required in the original sensor fusion algorithm no longer
holds. This is due to the fact that each TFM only quantifies one sensor’s output
in isolation from the others. Thus, it is possible that all sensors15 provide faulty
measurements in a single round or that all are correct in a single round. Therefore,
f can now be considered as an input parameter to the fusion algorithm as opposed
15

Only possible if all sensors have ei > 0.
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to a preliminary assumption. Note that if f is smaller than the actual number of
faulty measurements per round, the resulting fusion polyhedron may not contain the
true value.
The chosen value of f introduces a trade-off between accuracy and precision of
the fusion polyhedron. In particular, decreasing f will result in a smaller (i.e., more
precise) fusion polyhedron in any given round. On the other hand, it may increase
the proportion of rounds where the fusion polyhedron does not contain the true value
(i.e., less accurate), in which case a more conservative value of f would be required.
Therefore, in this section we provide a way of quantifying the effect of the value of
f on the performance of sensor fusion.
To formalize these statements, suppose that we are given a TFM for each sensor.
Since we consider a periodic system in which sensors are sampled at the same rate,
in this section we assume that window sizes are the same for all sensors, i.e., the
TFM’s have the form (Ei , ei , w). Define a global fault as a round in which there are
more than f faulty measurements. Recall that in such a case the fusion polyhedron
is not guaranteed to contain the true value.
Definition (Global Fault). Given an upper bound f on the number of faulty measurements in a given round, a global fault occurs if more than f sensors provide
faulty measurements in that round.
The goal is to find a global fault model (E, W )f for the entire system in which
there are at most E rounds with a global fault in any window of W rounds. The
fault model will determine how robust (and consequently, conservative) any filtering
algorithm has to be in order to produce a meaningful output. Note that the values
of (E, W )f depend on the sensors’ TFM but not on the actual sensor measurements,
even if they are faulty; hence, this result holds even in the presence of stealthy attacks
that comply with the sensors’ TFMs.
Obtaining a closed-form solution for the values of E and W is made difficult by the
combinatorial nature of the problem. Therefore, we have derived an algorithm that,
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Algorithm 3 Computing the Global Fault Model of Sensor Fusion
Input: n transient fault models of the form (Ei , ei , w) and sensor fusion parameter
f
1: WR ← w
S
2: ES ← order descending( ei )
3: E ← 0
4: while WR > 0 and ES (f + 1) > 0 do
5:
for {i ← 1; i ≤ f + 1; i ← i + 1} do
6:
ES (i) ← ES (i) − 1
7:
end for
8:
ES ← order descending(ES )
9:
WR ← WR − 1
10:
E ←E+1
11: end while
12: W ← w
13: return (E, W )
given the TFMs and f as input, outputs E and W . As formalized in Algorithm 3,
it computes the largest possible number of rounds in which at least f + 1 faulty
measurements can occur; this is the largest number of rounds in which the fusion
polyhedron is not guaranteed to contain the true value. Intuitively, at each round
the algorithm “schedules” faulty measurements for the sensors that have the largest
number of “allowed” faulty measurements until the end of the window.
Theorem 14. The output, E, of Algorithm 3 is the largest number of global faults
possible in a window of size W .
Note that Algorithm 3 is polynomial in the number of sensors, n, and is pseudopolynomial in the window size, w. At the same time, we note that it is executed
offline, at design stage, hence the execution time will not be prohibitive even for very
large window sizes. To inspect which choice of f is best suited for a given system,
designers need to take into account Algorithm 3 and its output. Comparing different
pairs (E, W )f may not always be possible in a quantitative way but an analysis
similar to that of Figure 4.13 may be performed so that the best combination of
accuracy vs. precision is chosen.
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Algorithm 4 Filtered Fusion Polyhedron
Input: mapping function m, an array F P containing W fusion polyhedra (in chronological order) and a bound E on the number of global faults
1: F PC ← ∅
2: for {i ← 1; i ≤ W − 1; i ← i + 1} do
3:
mapped P ← m(m(· · · m(F P (i)))) // map i times
4:
F PC .add(mapped P )
5: end for
6: F PC .add(F P (W ))
7: return sensor f usion(F PC , E)
Using the intuition of Algorithm 3 (i.e., mapping historical sensor measurements
to the current time and arguing about how many of them could be faulty in the worst
case), it is now possible to derive a bounded fusion polyhedron that is guaranteed to
contain the true value. To do this, we once again make use of the function m that
maps past polyhedra to the current time:
m(Pi,k ) = {z ∈ Rd | z = Ap + q, ∀p ∈ Pi,k , kqk ≤ M }.
It is now possible to design an algorithm to compute the filtered fusion interval at
time k using the last W fusion intervals.
The proposed algorithm is formalized in Algorithm 4. Essentially, all fusion
polyhedra are mapped, using m, to the current time k, thus obtaining W polyhedra
at k. Then we apply the original sensor fusion algorithm – since at most E mapped
polyhedra are faulty, we output the smallest polyhedron that contains all points
that lie in at least W − E mapped polyhedra. Thus, a filtered fusion polyhedron
is computed that is a conservative, but bounded, estimate of the system’s current
state. Note that Algorithm 4 is polynomial both in the number of sensors and the
window size.
Proposition 10. The complexity of Algorithm 4 is O(CW 2 + W log W ) where
C is the cost of the mapping function m. Constructing the input array F P is
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O((n log n)W ) where n is the number of sensors.
It is important to note that Algorithm 4 can be computed even more efficiently
by noting that when calculating the filtered fusion polyhedron at a given round, we
can reuse the result of the calculations of the previous round, i.e., only one round of
polyhedron mappings needs to be performed.
We note that Algorithm 4 does not always produce the smallest possible polyhedron that is guaranteed to contain the true value. On other hand, as shown in the
above Proposition, it is efficient and can be implemented in real time whereas it is
difficult to obtain an algorithm that outputs such a polyhedron and is not exponential in the number of sensors and rounds. Finally, Algorithm 4’s output is guaranteed
to contain the true state and is bounded (provided E < dW/2e), so it is still in the
spirit of worst-case analysis.

4.7.4

Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the modified sensor fusion algorithm
as well as the selection of the TFM parameters through a case study on the LandShark. For this case study, three of the LandShark’s velocity sensors were used – the
two wheel encoders and the GPS. Each of these sensors can be filtered to provide a
velocity measurement at a rate of 10 Hz. Thus, we use the redundancy of velocity
measurements (i.e., one-dimensional intervals) to evaluate the proposed techniques
in the presence of transient faults (e.g., tire slip).
Transient Fault Model Parameter Selection
This subsection illustrates the selection of the TFM parameters following the method
described in Section 4.7.2. First, we collect the training data by driving the LandShark straight at a constant speed of 1 m/s on different surfaces such as grass,
asphalt and snow, where the environment may cause transient faults (e.g., slipping

133

1

1

0.6
0.4

0.6
0.4

0.2

0.2

0

0

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.8
w=10
w=30
w=50
w=100
w=200

e/w

0.8
w=10
w=30
w=50
w=100
w=200

e/w

e/w

0.8

1

w=10
w=30
w=50
w=100
w=200

0.6
0.4
0.2

0

0.1

0.2

ϵ

0.3

0.4

0.5

0

0

0.1

0.2

ϵ

(a) Sensor 1: Left Encoder

0.3

0.4

0.5

ϵ

(b) Sensor 2: Right Encoder

(c) Sensor 3: GPS

Figure 4.14: Empirical plots of the proportion of faults in a window (e/w) against
the error bound ().
Table 4.6: Transient fault models for the sensors on the LandShark.

Window Size
w=1
w = 10
w = 30
w = 50
w = 100
w = 200

L. Encoder

e
0.26 n.a.
0.229
2
0.195
6
0.195 11
0.131 26
0.117 36

R. Encoder

e
0.32 n.a.
0.234
2
0.207
6
0.199 11
0.168 22
0.126 37

GPS

e
0.48 n.a.
0.295
2
0.19
9
0.19
9
0.19
9
0.19
10

tires would mean encoders provide higher-than-actual velocity). The gathered training data corresponds to 2400 velocity measurements by each sensor at 10 Hz (i.e.,
about four minutes). By examining the training data, we obtain Figure 4.14, which
is the real-data equivalent of Figure 4.13.
Table 4.6 summarizes the chosen parameters, where the window size w is varied
between 10, 30, 50, 100 and 200. For example, for w = 50 in GPS (Figure 4.14c),
the knee point appears around  = 0.19 and e/w = 0.18, corresponding to e = 9.
Note that the knee points are more clearly visible as the window size increases.
Finally, we note that the original sensor fusion (SF) approach would use the most
conservative error bounds (interval sizes) because it is designed for the worst case.
Specifically, in Figure 4.14, we select the smallest  such that no faulty measurements
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can be observed (e.g., 0.48 for GPS). Note that the parameters for SF would be
equivalent to w = 1. We observe that one benefit of using TFM is that as the
window size increases, the size of error bounds is generally reduced, thus allowing
more precise sensor fusion (e.g., with w = 200, the interval sizes are more than twice
smaller than those with w = 1).
Evaluation of Filtered Fusion Polyhedron
To evaluate the usefulness of the filtered fusion polyhedron (note that it is just a onedimensional interval in this case study), we once again use three of the LandShark
velocity sensors, namely the two encoders and GPS. As discussed in Section 4.7.3,
there exists a trade-off between the precision and the accuracy of the fusion polyhedron depending on the choice of f . Thus, we evaluate these metrics using the
LandShark data; note that we use the same TFM parameters as the ones shown in
Table 4.6.
To do this, we proceed as follows: we first collect data from 17 runs of the
LandShark, each consisting of about 500 velocity measurements by each sensor at
10 Hz. The true state is obtained in the same way as in TFM case study. Varying
f between 0 and 1,16 we perform sensor fusion at each round and check whether
the fusion interval contains the true state (i.e., there is a global fault). Then we
compute the worst number of rounds (denoted by Ê) with global faults in a window
and compare that with the theoretical bound E computed by Algorithm 3 given the
TFM parameters for each sensor. In addition, we calculate the average size of the
correct fusion intervals for each setup (denoted by F I).
Table 4.7 shows the performance results, where in addition to the absolute values
of E and Ê, we show their proportion of the window size in a percentage. Ê is never
larger than E but is sometimes equal, hence the worst case is indeed observed in
reality. At the same time, as the window size increases, the analytical worst-case
16

The case of f = 2 is excluded because n = 3, and, in that case, the fusion interval cannot be
bounded in general.

135

Table 4.7: Sensor fusion performance for different f . E (Ê) is the theoretical (empirical) worst-case number of rounds with global faults.

Window Size
w = 10
w = 30
w = 50
w = 100
w = 200

f =0
E
6 (60%)
21 (70%)
31 (62%)
57 (57%)
83 (42%)

Ê
6 (60%)
9 (30%)
9 (18%)
36 (36%)
68 (34%)

f =1
E
3 (30%)
10 (33%)
15 (30%)
28 (28%)
41 (21%)

Ê
2 (20%)
3 (10%)
3 (6%)
8 (8%)
27 (14%)

Table 4.8: Average size of filtered fusion interval for different values for f and noise
bound M .

Window Size
w = 10
w = 30
w = 50
w = 100
w = 200

f =0
M = 0.005 M = 0.001
0.504
0.466
0.545
0.400
0.635
0.403
0.815
0.366
1.036
0.371

f =1
M = 0.005 M = 0.001
0.499
0.466
0.493
0.397
0.540
0.399
0.598
0.358
0.673
0.334

becomes less tight. Furthermore, as f increases, the number of worst-case global
faults decreases. Regardless of the choice of f , both metrics generally improve with
window size. The reason is that the TFM for a bigger window tends to have a smaller
(e/w) ratio (resulting in better accuracy).
In addition, we also computed the filtered fusion interval at each round for the
different setups. Since a constant input was used to drive the LandShark, the vehicle’s state does not change except for process noise. Since the noise is not known
exactly, we used two different bounds to compute the filtered fusion interval. Table 4.8 presents the average size of the filtered fusion interval for the two values of f
and for noise bounds equal to either 0.005 m/s or 0.001 m/s. For larger values of the
noise, the proposed filtering algorithm does not perform very well with large win-
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Table 4.9: Average running time (in microsecond) of filtered fusion for different
values for f and noise bound M .

Window Size
w = 10
w = 30
w = 50
w = 100
w = 200

f =0
M = 0.005 M
33
38
43
57
72

= 0.001
35
39
47
54
87

f =1
M = 0.005 M
34
44
43
50
72

= 0.001
35
43
48
56
86

dows due to the increased uncertainty that it introduces. Yet, for the smaller noise
bound using larger windows is still more beneficial for the system. Since the filtered
fusion interval always contains the true value and its size is not significantly larger
than the average size of the fusion interval in a given round, we argue that systems
with small noise should utilize the filtered fusion interval as a correct conservative
estimate of their state.
Lastly, to analyze the time overhead of Algorithm 4 which calculates the filtered
fusion interval, we measured the average running time of one round of the filter fusion
for the different setups.17 Table 4.9 shows that although the running time increases
with the window size W , the time overhead is negligible overall (considering that
the sensors’ sampling frequency is 10Hz).

17

The running time was measured on a machine with a 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 processor.
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Chapter 5
Context-Aware Sensor Fusion
Having developed the sensor fusion framework for safety detection with guarantees
in Chapter 4, in this chapter, we present an approach for incorporating context measurements in order to further strengthen the guarantees of sensor fusion. As argued
extensively in Chapters 1 and 3, context measurements are high-level representations of data collected from the system’s environment sensors; as such, these discrete
measurements can be used to provide (rough) information about the system state
as well. Similar to the context-aware estimation case, context measurements can
be incorporated into the sensor fusion framework as well. Context measurements
are especially useful in scenarios where standard continuous sensors might be faulty
or attacked (e.g., in a scenario with a perfectly attackable system that is unable to
detect an attack on its continuous sensors [147]).
Similar to Chapter 3, in this chapter we focus on binary measurements as a
b
rich subclass of all context measurements. In particular, each measurement yi,k
is

equal to 1 if a context element is detected and -1 otherwise. As argued in Chapter 3,
examples of binary measurements include building detection scenarios (implying that
the system must be close to the detected building) as well as threshold medical alarms
(meaning that the patient might be in a critical state).
Contrary to the nominal case discussed in Chapter 3, where we model context

138

measurements in a probabilistic setting, in this framework we employ worst-case
analysis since we would like to provide safety guarantees about the system’s state.
Specifically, when a context measurement of 1 is received, it is mapped to a bounded
set of possible values of the system state. Similar to the attack-resilient sensor
fusion setting, we assume each set is a bounded polyhedron. Modeling context
measurements as polyhedra captures a wide class of context measurements. For
example, if a building is detected using image processing, a polyhedron (e.g., a
trapezoid) in front of the building could be constructed in order to indicate the
system can only detect the building from within that set. Similarly, if a radio beacon
is detected, a rectangle around the beacon is constructed so as to indicate the system
is close to that beacon.
Given this interpretation of context measurements, it is now possible to extend
the continuous-sensor fusion algorithm (Algorithm 1) to the context-aware case.
Note that context measurements can also be faulty/attacked, similar to continuous
measurements. Thus, once again we make the same assumption that less than half
of all sensors (continuous and binary) are attacked at any given time. With this
in mind, the resulting algorithm is similar to the original sensor fusion algorithm,
which essentially constructs all sets that might contain the true state.
We evaluate the context-aware sensor fusion algorithm in a case-study simulation
using the LandShark robot. In this scenario, the LandShark only has access to GPS
for estimation and control purposes. At the same time, an undetectable attack is
performed on GPS such that the system believes it is safe when it is in fact heading
towards an obstacle. By incorporating context measurements obtained from nearby
buildings, however, the system can detect it is in an unsafe state and apply an
emergency control response (e.g., shutdown).
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5.1

Problem Statement

This section formulates the system and attack models used in this chapter before
formulating the context-aware sensor fusion problem statement.

5.1.1

System Model

The system model is the same as the standard sensor fusion model, with the important addition of context measurements. In particular, no assumptions are made
about system dynamics (since the technique is applied independently at each time
step):
xk+1 = f (xk , uk ) + νkp .

(5.1)

The nominal plant sensor model is also the standard abstract sensor model, i.e.,
each plant sensor si provides a direct measurement of the state at time k of the form
c
m
yi,k
= xk + νi,k
,

(5.2)

which is then converted to a polyhedron Pi,k such that
c
Pi,k = {yi,k
+ z ∈ Rd | Bi z ≤ bi }.

(5.3)

In addition to continuous plant measurements, we also consider context measurements in this chapter. As noted in the introduction of this chapter, we focus
b
on binary context measurements, such that each measurement yi,k
is either 1 or -1

depending on whether a context element is detected. When a measurement of 1 is
received, the measurement is mapped to a bounded polyhedron Qi,k similar to the
continuous abstract sensor model, i.e.,
b
yi,k
= 1 ⇒ xk ∈ Qi,k
b
yi,k
= −1 ⇒ xk ∈ Q̄i,k ,

140

(5.4)

where
Qi,k = {z ∈ Rn | Di z ≤ di },
for some matrix Di and vector di , and Q̄i,k is the complement of Qi,k . As mentioned above, such polyhedra can capture a wide variety of context detections, e.g.,
a building recognition scenario.
In this chapter, we develop approaches for the nominal sensor fusion framework,
i.e., we assume that all non-attacked sensors (both continuous and binary) provide
correct measurements. We leave context-aware sensor fusion with transient faults
for future work.

5.1.2

Attack Model

The attack model for continuous sensors is also the same as in the standard sensor
fusion setting, i.e., if a sensor is attacked then no assumptions are made about what
measurements it sends. The attack model for context measurements has several
aspects, as described below.
There are two ways in which an attack on a context measurement can manifest
– it can indicate the state is in Qi,k when it is not (i.e., a false positive) or it can
fail to indicate the state is in Qi,k when it is in fact there (i.e., a false negative). In
this chapter, we focus on false positives only – in fact, as will become apparent in
Section 5.2, the context-aware sensor fusion algorithm only considers positive context
measurements in order to keep the worst-cases guarantees of sensor fusion. Thus,
an attacked context measurement is assumed to provide false positives only (thereby
wrongly implying the state is in the corresponding set Qi,k ). Incorporating false
negatives in the fusion algorithm is left for future work (as discussed in Chapter 7).
Similar to the standard sensor fusion setup, in order to be able to provide worstcase guarantees, we assume that less than half of all sensors (continuous and binary)
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are attacked.

5.1.3

Problem Statement

Given the above system and attack models, respectively, the context-aware sensor
fusion problem is as follows.
Problem. Given a system with n sensors (both continuous and binary), the contextaware sensor fusion problem is how to obtain a fusion polyhedron in a single time
step, i.e., a minimal-volume polyhedron that is guaranteed to contain the true state.

5.2

Approach

Given the system and attack models in Section 5.1, the context-aware sensor fusion
procedure is similar to the standard sensor fusion algorithm presented in Algorithm 1.
The modified approach is shown in Algorithm 5. Let P denote the set of all n
measurements, with f again denoting an upper-bound on the number of corrupted
measurements (i.e., not containing the true value). Let there be nc polyhedra from
continuous sensors in P and nb polyhedra from context measurements such that
n = nc + nb . In order to find a fusion polyhedron that is guaranteed to contain the
true value and is minimal in size, we find all intersections of n − f measurements
and take their convex hull.
Thus, the fusion polyhedron is once again the minimal polyhedron that is guaranteed to contain the true value. Note that no comparison can be made with the fusion
polyhedron using only the continuous sensors because even computing such a fusion
polyhedron would require assuming an upper bound on the number of attacked continuous sensors. The benefit of adding context measurements is that sensor fusion
can provide worst-case guarantees in the presence of more (or all) continuous sensor attacks than in the no-context setting as long as a sufficient number of correct
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Algorithm 5 Context-Aware Sensor Fusion Algorithm
Input: An array of sets P of size n (n = nc +nb ) and an upper bound on the number
of corrupted measurements f
1: C ← combinations n choose n minus f (P )
2: RNk ,f ← ∅
3: for each K in C do
4:
add(RNk ,f , intersection(K))
5: end for
6: return conv(RNk ,f )
context sensors are used (such that the total number of attacked sensors is less than
half).
Note that Algorithm 5 makes no use of the sets Q̄i,k , i.e., it ignores context
measurements when they are not received. The reason for this is that if these sets
are incorporated in the algorithm, it would not be possible to provide a bounded
polyhedron in the worst-case because the sets Q̄i,k are unbounded (as complements
of the bounded Qi,k sets). Thus, although some information is lost while ignoring
context measurements of -1, we do so at the benefit of being able to maintain our
worst-case guarantees. Providing guarantees while incorporating negative context
measurements is left for future work.

5.3

Case-Study Evaluation

This section presents a case-study evaluation of the context-aware sensor fusion
technique. We simulate an example of a so called perfectly attackable system [147],
i.e., a system whose continuous sensor is under attack such that the estimation error
can grow unbounded but the system cannot detect the attack. We show that the
system can use context measurements in such a case in order to detect when it is in
an unsafe state.
In particular, we simulate a scenario in which the LandShark is moving in an
urban environment and trying to avoid an obstacle. The entire scenario is shown in
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Figure 5.1: Perfectly attackable system using context measurements. Kalman filter
estimates lead the system to believe it is safe whereas the context-aware sensor fusion
bounds indicate that the system is unsafe.

Figure 5.1; the LandShark tries to avoid the wall on the East side, so it initially goes
North until it believes it is safe. However, the LandShark’s only position sensor, a
GPS, is attacked such that the Kalman filter estimates fool the system in believing
it is safe – the GPS attacks are also carried out in such a way so as to avoid detection
by standard anomaly detectors (e.g., a chi-squared detector [147]). As a result, the
system starts heading East too early and crashes into the wall.
On the other hand, we note that since the LandShark is going through an urban
environment, it can use image processing to recognize nearby buildings and obtain
context measurements from them. Thus, for each building on the map, the LandShark receives a context measurement (in the form of a square around the building)
if it is in the proximity of that building. At each time step, all context measurements are used together with the GPS measurement in the context-aware sensor
fusion algorithm; the upper and lower bounds of the resulting fusion polyhedron are
also shown in Figure 5.1. As can be seen in the figure, the fusion polyhedron always
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contains the true value and, more importantly, indicates that the system is not safe,
i.e., it is not North of the obstacle. Thus, this is an example in which the system can
greatly benefit from context measurements and can avoid the obstacle (e.g., by going
North until the fusion polyhedron contains no points that are inside the obstacle).
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Chapter 6
Attack Detection in the Presence
of Transient Sensor Faults
Having developed multiple techniques for estimation and safety detection in the
previous chapters, in this chapter we note that all these techniques rely on sensors
providing accurate information. In particular, although the sensor fusion approaches
are indeed robust to attacks on half of the system’s sensors, their performance could
be improved if attacked sensors are identified and discarded. Thus, in this chapter
we provide a general technique for sensor attack detection and identification.
One of the main requirements of such a detection algorithm is that it accounts
for the fact that sensors might sometimes provide faulty measurements. As argued
in Chapter 4, sensors often experience transient faults that usually do not last long
and recover on their own (e.g., GPS losing connection in a tunnel and regaining
it afterwards); thus, one can design controllers that are robust to such scenarios.
Since transient faults are not a security threat for CPS, in this chapter we develop
an attack detection algorithm that does not raise false alarms due to temporarily
wrong sensor measurements and instead only flags actual sensor attacks.
As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, standard detection techniques either assume 1)
the system is in a known nominal state, i.e., known initial condition, such that a
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change detection approach could be employed [25, 52, 94, 130, 138, 221] or 2) that
a specific fault/attack is present such that specific detectors for that fault/attack
could be developed, e.g., generalized likelihood ratio tests or sequential probability
ratio tests [23, 24, 177, 178]. At the same time, these two assumptions are not
justified in modern CPS that may never have a known nominal state (e.g., perfectly
attackable systems [147]) and may not know in advance what faults/attacks they
might experience.
Redundancy-based approaches eliminate the need for the above unrealistic assumptions by adding more sensors and assuming that less than half are under attack [78, 211]. A major shortcoming of existing redundancy-based attack detection
works [109, 136] is that they conservatively treat transient faults as attacks. While
there exist papers distinguishing attacks from faults [21], they make specific assumptions about the form or direction of faults/attacks, thus being unsuitable for
our problem.
Different from existing works, in this dissertation we address the problem of sensor
attack detection in the presence of transient sensor faults. Similar to Chapter 4, we
use the abstract sensor model (in which each sensor provides a polyhedron) – this
model is well suited for worst-case analysis due to the noise bounds it provides.
In order to distinguish between attacks and faults, similar to Chapter 4, we make
use of sensor transient fault models (TFMs) that are now being provided by some
manufacturers [82]. Such a model consists of three dimensions: (1) polyhedron size,
(2) window size, and (3) number of allowed faulty measurements per window. In
the case when such TFMs are not available, one may refer to Section 4.7.2 for an
approach to obtain such models from sensor data.
As noted in Section 4.7, depending on the attacker’s goals and capabilities sensor
attacks can manifest as either transient or non-transient faults. Masking a sensor’s
measurements as a transient fault may prevent the attacker from being discovered
but limits his capabilities. On the other hand, if the attacked measurements are
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consistently wrong and resemble a permanent fault, they may inflict more damage
but may be detected quickly. In this dissertation, we provide resilience to both kinds
of attacks: in this section, we present 1) a detector for attacks that manifest as
non-transient faults, whereas in Section 4.7 we developed 2) a modified sensor fusion
algorithm whose output is guaranteed to contain the true state even in the presence
of sensor attacks that might appear as transient faults.
In order to develop a detector for attacks that manifest as non-transient sensor
faults, we assume there exists a TFM for each sensor and propose a detection and
identification algorithm for sensors that do not comply with their TFMs. The algorithm uses pairwise relationships between sensors – if two sensors’ measurements
are too distant from each other, then one of them must be wrong. By accumulating
this information over time, we develop a sound algorithm for attack detection and
identification.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the detection algorithm (in terms of false
alarm and detection rates) using real data collected from the LandShark robot. In
particular, we collected measurement data from several runs of the LandShark; this
data was then retrospectively augmented with several kinds of attacks. The proposed
detector (configured with a large enough TFM window) is able to eventually detect
all sensor attacks, thus illustrating the usefulness of this approach.

6.1

Problem Statement

This section presents the system and attack models considered in this chapter before
formulating the problem of sensor attack detection in the presence of transient faults.

6.1.1

System Model

The system model used in this Section is the general abstract sensor model used in
Chapter 4. Similar to Chapter 4, we note that the techniques developed here are
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the benefit of the transient fault model. Each of s2 , s3
and s4 provide one faulty measurement, but their other measurements are correct.

independent of system dynamics, hence no assumptions on dynamics are made:
xk+1 = f (xk , uk ) + νkp .

(6.1)

The sensor model is also the same model as in Chapter 4, where each sensor si
provides a direct measurement of the state at time k of the form1
m
yi,k = xk + νi,k
,

(6.2)

which is then converted to a polyhedron Pi,k such that
Pi,k = {yi,k + z ∈ Rd | Bi z ≤ bi }.

(6.3)

In addition, similar to Section 4.7, each sensor has a corresponding TFM (Ei , ei , wi )
that specifies an upper bound ei on the number of faulty measurements in any window of size wi . For sensor si , the set Ei contains the pair (Bi , bi ) that specifies the
shape of the corresponding polyhedron Pi,k .
To illustrate the benefit of the TFM, consider Figure 6.1. If one were to treat all
transient faults as attacks, then each of s2 , s3 and s4 would be declared as attacked
because they each produce a faulty measurement in rounds 3, 2, and 1, respectively
(these faulty measurements can be detected because they do not overlap with the
1
Note that measurements are not explicitly treated as continuous or binary in this chapter since
the technique treats them in the same way, i.e., by considering their corresponding polyhedra.
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fusion interval at the respective times); however, it is more beneficial for the system
to just discard the faulty measurements and continue the use the sensors at the times
when they do provide correct measurements.

6.1.2

Attack Model

As mentioned to the introduction of this chapter, we focus on detecting attacks that
manifest as non-transient sensor faults, i.e., the attacked sensor measurements do
not conform to their corresponding TFMs. Thus, in this chapter we treat all nontransiently faulty sensors as attacked (even if an alarm is raised due to an actual
non-transient fault, we argue that this is not a false alarm since such a sensor might
compromise the system’s operation).
Definition (Attacked Sensor). A sensor is considered attacked if it is non-transiently
faulty.
Once again, we emphasize that attacks that manifest as transient faults are handled in Section 4.7, where we developed a sensor fusion algorithm that provides
guarantees even in the presence of attacks that manifest as transient faults.
Finally, no assumptions are made on the number of attacked sensors. As long as
there is one non-attacked sensor in the system, attack detection is possible. Stronger
assumptions are needed for attack identification, as noted in the following sections.

6.1.3

Problem Statements

The problem addressed in this chapter is sensor attack detection in the presence of
transient sensor faults.
Problem. Given a system with n sensors and a transient fault model (Ei , ei , wi ) for
each sensor, develop an algorithm to detect the existence of an attacked sensor and
possibly identify which sensor is under attack.
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6.2

A Sound Algorithm for Attack Detection and
Identification

In this Section we describe our approach to sensor attack detection and identification,
which aims to differentiate sensor attacks from mere transient faults given each
sensor’s TFM. This section assumes that a TFM has already been identified for each
sensor; one way of developing such models is presented in Section 4.7.2.
The detection algorithm developed in this chapter is based on Pairwise Inconsistencies (PI’s) between two sensors. Two types of PI’s are the key concepts of our
approach: weak inconsistency and strong inconsistency. At a high level, we accumulate information about inconsistencies between sensor measurements over time and
utilize it for attack detection and identification. In the following subsections, we first
define each type of inconsistency and then present the attack detection/identification
method. We conclude with a discussion on the conditions on the TFM parameters
under which our approach can operate.

6.2.1

Weak and Strong Inconsistency

As usual, this section is built on the premise that the true state is unknown in general.
Thus, it is not always known which sensors have provided correct measurements.
However, we know how correct sensor measurements should relate to each other,
and mainly use this mutual information in our approach. The first relation between
two sensors, si and sj , is weak inconsistency. Two sensors are weakly inconsistent
at a given time if one of them provides a faulty measurement.
Definition (Weak Inconsistency). We say that sensors si and sj are weakly inconsistent at time k if one of them provides a faulty measurement at time k.
Since weak inconsistency is defined upon the unknown true state, it is impossible
to decide weak inconsistency in general. However, there exists a useful sufficient
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condition. If the intervals of two sensors do not overlap each other, one of them
must have provided a faulty measurement because the true value cannot lie in both
intervals. This condition is formally stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. If two sensors, si and sj , provide polyhedra that do not overlap at time
k, i.e.,
Pi,k ∩ Pj,k = ∅,
then at least one of the two sensors provided a faulty measurement at time k.
Note that both transient faults and attacks can cause weak inconsistency in a
round. Thus, to disambiguate between transient faults and attacks, we introduce
another relation between two sensors, namely strong inconsistency. Two sensors are
strongly inconsistent if and only if one of them is non-transiently faulty (i.e., it does
not comply with its transient fault model).
Definition (Strong Inconsistency). We say that sensors si and sj are strongly inconsistent at time k if one of them is non-transiently faulty at time k.
Similar to weak inconsistency, strong inconsistency cannot be decided in general.
However, once again there exists a sufficient condition. If two sensors are weakly
inconsistent more times than a certain threshold in a window, they become strongly
inconsistent.
Lemma 4. Two sensors, si and sj , are strongly inconsistent at time k if the following
condition is true:


0 =k
kX




W I(i, j, k 0 ) > ei + ej

(6.4)

k0 =k−min(wi ,wj )+1

where W I(i, j, k) = 1 if si and sj are weakly inconsistent at time k, and W I(i, j, k) = 0
otherwise.
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The notions of pairwise inconsistency in this subsection form a basis for the attack
detection and identification techniques to be explained in the following subsection.

6.2.2

Attack Detection and Identification

In this subsection, we describe our approach to attack detection and identification
using the notions of weak and strong inconsistency. An attack is detected when
there exist two sensors which are strongly inconsistent because one of them must be
non-transiently faulty. An attacked sensor is identified if it is strongly inconsistent
with multiple sensors. To propagate the strong inconsistencies over time, we use
a sequential detection approach (motivated by sequential detection theory [212])
and accumulate the information over time. These statements are formalized in the
remainder of this subsection.
Theorem 15. If two sensors, si and sj , are strongly inconsistent at any time k,
then one of them must be attacked.
Theorem 15 is the main result of this chapter. It says that the existence of a
strong inconsistency between two sensors is sufficient for the existence of an attack.
Thus, the attack detection algorithm developed in this chapter works by detecting
strong inconsistencies between sensors using the sufficient condition in Lemma 4.
As the existence of strong inconsistency between two sensors cannot determine
which sensor is attacked, we now address the attack identification problem. Note that
it is necessary to assume that at most a sensors are attacked such that a < n − 1. To
explain the need for the assumption, suppose that sensor si is strongly inconsistent
with all other sensors. Without the assumption on a, it is impossible to declare that
si is attacked because si could be correct and all other sensors could be attacked,
or vice versa. For this reason, when a ≥ n − 1, there can exist no detector which
correctly identifies attacks based on pairwise comparisons alone.
When a < n − 1, there is a sufficient condition for identifying attacked sensors.
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Theorem 16. Assume a < n − 1 and let d(i) denote the number of sensors that
have been strongly inconsistent with si during the system’s operation. Then, si can
be identified as attacked if d(i) > a.
Next, we note that there exists a constraint on the TFM parameters governing
the feasibility of our PI-based approach. The following lemma provides a sufficient
condition for the impossibility of attack detection by the PI-based method:
Lemma 5. If ei + ej ≥ min(wi , wj ) for all distinct i and j, then no attack can be
detected by our approach.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the soundness of the developed attack detection/identification approach.
Proposition 11. The attack detection/identification methods proposed in Theorems 15 and 16 are sound. In other words, the algorithms raise no false alarm
(assuming the transient fault model parameters are correctly specified).

6.3

Case Study

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the attack detection/identification
algorithm. For this case study, the same data as in Section 4.7.4 was used, i.e., three
of the LandShark’s velocity sensors were used – the two wheel encoders and the
GPS. The gathered data corresponds to 2400 velocity measurements by each sensor
at 10 Hz (i.e., about four minutes). The LandShark was driven on different surfaces
(namely, grass, asphalt and snow) such that different types of faults might occur.
Thus, we use the redundancy of velocity measurements (i.e., one-dimensional
intervals) to evaluate the proposed techniques in the presence of transient faults
(e.g., tire slip).
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Table 6.1: False alarm rate
Detector
False Alarm
Rate(%)

6.3.1

SF

P I10

P I50

P I200

0.06

0.64

0.00

0.00

Attack Detection Performance

To evaluate the performance of the attack detectors, we use the TFM parameters
obtained in Section 4.7.4 and employ various attack scenarios as explained below.
We first evaluate the false alarm rates of the attack detectors; the false alarm
rate is calculated as the number of incorrect alarms over the total number of tests.
Note that all raised alarms are considered to be incorrect because no attacks are
present yet. We perform the first test as soon as w measurements are available;
consequently, whenever a new measurement arrives from each sensor, a new test is
performed using the last w measurements. Table 6.1 shows the false alarm rates for
the TFM parameters of Table 4.6; note that we use P Iw to indicate the proposed
Pairwise-Inconsistency-based approach using a window of length w.2 The results
show that for window sizes 200 and 50, the false alarm rate is zero, but it is non-zero
for window sizes 10 and 1 (note that P I1 is referred to as the sensor fusion (SF)-based
detector since the interval sizes would be conservatively set large enough so that no
faulty measurements are observed). The reason is that the false alarms result from
transient faults and they do not appear too often in larger windows. On the other
hand, the SF-based approach has a low false alarm rate because it uses conservative
error bounds; it raises some false alarms because the largest faulty measurement
observed in the training data was less than the one in the test data.
We now evaluate the attack detection rate assuming that only one (unknown to
us) out of the three sensors is attacked. We consider three different attack scenarios:
(1) bias attack; (2) random attack; (3) greedy attack. The bias attack adds a constant
2

P I30 and P I100 are excluded for the rest of the Chapter to avoid clutter.
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Table 6.2: Detection rate
Detector
Biased Attack
Random Attack
Greedy Attack

SF
62.74
4.91
0

P I10
99.74
36.10
0.4817

P I50
100
93.30
0

P I200
100
100
0

of 0.8 m/s to the attacked sensor. The random attack adds a uniformly distributed
random noise between 0 and 0.8 m/s.3 . The greedy attack replaces the measurement
of the attacked sensor with a specially crafted measurement designed to maximize
the uncertainty (i.e., the fusion interval size) in the system; this is also the stealthy
attack discussed in Section 4.6.4 Note that the attack is present in every round in
the detection rate test, thus all raised alarms are true alarms.
To evaluate the attack detection rate, we employ the same test data as above and
augment it by simulating each attack scenario described above. Table 6.2 summarizes
the detection rates for each detector and attack scenario. The detection rate improves
in general as the window size increases. The only exception is greedy attack, where
most of the detectors raise no alarms. This indicates that given enough knowledge
and computational power, the attacked sensor can pretend as if it is a correct one
while it negatively affects the system. Note that the SF-based approach’s detection
rate is lower than the PI-based one’s because it uses conservative error bounds.
Note that the false alarm rate improves with window size, whereas, for the same
reason, the attack detectors with a large window size may be slow to detect attacks.
Therefore, we also evaluate the detection rate vs. the elapsed time since the attack
begins. The results for the various TFM parameters are shown in Figure 6.2, where
the steady-state detection rates correspond to the detection rates in Table 6.2. Figure 6.2c shows that all detectors rarely detect any greedy attacks. From the cases
3

The magnitudes of the bias and random attacks are selected to be roughly as large as the
interval size of the most imprecise sensor (i.e., GPS).
4
We assume the greedy attack knows the other abstract measurements, as possible if sensor
communication occurs on a shared medium, e.g., CAN bus.
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Figure 6.2: Time to detection plots under the three classes of attacks.
of biased and random attacks, Figure 6.2 shows that the steady-state detection rate
improves with window size, and the time needed to reach the steady-state detection
level increases only marginally.
To compare the attack detectors in greater depth and to examine their robustness to the choice of the TFM parameters, we vary the error bounds of the TFM
parameters selected in Section 4.7.4. Specifically, varying  of each sensor from 50%
to 150% of their magnitudes, we calculate the false alarm rate and detection rate
for each setup. By examining the robustness of attack detector regarding the TFM
parameters, we can qualitatively demonstrate the importance of accurate parameter
selection. The results for the varied TFM parameters for each window size are depicted as the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve in Figure 6.3, which is a
classical way to measure a detector’s performance. Note that the 45◦ line is a dotted
line and is moved lower to make comparative performance clear.5
Note that data points which trend towards the upper left corner indicate a better
detector because the detector would have a larger detection rate and a smaller false
alarm rate [212]. We can qualitatively evaluate that one detector is more robust than
another if the ROC data points cluster nearer to the upper left corner when varying
its parameters [212]. Therefore, the robustness of the PI-based detectors improves
with window size in general. Note that P I10 performs marginally better than the
5

Only 13 points are used to show the general trend and avoid overcrowding.
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Figure 6.3: Detection Rate vs. False Alarm Rate under the three classes of attacks. Dotted black lines denote 45◦ lines. Solid lines connect points for a clearer
presentation. Note the scale is different in the greedy attack case.
SF-based detector, and P I200 and P I50 apparently outperform the others. Lastly,
the ROC curves for the greedy attack scenario lie on the 45◦ line, which implies that
when the most powerful attacker is present, the performance of the attack detectors
is not better than a coin flip.
The results presented in this section suggest that the false alarm rate, the detection rate and the robustness of PI-based detectors improve with window size, at a
cost of a marginal increase of time-to-detection. In addition, the PI-based detector
outperforms the SF-based one as the window size increases.
Finally, we only briefly highlight the attack identification performance because
it shows almost identical results to the detection one. Note that in general, the
identification rate also improves with window size, experiencing only a marginal
increase in time-to-identification.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation addressed the problem of providing detection and
estimation techniques in order to ensure the safety and security of modern CPS.
In addition, all of these techniques provide guarantees about their performance, in
expectation or in the worst case depending on the application. Our main contribution
lies in the generality of the proposed approaches – while most existing works address
safety/security problems by making unreasonable assumptions (either the system is
in a known nominal state or the class of fault/attack is known), we make use of sensor
redundancy and context information in order to avoid making such assumptions. In
summary, we make contributions to three fields of this problem space: 1) nominal
context-aware estimation, 2) safety detection and 3) sensor attack detection.
In Chapter 3, we note that incorporating context information for the purposes
of estimation and detection is a novel idea in itself. Context measurements can be
extracted from the system’s environment data and are essentially high-level representations of low-level measurements (e.g., a recognized building in an image). Thus,
they can be used for state estimation purposes, in addition to (or in lieu of) standard linear continuous measurements. In Chapter 3, we model context measurements
probabilistically (i.e., each measurement has a known probability of occurring given
the system’s state) and develop a context-aware filter using two different types of
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measurement models. In particular, the specific contributions of Chapter 3 are:
• Formulation of the context-aware filtering problem for linear systems. Two
classes of probability of context detection functions were investigated, namely
inverse-exponential functions and sigmoid functions.
• Development of a Gaussian-Mixture-based filter and a sigmoid-based filter using the two proposed classes of probability of detection functions, respectively.
• Asymptotic analysis of the sigmoid-based filter. We provided sufficient conditions on the number of available context measurements under which the filter’s
uncertainty is bounded. In addition, we argued that the filter converges to a
Newton Method in the limit (after repeated updates), thus providing evidence
that it is likely asymptotically unbiased.
• Evaluation in simulation of both filters. Different features of the filters were
explored in multiple case studies. The probit-based filter’s evaluation also
suggests the filter is likely asymptotically unbiased.
• Real-patient data evaluation of the sigmoid-based filter. We applied the filter to the problem of estimation of blood oxygen content using non-invasive
measurements only.
Chapter 4 addresses the main problem considered in this dissertation, namely
safety detection in the presence of arbitrary faults and attacks in sensors. We develop
sensor fusion techniques to take advantage of the inherent sensor redundancy in
modern CPS. We then provide multiple ways of improving the output of sensor
fusion by using historical measurements and by analyzing different schedules of sensor
measurement transmissions in order to minimize the attacker’s impact on the system.
In summary, the contributions of Chapter 4 are:
• Development of multidimensional sensor fusion algorithm where each sensor
measurement is converted to a polyhedron. The output of sensor fusion, the
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fusion polyhedron, is guaranteed to contain the true state assuming less than
half of all sensors are attacked.
• A modified sensor fusion algorithm incorporating measurement history. System
dynamics are used in order to map previous measurements to the current time.
We showed that the fusion polyhedron using history is always a subset of the
one computed without history.
• Comparison of different sensor transmission schedules in terms of the expected
size of the fusion interval. We provided both theoretical and simulation results
in favor of the Ascending schedule, the one in which most precise sensors
transmit first.
• Sensor fusion in the presence of transient faults. Since standard sensor fusion
loses its guarantees in the presence of sensor faults in addition to attacks, we
developed a modified algorithm whose output is still guaranteed to contain the
true state. In order to capture transient faults, we provide a transient fault
model (TFM) for each sensor limiting the number of faulty measurements in
a given window; we also showed how to obtain a TFM from available sensor
data.
• Evaluation of all proposed techniques both in simulation and in experiments
using the LandShark robot.
In order to further strengthen the guarantees of sensor fusion, in Chapter 5
we incorporated an additional piece of information, namely context measurements.
We developed a modified algorithm with both continuous and binary measurements
whose output is once again guaranteed to contain the true state. Context-aware
sensor fusion would be especially useful in scenarios where more than half of the
standard continuous measurements might be under attack, in which case the addition
of context measurements can allow the system to still provide worst-case guarantees
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about its safety. To evaluate this approach, we provided a case-study simulation of
a perfectly attackable system that cannot detect the attack on GPS, thus leading
to a crash; if context measurements (in the form of building detections) are used,
however, the system can detect that it is unsafe and avoid the collision.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we note that all of the above techniques’ performance could
be improved if better data is provided by the system’s sensors. Thus, we developed
a sensor attack detection technique in order to identify and discard attacked sensors,
thereby improving the performance of estimation and sensor fusion. The attack
detection algorithm was developed so that it does not raise unnecessary alarms in
the presence of transient faults, which are a normal part of system operation. This
approach was evaluated on real data collected from the LandShark and augmented
retrospectively with several kinds of attacks.
There are multiple potential avenues for future work based on the results in this
dissertation. In this chapter, we focus on two main classes of possible extensions,
namely generalizing the notion of context as well as investigating further the current
applications of context measurements in estimation and sensor fusion. Note that
both branches include context – this should be no surprise given the rising availability
of context measurements from improved machine learning and detection algorithms.
In particular, some questions one might ask in terms of formalizing context are:
• What is context in general? Can we formalize the difference between standard
sensors and context sensors (not just mathematically, but also conceptually)?
• When is context useful? If we assume context is always a high-level representation of other sensor data, then what is the benefit of using context as opposed
to the actual sensor data?
The more specific and immediate extensions of this dissertation concern directly
the approaches presented here:
• Extend Theorem 1 to the multidimensional case in order to provide more
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intuition about when the sigmoid-based context-aware filter’s uncertainty is
bounded.
• Provide conditions under which the sigmoid-based context-aware filter converges to the true state.
• Develop context-aware estimation with discrete measurements that are not just
binary but come from a larger (possibly infinite) set. The main challenge with
such a problem is its combinatorial nature.
• Use historical context measurements in the context-aware sensor fusion algorithm in the same way as standard continuous measurements, e.g., by using
pairwise intersection.
• Note that the proposed context-aware sensor fusion algorithm only makes use
of context measurements when they are equal to 1, i.e., measurements of -1
are not used explicitly in the algorithm. Adding the negative measurements
is challenging because it is not clear how to maintain a bounded fusion polyhedron. Thus, this is another possible extension of the context-aware sensor
fusion algorithm.
• Incorporate a transient fault model for context measurements, similar to sensor
fusion with transient sensor faults as presented in Section 4.7. This problem
presents a different type of challenge, namely the fact that it introduces potential mode switches for the system. Since context measurements can only
be observed from certain states, for each received measurement one needs to
consider whether the system is in a state from which obtaining that context
measurement is possible or whether the measurement is just a false alarm.
Similarly, if a measurement is not received, it is possible that the system is not
in a state from which this context measurement can be obtained but it is also
possible that the context measurement was not received due to an imperfect
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detection or classification algorithm.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1

Proof of Proposition 2

First note that the update equation takes the form:
p(ykb | x)φ(x; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )
p(ykb | x0 )φ(x0 ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx0
Φ(ykb (bTk x + ak ))φ(x; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )
=
,
Zk

pk|k (x) = R

where
Z
Zk =

Φ(ykb (bTk x0 + ak ))φ(x0 ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx0 .

The derivation for Zk is carried out as follows:
Z



Φ(ykb (bTk x0 + ak ))φ(x0 ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx0 = Ex Φ(ykb (bTk x + ak ))
h
i


b T
= Ex P(z1 ≤ yk (bk x + ak )) = E(x,z1 ) 1z1 ≤ykb (bTk x+ak )

Zk =

= P(ykb (bTk x + ak ) − z1 ≥ 0)


q
b T
T
= P yk (bk µk|k−1 + ak ) + z2 bk Σk|k−1 bk + 1 ≥ 0
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= P(z2 ≥ −Mk ) = 1 − Φ(−Mk ) = Φ(Mk ),
where z1 and z2 are standard Normal random variables independent of each other
and of x.

A.2

Proof of Proposition 3

To show that the function
g(x) = ln(pk|k (x))

(A.1)

is concave, we need to show that its Hessian (with respect to x) is negative definite.
To see this, first note that
q
g(x) = − ln(Zk ) + ln(Φ(ykb (bTk x + ak ))) − ln( (2π)n |Σk|k−1 |)
1
− (x − µk|k−1 )T Σ−1
k|k−1 (x − µk|k−1 ).
2
The first derivative of g(x) is:
g 0 (x) = bk ykb α(ykb (bTk x + ak )) − Σ−1
k|k−1 (x − µk|k−1 ),
where α(x) = φ(x; 0, 1)/Φ(x). The Hessian of g(x) is:
g 00 (x) = bk bTk (ykb )2 [−α(ykb (bTk x + ak ))(ykb (bTk x + ak )) − α2 (ykb (bTk x + ak ))] − Σ−1
k|k−1
= −bk bTk h(ykb (bTk x + ak )) − Σ−1
k|k−1 .
Since bk bTk is positive semidefinite and Σk|k−1 is positive definite, it remains to show
that the term h(ykb (bTk x + ak )) is non-negative; but this is true as shown in Proposition 5.
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A.3

Proof of Proposition 4

First note that
Z
µk|k =

x

b T 0
0 Φ(yk (bk x

+ ak ))φ(x0 ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 ) 0
dx .
Zk

One way to compute the mean in closed form is, similar to the derivation in Chapter
3.9 in [165], by first computing the gradient with respect to µk|k−1 of the following
two equivalent expressions for Zk :
Z

Φ(ykb (bTk x0 + ak ))φ(x0 ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx0 = Φ(Mk ).

(A.2)

The corresponding derivatives are:
∂Zk
=
∂µk|k−1

Z

0
b T 0
0
0
Σ−1
k|k−1 (x − µk|k−1 )Φ(yk (bk x + ak )) · φ(x ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx

φ(Mk ; 0, 1)
,
= ykb bk q
T
bk Σk|k−1 bk + 1
where we used the fact that ∂Φ(x)/∂x = φ(x). Note that the first term in the integral
−1
on the left-hand side is Zk Σk|k−1
µk|k . The second term is Zk Σ−1
k|k−1 µk|k−1 . Therefore,

we get
ykb φ(Mk ; 0, 1)
−1
q
.
Zk Σ−1
µ
=
Z
Σ
µ
+
b
k k|k−1 k|k−1
k
k|k−1 k|k
bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1
Thus, we arrive at
α(Mk )
µk|k = µk|k−1 + ykb Σk|k−1 bk q
,
bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1
where we used the second expression for Zk in order to get α. The final expression
for µk|k is obtained by solving for χk in the equation α(Mk )(bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1)−1/2 =
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(bTk Σk|k−1 bk + χk )−1 .
The expression for the covariance matrix is:
Σk|k = Σ̂k|k − µk|k µTk|k ,

(A.3)

where
Z
Σ̂k|k =

x0 x0T

Φ(ykb (bTk x0 + ak ))φ(x0 ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 ) 0
dx .
Zk

Σ̂k|k can be computed in closed-form similar to the mean, by computing the Hessians
with respect to µk|k−1 of both sides of (A.2):
Z

0
0
T −1
b T 0
0
0
Σ−1
k|k−1 (x − µk|k−1 )(x − µk|k−1 ) Σk|k−1 Φ(yk (bk x + ak ))φ(x ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx
Z
b T 0
0
0
− Σ−1
k|k−1 Φ(yk (bk x + ak ))φ(x ; µk|k−1 , Σk|k−1 )dx

= −ykb bk bTk

φ(Mk ; 0, 1)(bTk µk|k−1 + ak )
.
(bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1)3/2

−1
Note that one of the terms in the integral on the left-hand side is Zk Σ−1
k|k−1 Σ̂k|k Σk|k−1 .

Therefore, we rearrange terms and divide by Zk to obtain the following:
−1
−1
−1
−1
−1
−1
T
T
Σ−1
k|k−1 Σ̂k|k Σk|k−1 = Σk|k−1 + Σk|k−1 µk|k µk|k−1 Σk|k−1 + Σk|k−1 µk|k−1 µk|k Σk|k−1
−1
T
b
T
− Σ−1
k|k−1 µk|k−1 µk|k−1 Σk|k−1 − yk bk bk

α(Mk )(bTk µk|k−1 + ak )
.
(bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1)3/2

Finally, we arrive at the expression for Σ̂k|k :
Σ̂k|k = Σk|k−1 + µk|k µTk|k−1 + µk|k−1 µTk|k − µk|k−1 µTk|k−1
− ykb Σk|k−1 bk bTk Σk|k−1

α(Mk )(bTk µk|k−1 + ak )
.
(bTk Σk|k−1 bk + 1)3/2

Thus, the covariance matrix can be computed by plugging in the expression for Σ̂k|k
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in (A.3). To simplify it to the final form shown in the Proposition statement, we
first plug in the expression for µk|k − µk|k−1 from (3.10) and then solve for γk .

A.4

Proof of Theorem 1

Consider the (scalar) modified algebraic Riccati equation (MARE) defined as:
gβ (x) = axa + q − βaxb(bxb + 1)−1 bxa,
where b = mini |bi |, i.e., the minimum-in-magnitude of all context weights. Note that
if β = 1, then this becomes the standard algebraic Riccati equation, which converges
for any σ0 . On the other hand if β = 0, the covariance matrix diverges for some σ0
if a is unstable. We use the MARE to bound the expected value of context-aware
filter’s variance and give conditions on β for which the expectation is bounded.
We first bound the expected variance of the filter using the MARE. From (3.14),
followed by applying the prediction step, we get (by using the simplified notation
σk = σk|k−1 ):
E[σk+1 ] = E[aσk a + q − τm aσk bk (bk σk bk + γkm )−1 bk σk a − τp aσk bk (bk σk bk + γkp )−1 bk σk a]
≤ E[aσk a + q − ηaσk b(bσk b + γkm )−1 bσk a − ηaσk b(bσk b + γkp )−1 bσk a]
≤ E[aσk a + q − ηaσk b(bσk b + min{γkm , γkp })−1 bσk a]
−1

(1 − h(0))(bσk b) + 1
≤ E[aσk a + q − ηaσk b bσk b +
bσk a]
h(0)
= E[aσk a + q − ρaσk b(bσk b + 1)−1 bσk a]
= E[gρ (σk )],
where ρ = ηh(0) < 1, τm is the probability of ykb = −1 (with resulting γkm ); τp and γkp
are their analogues when ykb = 1. The first equality is the expected value of σk+1 for
each possible value of ykb . The second inequality uses the fact that both τp , τm ≥ η.
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In the third inequality we simply discard one of the two negative terms, keeping the
one with smaller γk (i.e., the one that results in Mk < 0; note that 0 < h(x) < 1 and
h0 (x) < 0, from Proposition 5). The last inequality is true because h(x) > h(0) for
any x < 0.
The rest of the proof mimics the proof of Theorem 3 in [190]. Consider the
sequence sk+1 = gρ (sk ), with s0 = σ0 . We show that E[σk ] ≤ sk using induction.
Note that E[σk ] ≤ sk implies:
E[σk+1 ] ≤ E[gρ (σk )] ≤ gρ (E[σk ]) ≤ gρ (sk ) = sk+1 ,
where the first inequality was shown above, and the second and third inequalities
are shown in Lemma 1 in [190]. Furthermore, as shown in Theorem 3 in [190], sk is
bounded from above, given that ρ > ρ (ρ ∈ [0, 1), as shown in [190]), i.e.,
E[σk ] ≤ sk ≤ Mσ0 , ∀k.

A.5

Proof of Lemma 1

The proof proceeds by induction on k. The base case is shown in (3.14). For the
induction step, we assume that K < N updates result in the form in (3.18), with
matrices Γk and Bk replaced by ΓK and BK , respectively. Given weights bk+K+1 , the
next discrete update is
Σk+K+1 = Σk+K − Σk+K bk+K+1 β −1 bTk+K+1 Σk+K
where by induction
T
T
+ ΓK )−1 BK Σk ,
Σk+K = Σk − Σk BK
(BK Σk BK

β = bTk+K+1 Σk+K bk+K+1 + γk+K+1 .

170

(A.4)

By rearranging terms and using the block matrix inversion lemma, Equation (A.4)
can now be written as
h

i

Σk+K+1 = Σk −
Σk bk+K+1 ·

−1
T
BK Σk BK + ΓK
BK Σk bk+K+1

·
T
bTk+K+1 Σk BK
bTk+K+1 Σk bk+K+1 + γk+K+1


BK Σk
,
·
T
bk+K+1 Σk
T
Σk BK

i.e.,
h
i
T
Σk+K+1 = Σk − Σk BK
bk+K+1 ·

−1


i
h
ΓK
0
BK

 Σk B T bT
+
· 
K
k+K+1
0 γk+K+1
bk+K+1


BK
 Σk ,
·
T
bk+K+1
which has the desired form of the Riccati (update) equation.

A.6

Proof of Theorem 2

We first prove sufficiency (<=). Let B be the matrix of persistently exciting bi , i.e.,
B = [b1 , . . . , bd ]T . Note that B is square and invertible. Consider the sequence of
times k1 , k2 , . . . , where k1 = 1 and kt+1 = kt + lkt + 1; note that all bi in B occur in
between each pair of kt and kt+1 by construction. Thus, using Lemma 1, it suffices
to show that the eigenvalues of the covariance sequence
Σkt+1 = Σkt − Σkt B T (BΣkt B T + Γkt )−1 BΣkt

171

(A.5)

converge to 0 in probability. Note from (3.14) that no binary update can increase the
eigenvalues of Σk , so any updates with weights and offsets not in P can be ignored
as they do not affect the convergence.
Diagonalizing Σkt = U DU T , we rewrite (A.5):
Σkt+1 = U (D − D(D + M Γkt M T )−1 D)U T ,

(A.6)

where M = U T V −1 . Diagonalizing M Γkt M T = P ΛP T , we conclude that
Σkt+1  U (D − D(D + δmax I)−1 D)U T ,

(A.7)

where δmax is the largest eigenvalue of M Γkt M T . Thus, each eigenvalue λikt is reduced
at least by (λikt )2 /(λikt + δmax ). Therefore, λikt → 0 as long as δmax is bounded from
(the largest γk between times kt and kt+1 ) is
above. But δmax is bounded if γkmax
t
bounded. From (3.15), it can be seen that γk is bounded from above if the function
h is bounded from below. But for each k, Mk < 0 with probability at least
min

ykb ∈{1,−1},(bi ,ai )∈P

Φ(ykb ((bi )T x∗ + ai )),

where x∗ is the true (non-moving) state. Thus, h has a non-zero probability of
having negative input, i.e., it is bounded from below by h(0) = α2 (0) (note that
h0 (x) < 0, from Proposition 5). Thus, the probability that h is never bounded from
p

below converges to 0, i.e., λikt −−→ 0.
To prove necessity (=>), note that if (bk , ak ) is not persistently exciting, there
exists a time K, such that the set of context weights bk for k > K does not span Rd ,
i.e., the matrix BK of all such weights is not full rank. We now show this implies
that there exists at least one λik that does not go to 0. Returning to (3.18), note
that there exists a rotation matrix U such that one eigenvector (call it p) of Σk U T
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⊥
is aligned with an eigenvector of BK
, the null space of BK . Consider the matrix

T
T
+ Γk )−1 BK Σk )U T .
(BK Σk BK
G = U (Σk − Σk BK

G has the same eigenvalues as Σk+K but the eigenvalue corresponding to p is also an
eigenvalue of Σk , i.e., this eigenvalue remains unchanged when BK is not full rank.

A.7

Proof of Theorem 3

First note that applying the matrix inversion lemma to the covariance update in (3.14),
we get:
Ωk+1 = (Σk − Σk bk+1 (bTk+1 Σk bk+1 + γk+1 )−1 bTk+1 Σk )−1
−1 T
= Σ−1
k + bk+1 γk+1 bk+1 .

Therefore,
−1 T
Ωsk+1 = Ωk+1 − Ωk = bk+1 γk+1
bk+1 .

The mean at time k + 1 is equal to (by using the mean update in (3.10)):
b
µk+1 = µk + Σk bk+1 (bTk+1 Σk bk+1 + χk+1 )−1 yk+1
−1 b
= µk + Σk bk+1 Nk+1
yk+1 ,

where Nk+1 = bTk+1 Σk bk+1 + χk+1 . Thus, the information mean of the “site” approximation becomes
s
ωk+1
= Ωk+1 µk+1 − Ωk µk
−1 b
= Ωk+1 µk + (I + Lk+1 )bk+1 Nk+1
yk+1 − Ωk µk
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−1 b
= Ωsk+1 µk + Ωk µk + (I + Lk+1 )bk+1 Nk+1
yk+1 − Ωk µk ,

−1 T
where Lk+1 = bk+1 γk+1
bk+1 Σk , and we used the inverse-lemma expression for Ωk+1 .

A.8

Proof of Corollary 3

As shown in Theorem 2, if bk is persistently exciting, then all eigenvalues of Σk
converge to 0 for large k. To analyze the convergence of the natural parameters of
the “site” approximations, first note that the first derivative of ψ is as follows:
0

b
b
ψk+1 (x) = −bk+1 α(yk+1
(bTk+1 x + ak+1 ))yk+1
.

(A.8)

The second derivative of ψ is:
00

b
ψk+1 (x) = bk+1 bTk+1 h(yk+1
(bTk+1 x + ak+1 )).

(A.9)

00

−1 T
−1
We first show that Ωsk+1 = bk+1 γk+1
bk+1 converges to ψk+1 (µk ), i.e., that γk+1
b
converges to h(yk+1
(bTk+1 µk + ak+1 )). But this is clear from (3.15): as the eigenvalues
−1
b
of Σk converge to 0, γk+1
converges to h(Mk+1 ), and Mk+1 converges to yk+1
(bTk+1 µk +

ak+1 ).
−1 b
s
= Ωsk+1 µk +(I+Lk+1 )bk+1 Nk+1
yk+1 .
As derived in (3.22), the information mean is ωk+1
−1
b
First note that Nk+1
converges to 1/χk+1 , which in turn converges to α(yk+1
(bTk+1 µk +

ak+1 )), as can be seen from (3.11). Thus, in order to show that the second term of
0

s
ωk+1
converges to −ψk+1 (µk ), it suffices to show that Lk+1 converges to 0. But this

is clear from the definition of Lk+1 in Theorem 3.
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A.9

Proof of Proposition 6

Since there are at least n − f correct polyhedra, the true state is contained in at
least n − f polyhedra, and hence it will be included in the fusion polyhedron.

A.10

Proof of Proposition 7

We first note that any set that is guaranteed to contain the true state must contain
RNk ,f since any point that is excluded may be the true state. This proves the
proposition since conv(RNk ,f ) is the smallest convex set that contains RNk ,f .

A.11

Proof of Lemma 2

P
Let p be any vertex of the convex hull. Then p =
θi vi , where the vi are the vertices
P
of the polyhedra,
θi = 1 and θi ≥ 0 (i.e., p is a convex combination of the vi ’s).
This means that p lies on a hyperplane defined by some of the vi ’s, hence it cannot
be a vertex, unless it is one of the vi ’s.

A.12

Proof of Theorem 4

We use a counting argument. Let V be the set of vertices of SNk ,f . By Lemma 2,
each vertex in V is a vertex of one of the polyhedra formed by the intersection of
n − f of the sensor polyhedra (in step 4 of Algorithm 1). Therefore, it is contained
in at least n − f polyhedra. For each p ∈ V, let Pp denote the number of polyhedra
containing p. Consequently, Pp ≥ n − f . Then
vP (n − f ) ≤

X
p∈V
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Pp .

The sum in the right-hand side can be split into two sums. One contains the number
of polyhedra where each of the polyhedra contains all vP vertices (we denote this
number by a). Then the number of the remaining polyhedra is n − a. The part of
the sum due to the polyhedra that contain fewer than vP vertices can be bounded
from above by (n − a)(vP − 1) since each of these polyhedra contains at most vP − 1
vertices. We then have
vP (n − f ) ≤ avP + (n − a)(vP − 1),
which implies that a ≥ n−f vP , i.e., at least n−f vP polyhedra contain the vP vertices
of the fusion polyhedron. Since polyhedra, including the fusion polyhedron, are
convex, we conclude that at least n − f vP polyhedra contain the fusion polyhedron.
This completes the proof, since
|SNk ,f | ≤ maxn−f vP {|P | : P ∈ Nk } = minf vP +1 {|P | : P ∈ Nk }.

A.13

Proof of Theorem 5

Assume the opposite – that there exists a point xA ∈ SNk ,f that is not in conv(Ck ).
P
Then for any convex combination
θi vi = xA , where vi ∈ Pj for some j, at least
one vi must not be in any polyhedron in Ck , meaning that it is contained in at most
f polyhedra, where f < n − f . Therefore, there does not exist a convex combination
P
θi vi = xA with all vi contained in at least n − f polyhedra, and hence xA cannot
be in SNk ,f .

A.14

Proof of Theorem 6

Consider any point p ∈ m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f . Then p lies in at least n − f polyhedra in Nk+1 , and there exists a q such that p ∈ m(q) that lies in at least n − f
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polyhedra in Nk . Thus, p lies in at least 2n − 2f polyhedra in m(Nk ) ∪ Nk+1 , i.e.,
p ∈ Rm(Nk )∪Nk+1 ,2f , implying
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ) ⊆ conv(Rm(Nk )∪Nk+1 ,2f ) = Sm(Nk )∪Nk+1 ,2f .

A.15

Proof of Theorem 7

Note that for any sets A and B, conv(A ∩ B) ⊆ conv(A), and thus
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ) ⊆ conv(RNk+1 ,f ) = SNk+1 ,f .
Furthermore, any point p ∈ conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ) is a convex combination of
points qi in m(RNk ,f ). But m(RNk ,f ) ⊆ m(SNk ,f ) (since RNk ,f ⊆ SNk ,f ) and the fact
that m(SNk ,f ) is convex imply p ∈ m(SNk ,f ). Accordingly,
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk ,f ) ⊆ SNk ,f and
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ) ⊆ m(SNk ,f )
implying
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ) ⊆ m(SNk ,f ) ∩ SNk+1 ,f .

A.16

Proof of Theorem 8

Note that, since the fusion interval is always guaranteed to contain the true value,
the number of corrupted polyhedra in map S and fuse is still at most f , but the
number of correct ones is now at least n + 1 − f . In addition, note that
m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ⊆ m(SNk ,f )
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since m(RNk ,f ) ⊆ m(SNk ,f ). Furthermore, any point p ∈ RNk+1 ,f is contained in
n − f polyhedra in Nk+1 . Thus, all points in m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f are contained in
n + 1 − f polyhedra in m(SNk ,f ) ∪ Nk+1 , and hence in Rm(SNk ,f )∪Nk+1 ,f . Since the
fusion polyhedron is convex,
conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ) ⊆ Sm(SNk ,f )∪Nk+1 ,f .

A.17

Proof of Theorem 9

Let p be any point in Rm(Nk )∩p Nk+1 ,f . Then p lies in at least n − f polyhedra in
m(Nk ) and at least n − f polyhedra in Nk+1 . Hence,
Rm(Nk )∩p Nk+1 ,f ⊆ RNk+1 ,f .
Furthermore, there exists a point q = A−1 p that is contained in n − f intervals in
Nk . Therefore, p is also contained in m(RNk ,f ). Then
Rm(Nk )∩p Nk+1 ,f ⊆ m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f , i.e.,
Sm(Nk )∩p Nk+1 ,f ⊆ conv(m(RNk ,f ) ∩ RNk+1 ,f ).

A.18

Proof of Proposition 8

Note that pairwise intersection does not increase the number of attacked polyhedra.
If a sensor is not attacked, then both of its polyhedra (in time k and k+1) contain the
true value; in addition, the map m preserves the correctness of polyhedra, hence any
pairwise intersection will also contain the true value. Thus, the number of attacked
and non-attacked sensors is the same, therefore Proposition 6 implies that the fusion
polyhedron contains the true value.
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A.19

Proof of Proposition 9

Each of the polyhedra computed after pairwise intersection (i.e., m(Pi,k ) ∩ Pi,k+1 )
is a subset of the corresponding polyhedron when no history is used (i.e., Pi,k+1 ).
Consequently, the fusion polyhedron will always be a subset of the fusion polyhedron
obtained when no history is used.

A.20

Proof of Theorem 10

First suppose the first statement is true. We argue that the optimal strategy for the
attacker is to attack on both sides of seen intervals. For any Il ∈ C R , Il must overlap
with at least one point in SC S ∪∆,0 (the overlap must contain the true state) and since
|Il | ≤ (|amin | − |SC S ∪∆,0 |)/2 then Il will necessarily overlap with all malicious sensors
implementing the above strategy. Note that since f < dn/2e, the fusion interval
cannot be larger than the union of all correct intervals. Therefore, this strategy is
optimal because the attacker can guarantee that all her intervals contain all correct
intervals. Figure 4.9a illustrates this case. All seen correct intervals coincide, and
the attacker’s intervals are large enough to guarantee that attacking on both sides
will make sure all unseen intervals are included.
Now suppose the second case is true. Then the attacked intervals are large
enough to contain both ln−f −fa and un−f −fa , thus making sure the fusion interval
is [ln−f −fa , un−f −fa ]. This attack is optimal since the unseen intervals are all small
enough to not change the positions of points un−f −fa and ln−f −fa . Figure 4.9b
presents an example of this case. The unseen interval, I3 , cannot change the largest
and smallest points contained in at least one correct interval.
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A.21

Proof of Theorem 11

Let Il and Iu be the two correct intervals with smallest lower bound and largest
upper bound, respectively. Since f < dn/2e, the lower bound of SN ,f cannot be
smaller than the lower bound of Il and its upper bound cannot be larger than the
upper bound of Iu . Thus, the width of SN ,f is bounded by the sum of the widths of
Il and Iu because any two correct intervals must intersect. Hence, the width of SN ,f
is bounded by the sum of the two largest correct intervals.

A.22

Proof of Theorem 12

Note that |SF | < |Sna | is impossible since the attacker can send the correct measurements from her sensors. Thus, suppose |SF | > |Sna |. Let SC,0 be the intersection of
the correct intervals in the configuration that achieves SF . Suppose SF extends SC,0
on the right (note that the argument for the left side is symmetric) by some distance
d and let A be the rightmost point contained in SF . Since f < dn/2e, A must lie in
at least one correct interval Ic . Since Ic is correct it must contain SC,0 , which implies
d + |SC,0 | ≤ |Ic | ≤ |Imax |, where Imax is the largest correct interval. Let Ia be any
attacked interval that contains A. Because |Ia | ≥ |Imax |, Ia can be placed to contain
both A and SC,0 . Since this can be done for all attacked intervals containing A, the
same worst-case fusion interval can be achieved if no intervals were attacked.

A.23

Proof of Theorem 13

Note that if |Sfwc
| = |Sna |, the theorem follows trivially. Consider the case |Sfwc
|>
a
a
|Sna |. Suppose |Sfwc
| is not achievable if the fa smallest intervals are attacked. Let
a
S be the configuration with fa corrupted intervals that achieves |Sfwc
| and let A be
a
the rightmost point in Sfwc
. Since |Sfwc
| > |Sna | there exists an interval Ia ∈ S that
a
a
does not contain the true state but contains A. Let Nsmall be the set of fa smallest
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intervals. If Ia ∈ Nsmall for all such Ia then Sfwc
is achievable if Nsmall is under attack
a
and the theorem follows.
Now suppose there exists an Ia as above such that Ia ∈
/ Nsmall . Then there exists
an interval Ismall ∈ Nsmall that is not under attack. If we swap Ia and Ismall such
that Ismall now contains A and Ia contains the old interval Ismall , Ia is made correct
and Ismall corrupted while preserving the size of the fusion interval. Since we can do
| can be achieved if Nsmall is under attack.
the same for all such Ia , |Sfwc
a

A.24

Proof of Theorem 14

The proof of optimality mirrors the proof of optimality of the Earliest Deadline
First (EDF) scheduling algorithm. Suppose there exists a schedule s that is better
than the proposed here. Then s contains a round k in which a sensor si produces
a faulty measurement and sensor sj does not, even though sj has more “unused”
faulty measurements.
Suppose sj ’s next scheduled faulty measurement according to s is at time k 0 > k.
Without loss of generality, we can assume si does not have a faulty measurement at
k 0 .1 Then by swapping sj and si ’s faulty measurements, i.e. making si ’s measurement faulty at time k 0 and sj ’s faulty at time k, we do not affect the magnitude of E
(since the number of faulty measurements in each round remains the same). By replacing all such pairs we eventually transform s into a new schedule s0 that is exactly
the schedule suggested by the proposed algorithm here. Therefore, Algorithm 3 is
optimal.
Since sj has more remaining faulty measurements, there exists a time k 0 when sj provides a
faulty measurement and si does not. If no such time exists, then we can remove the “scheduled”
faulty measurement by si at time k and replace it with a faulty measurement by sj (still within its
TFM).
1
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A.25

Proof of Proposition 10

First note that the mapping function m is called O(W 2 ) times (line 3 inside the loop).
Additionally, computing the fusion polyhedron in F PC (line 6) requires O(W log W )
time (as shown in [136], the sensor fusion algorithm takes O(n log n) time, where n
is the number of sensors).
As for the second claim, note that the cost of obtaining one element of F P is
again O(n log n), i.e., one run of the sensor fusion algorithm. Since the size of F P
is W , the claim follows.

A.26

Proof of Lemma 3

Since the two polyhedra have an empty intersection, the true state can lie in at most
one of them, i.e., at least one of them cannot contain the true state.

A.27

Proof of Lemma 4

Note that a weak inconsistency at time k 0 implies at least one sensor provides a
faulty measurement at k 0 , hence the premise implies that the number of faulty measurements in both sensors combined is also greater than ei + ej . This means that,
in a window of size min(wi , wj ), either si has at least ei faulty measurements or sj
has at least ej faulty measurements. In turn, this implies that one of them must be
non-transiently faulty.

A.28

Proof of Theorem 15

If two sensors are strongly inconsistent, then one of them must be non-transiently
faulty. Since non-transient faults are equivalent to attacks in this work, the Lemma
follows.
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A.29

Proof of Theorem 16

Suppose for a contradiction that si is not attacked. It follows that the d(i) > a sensors
which are strongly inconsistent with si must be attacked. This is a contradiction
because there are at most a attacks.

A.30

Proof of Lemma 5

Note that the premise implies that no strong inconsistency can be found between
any pair of sensors. This is true because even if si and sj are weakly inconsistent
in each round, it is possible that the measurements of si were faulty in the first ei
rounds and correct in the remaining ones, while the measurements of sj were correct
initially and faulty in the last ej rounds. In this way both sensors would be within
their TFMs, and one cannot conclude that an attack exists.

A.31

Proof of Proposition 11

The claim follows from the fact that both Theorems provide sufficient conditions for
the existence of an attack.
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[5] The Dräger Apollo Anesthesia Machine. http://www.draeger.com/sites/enus us/Pages
/Hospital/Apollo.aspx.
[6] Why Intuitive issued a recall for da Vinci surgical system.
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/12/06/intuitive-says-davinci-surgical-system-can-stall-issues-recall. Accessed: 2016-08-26.
[7] The LandShark, 2009. http://blackirobotics.com/LandShark UGV UC0M.html.
[8] US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Investigation pe 16-007.
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.pdf.
[9] T. Alpcan and T. Basar. A game theoretic analysis of intrusion detection
in access control systems. In Decision and Control, 2004. CDC. 43rd IEEE
Conference on, volume 2, pages 1568–1573. IEEE, 2004.
[10] S. Amin, A. Cárdenas, and S. Sastry. Safe and secure networked control systems under denial-of-service attacks. In International Workshop on Hybrid
Systems: Computation and Control, pages 31–45. Springer, 2009.
[11] S. Amin, G. A. Schwartz, and S. S. Sastry. On the interdependence of reliability
and security in networked control systems. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, pages 4078–4083.
IEEE, 2011.
184

[12] S. Amin, G. A. Schwartz, and S. S. Sastry. Security of interdependent and
identical networked control systems. Automatica, 49(1):186–192, 2013.
[13] R. Anati, D. Scaramuzza, K. Derpanis, and K. Daniilidis. Robot localization
using soft object detection. In IEEE Int. Conf. on Robotics and Automation
(ICRA), pages 4992–4999, 2012.
[14] B. D. O. Anderson and J. B. Moore. Optimal filtering. Courier Corporation,
2012.
[15] R. Anderson. Security engineering. John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
[16] D. Arney, M. Pajic, J. Goldman, I. Lee, R. Mangharam, and O. Sokolsky.
Toward patient safety in closed-loop medical device systems. In Proceedings of
the 1st International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, pages 139–148,
2010.
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